Wandering Virtues: Modesty, Patience, and Loyalty in Clinical Medicine by Murphy, Alan Christopher
  
 
Wandering Virtues: 
Modesty, Patience, and Loyalty in Clinical Medicine 
 
 
By 
 
Alan Christopher Murphy 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
Religion 
May, 2016 
Nashville, Tennessee 
 
Approved: 
Larry Churchill, Ph.D. 
Victor Anderson, Ph.D. 
Volney Gay, Ph.D. 
Keith Meador, M.D. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2016 by Alan Murphy 
All Rights Reserved
 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
These few pages are hardly sufficient to convey my thanks to the numerous people who 
have made this dissertation possible. The customary brevity of the acknowledgments section 
stands in sharp contrast to the depth of my appreciation. 
Pride of place goes to my dissertation director, Larry Churchill, who has been unfailingly 
generous, judicious, and wise in his guidance to me since I first met him three years ago, not only 
with respect to this dissertation, but also with respect to the field of medical ethics and to the 
moral life. Each of the other members of my committee has similarly contributed to my 
professional and personal development far beyond the limits of this dissertation. Without Victor 
Anderson’s invitation to Vanderbilt four years ago and sage advice since then, I would never have 
had the chance to begin this dissertation. Without Volney Gay’s insights, my understanding of 
ethics, psychology, and religion would have been sadly diminished. And without Keith Meador’s 
invitation to Vanderbilt’s Center for Biomedical Ethics and Society, I would not have found what 
I now regard as my natural academic and professional home. 
Many others at Vanderbilt have supported me during my studies. Though he never 
officially held the title, James Byrd has acted as a third advisor, keeping me on track and helping 
me fulfill my service obligations in ways that were hopefully beneficial to the university and that 
certainly have been beneficial to me. Karen Eardley has effectively been yet another advisor: 
without her, I would probably still be trying to register for my first semester of classes. The entire 
staff of Vanderbilt’s Office of Risk and Insurance Management is wonderful, but I would be 
remiss if I did not expressly thank Melissa Ahler, Betty Barrow, Sandy Bledsoe, Diane Moat, and 
 
iv 
Holly Larson for allowing me to do the best student job imaginable and for teaching me so much 
about compassionate, professional medicine along the way. 
I owe a special debt to the people of Vanderbilt’s Center for Biomedical Ethics and 
Society. In addition to their support for my research and writing, Profs. Churchill and Meador 
have welcomed me warmly into the life of the Center. Joe Fanning has been unstinting with his 
time and support as he has prepared me for the practical work of clinical ethics. Russell McIntire 
Jr. not only gave me the invaluable chance to teach in my field, but taught me what it is to be an 
educator all the way through. Elizabeth Heitman has shaped this dissertation and my thinking 
about medical ethics with her timely advice and encouragement. Kate Payne has generously 
shared her tremendous experience and expertise in clinical ethics consultation with me since 
joining the Center last year. Jessica Bratt Carle and John Compton have sharpened my thinking 
about many things, including this dissertation, in the numerous conversations they have 
graciously shared with me. And everyone at the Center knows that the whole office would fall 
apart without Denise Lillard’s diligence and good humor. While I am proud to complete this 
dissertation and begin the professional life for which the Center has prepared me, I am sad to 
leave a place that has become a home away from home and to leave people who have given me 
so much. 
Last (but by no means least), I thank my family members for the unflagging 
encouragement they have given me since long before I knew Vanderbilt was in my future. My 
parents-in-law, Mark and Carla Sullivan, have exhibited patience and confidence bordering on 
the heroic as they have encouraged their daughter’s husband in his (debatably rash) pursuit of a 
Ph.D. in the humanities. My brother, Ryan Murphy, though specialized in the far more practical 
 
v 
fields of architecture and engineering, has over the years given me exceptionally incisive 
feedback on my work, to my great benefit. My parents, Richard and Patricia Murphy, have 
supplied tremendous material support over decades of education. Even more importantly, Mom 
and Dad have supported me with their virtues when my own have failed me; my faith, fortitude, 
hope, and prudence did not carry me here on their own. Finally, my wife, Kristen Sullivan, is a 
blessing to me and to everyone she meets. It is no exaggeration to write that I could not have 
done any of this without her. Many of the authors I consider herein have theories about what 
motivates people to put on virtue, but I have little personal need for this theorizing: I am lucky 
to share my life with the person who is my foremost reason to strive to be better than I am. 
This dissertation is devoted to the virtues of modesty, patience, and loyalty, but it is 
possible only because my family is exemplary with respect to love, the greatest virtue of all.
 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................................................... iii 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 
1. Two Landmarks in the Field of Virtue ......................................................................................................... 4 
Introduction to the First Chapter ................................................................................................................. 4 
Eudaimonia ........................................................................................................................................................... 8 
 Aristotle’s Account of Eudaimonia ..................................................................................................... 10 
 Neo-Aristotelian Interpretations of Eudaimonia .......................................................................... 14 
 Thomas Aquinas’s Theological Revision of Eudaimonia ............................................................ 18 
 Present-Day Theorists Dissatisfied with Eudaimonia ................................................................. 19 
The Unity of the Virtues ................................................................................................................................. 24 
 Plato’s Account of the Unity of the Virtues ...................................................................................... 25 
 Present-Day Platonic Accounts of the Unity of the Virtues ....................................................... 28 
 Aristotle’s Account of Phronesis ......................................................................................................... 31 
 Later Aristotelian Accounts of Phronesis ........................................................................................ 33 
 Present-Day Complaints against Phronesis .................................................................................... 37 
 Limited Unity of the Virtues ................................................................................................................. 45 
Chapter Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 52 
2. Wandering Virtues .......................................................................................................................................... 54 
Surveying the Terrain beyond the Landmarks of Eudaimonia and the Unity of the Virtues 54 
A General Definition of Virtue ..................................................................................................................... 55 
 Aristotle’s Definition of Virtue ............................................................................................................. 56 
 David Hume’s Description of Virtue .................................................................................................. 58 
 Christine Swanton’s Humean Virtue ................................................................................................. 59 
 Judith Andre’s Contemporary Buddhist Virtue ............................................................................. 60 
 A Working Definition of Virtue ............................................................................................................ 62 
Defining Wandering Virtues Constructively .......................................................................................... 64 
 The Source of the Label .......................................................................................................................... 65 
 A Formal Definition of Wandering Virtues ..................................................................................... 66 
 Charity, an Antithesis of Wandering Virtue .................................................................................... 69 
 Courage, Almost a Wandering Virtue ................................................................................................ 71 
 Hope, Possibly a Wandering Virtue .................................................................................................... 72 
 
vii 
Defining Wandering Virtues Critically ..................................................................................................... 74 
 Splendid Vices ............................................................................................................................................ 75 
 Feelings and Passions .............................................................................................................................. 79 
 Natural Virtues .......................................................................................................................................... 81 
 Executive Virtues ...................................................................................................................................... 82 
 Virtues-In-Excess ...................................................................................................................................... 84 
 Partial Virtues ............................................................................................................................................ 87 
 Feedback Loops ......................................................................................................................................... 89 
 Principles ..................................................................................................................................................... 91 
 Consequentialist Satisficing .................................................................................................................. 94 
Chapter Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 98 
3. Modesty ............................................................................................................................................................... 99 
Delimiting the Virtue of Modesty ............................................................................................................... 99 
Is Modesty a Vice? .......................................................................................................................................... 102 
G. K. Chesterton on Modesty ..................................................................................................................... 105 
Is Modesty the Achilles’s Heel of Virtue Ethics? .................................................................................. 107 
Judith Andre on Humility ............................................................................................................................ 113 
Modesty as a Wandering Virtue ................................................................................................................ 115 
Modesty and Medical Prognosis ............................................................................................................... 122 
 A Vignette of Medical Prognosis ....................................................................................................... 126 
 Analyzing the Vignette in Light of Wandering Modesty ........................................................... 129 
Chapter Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 135 
4.  Patience ............................................................................................................................................................. 136 
Robert Kaster’s Analysis of Roman Patientia ....................................................................................... 136 
The Virtue of Patience as a Feature of Talcott Parson’s “Sick Role” ............................................ 139 
Distinguishing Patience from Delayed Gratification ........................................................................ 142 
Patience Satisfies the Second Requirement for Wandering Virtues ............................................ 145 
Patience Also Satisfies the First and Third Requirements for Wandering Virtues ................. 152 
The Patient Hospital Patience and Lapses in Emergent Health Care ......................................... 155 
The Patient Hospital Patience and Avoidable Hospital Readmissions ....................................... 159 
Chapter Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 162 
5. Loyalty ................................................................................................................................................................ 163 
Is Loyalty a Virtue? ........................................................................................................................................ 163 
Strategies to Salvage the Virtue of Loyalty ............................................................................................ 164 
Simon Keller’s Argument against Regarding Loyalty as a Virtue .................................................. 168 
Josiah Royce’s Argument for the Centrality of Loyalty to Ethics ................................................... 172 
Loyalty as a Wandering Virtue .................................................................................................................. 179 
Wandering Loyalty, Doctor–Patient Confidentiality, and Harms to Third Parties ................ 186 
Wandering Loyalty, Transplant Programs, and Transplant Patients .......................................... 190 
 
viii 
Chapter Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 197 
Conclusion: Unsafe Virtues in an Unsafe World ........................................................................................ 199 
WORKS CITED ....................................................................................................................................................... 203
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Virtue has long figured in discussions of medical ethics and, after a period of some neglect 
in the middle of the twentieth century, is now firmly re-established as part of ethical reflection 
in clinical medicine.1 However, some virtues are more popular than others. The cardinal virtues 
of fortitude, prudence, temperance, and justice and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and 
charity are thoroughly treated.2 But other virtues, such as modesty, patience, and loyalty, are less 
frequently discussed in the literature of both medical ethics and virtue ethics. 
I argue that these latter virtues are neglected in part because they fit uneasily within 
standard models of virtue ethics. In common usage, we do not find it strange to hear it said of 
someone that “he’s modest to a fault” or “she’s too loyal for her own good,” as if being too virtuous 
were actually a shortcoming. But many virtue ethics deny that it is ever possible for any genuine 
virtue to have this problem. Anything that appears to be a virtue, but that might otherwise be 
better, is specious at best and vicious at worst. 
Two venerable doctrines in virtue ethics buttress this position: (1) that all particular 
virtues have a common end in eudaimonia, that is, distinctively human flourishing, and (2) that 
any particular virtue entails all other virtues (“the unity of the virtues”). Even independent of the 
other, either of these makes it implausible to think that any genuine virtue should give rise to any 
                                                            
1 With regard to virtue’s long history in medical ethics, see one of the earliest works on medical ethics written in 
English: Thomas Percival, Medical Ethics; Or, A Code of Institutes and Precepts, Adapted to the Professional Conduct 
of Physicians and Surgeons (Manchester: S. Russell, 1803). 
2 In no small part, the increased visibility of virtue in medical ethics is due to the tireless work of the late Edmund 
Pellegrino and David Thomasma. Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma, The Christian Virtues in Medical 
Practice, ed. David G. Miller (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996); Edmund D. Pellegrino and 
David C. Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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moral difficulty when appropriately understood and applied. Together, as they are often 
presented, these doctrines make it impossible that genuine virtues should be anything but 
unmitigated excellence. 
This dissertation is divided into two related sections. The first section, comprising 
chapters one and two, examines eudaimonism and the unity of the virtues and investigates the 
form virtue might take in their absence. In the first chapter, I distinguish eudaimonia and the 
unity of the virtues from one another. Although they are commonly presented together 
(especially in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics), I disentangle each doctrine from the other and show 
that either ensures that any particular, genuine virtue must reliably conduce to the good. I then 
review and examine objections to each doctrine from both within and without the virtue ethics 
tradition. In the second chapter, I offer an account of what virtues could become in the absence 
of these two doctrines from virtue ethics. Without reference to the familiar landmarks of 
eudaimonia and the unity of the virtues, some virtues have a tendency to drift farther than others, 
especially those virtues that are not clearly bounded by coordinate vices of deficiency and 
extremity and that do not include references to the values of others. In this environment, these 
peculiar virtues encourage neglect of other virtues. Some traditional virtue ethics are so worried 
about such a prospect that they deny that these virtues are genuine virtues at all, or at least deny 
that these virtues are such apart from eudaimonia, the unity of the virtues, or other extensive 
hedges and restrictions on what counts as a virtue. I argue, however, that these virtues are 
genuine and worthy of close investigation precisely because of their propensity to give rise to 
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trouble. Borrowing a phrase from G. K. Chesterton without sharing his censure, I label these 
peculiar virtues “wandering virtues.”3 
The second section of the dissertation, comprising chapters three through five, is 
practical evidence that these wandering virtues can be described coherently and can help clarify 
classic and contemporary difficulties in clinical ethics. My procedure in treating modesty 
(chapter three), patience (chapter four), and loyalty (chapter five) is roughly parallel. In each 
case, I review and examine important accounts of these virtues, finding that while most of these 
accounts have considerable merit, all omit something important about these peculiar virtues. I 
then offer an account of the particular virtue as a wandering virtue and demonstrate the 
plausibility of this account by applying the wandering virtue to classic or contemporary 
problems in medical ethics in order to demonstrate the usefulness of treating the virtue as a 
wandering virtue.
                                                            
3 Gilbert K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (London: The Bodley Head, 1908), 38-39. 
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CHAPTER 1 
TWO LANDMARKS IN THE FIELD OF VIRTUE 
Introduction to the First Chapter 
I argue against one appealing, common-sense intuition about the virtues: that all genuine 
virtues reliably conduce to the good. In turn, I argue in favor of a conflicting common-sense 
intuition about the virtues: that with regard to certain, specific, genuine virtues, it is possible to 
be too virtuous for one’s own good or for the good in general. 
The first intuition, that all genuine virtues reliably conduce to the good, has clear appeal. 
Part of the appeal lies in what this intuition avoids. If virtues do not necessarily conduce to the 
good, we can find ourselves in the apparently paradoxical situation of commending a particular 
virtue with no assurance that those who possess that virtue will thereby become better persons 
or otherwise improve the world. Indeed, severing the strict connection between virtue and the 
good opens the door to virtues that could actually detract from the overall character of their 
possessors or lead to worse lives, rather than better ones. It seems incoherent to urge that 
persons who possess a particular virtue — modesty, for instance — may be more virtuous for 
possessing that virtue and simultaneously be diminished in character for possessing that same 
virtue. If we insist that all genuine virtues reliably conduce to the good, we avoid the dilemma 
and preserve all genuine, specific virtues as unqualified goods. 
More than simply avoiding a pitfall, the intuition that all genuine virtues uniformly 
conduce to good human character has positive contributions to make as well. Normatively, 
making the contribution to good (or excellent) character a requirement for virtue should make 
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it easier to identify which traits or habits are in fact virtues, as opposed to vices or incidental 
variations in personality. Stated more formally, if something is a virtue, then it uniformly 
conduces to the good (with the contrapositive that if something does not uniformly conduce to 
the good, then it is not a virtue). 
Framing the requirement conditionally, as above, illuminates two challenges that this 
thesis faces. First, requiring that all genuine virtues uniformly conduce to the good human 
character can result in an apophatic approach to the virtues, as the conditional shows. If 
something is a virtue, then we know that it uniformly conduces to the good, and if something 
does not conduce to the good, then we know that it is not a virtue. Even presuming a substantive 
account of the good or of good human character, we cannot ascertain which habits are virtues; 
we may only be able to specify which habits are not virtues. This sort of negative approach can 
still be productive in its own way, as Rosalind Hursthouse observes in connection with the 
related question of how the particular virtues and vices help us guide our lives: 
[A]lthough our list of generally recognized virtue terms is, I think, quite short, our list of vice terms is 
remarkably — and usefully — long, far exceeding anything that anyone who thinks in terms of standard 
deontological rules has ever come up with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from avoiding courses 
of action that are irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, indiscreet, 
incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, hypocritical, self-indulgent, materialistic, grasping, 
short-sighted, … and on and on.4 
Making the necessary changes to Hursthouse’s illustration, the requirement that all 
genuine virtues uniformly conduce to the good may not tell us what the specific virtues are, but 
it can certainly yield a very long list of habits that are not virtues. Whatever the usefulness of 
being able to say which habits are not virtues, the intuition that all genuine virtues reliably 
                                                            
4 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 41-42. 
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conduce to the good does not necessarily establish what the specific virtues are, even once good 
human character is defined. 
The second problem that the requirement faces is exactly this matter of definition. 
Requiring that any genuine virtue contribute to the good leaves open the question of what 
constitutes the good. Requiring that all genuine virtues uniformly contribute to the good (at a 
minimum, to good character) evidently makes some progress on the difficult task of specifying 
the virtues, but it defers the difficulty to what may prove to be a much more vexing question: 
what constitutes the good? One solution would be to make the condition of reliably conducing 
to the good both necessary and sufficient for the status of virtue, so that all those things that 
uniformly conduce to the true good are virtues, and that all virtues in turn uniformly conduce to 
the good. The co-extension of virtue and things conducive to the good is entailed by any 
argument that virtue is sufficient for moral success. However, the co-extension of virtue and 
things conducive to good character has been questioned since the dawn of Western moral 
reflection. Aristotle apparently rejected it, urging that some features of a person’s life uniformly 
conduced to good character (health and wealth notable among them) without qualifying as 
virtues.5 More recently, Bernard Williams famously argued that a great many contingent, 
apparently non-moral factors conduce to (and may even be central to) moral success, including 
the good generally and good character specifically.6 One might reply that externalities conducive 
to good character (such as Aristotle’s) tend not to be habits, so that it might still be possible that 
all habits that reliably conduce to good character are virtues; against Williams, one might urge 
                                                            
5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098b-1100a (in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Joe Sachs [Newburyport, 
MA: Focus, 2002], 13-15), 1179a (in Sachs, 195-196). 
6 Bernard Williams, “Moral Luck,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 20–39. 
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that habits that only coincidentally conduce to good character are not really reliable, and so 
would not count as virtues, either. These replies are often inherent in a particular author’s 
definition of virtue, but Aristotle’s and Williams’s points are still well-taken: virtue may not be 
sufficient for moral success, and in fact virtue may not even be the most important contributor 
to moral success in some instances. Severing virtue from tangible moral success (e.g., manifest 
good character) can curtail our ability to describe the good or good character in concrete terms. 
I will consider this point in greater detail further down in connection with eudaimonia. For now, 
it will suffice to remark that we can get into difficulties if we rest our specification of the virtues 
upon a definition of the good or of good human character when we may not all agree on what 
that good would look like. 
Despite these structural challenges, two venerable lines of argument in virtue ethics 
buttress the intuition that all genuine virtues uniformly conduce to the good: (1) that all 
particular virtues have a common end in eudaimonia, often rendered as distinctively human 
flourishing, and (2) that any particular virtue entails all other virtues (often labeled “the unity of 
the virtues” thesis). Even independent of the other, either of these doctrines makes it implausible 
to think that any genuine virtue could do anything but conduce to the good.7 Together, as they 
are often presented, these doctrines make it impossible that genuine virtue should be anything 
but unmitigated excellence. 
                                                            
7 Thomas Hurka is a rare dissenting voice with regard to eudaimonism: on Hurka’s account, it is one of 
eudaimonism’s failures that it “does not view moral virtue as intrinsically preferable to moral vice; considered 
apart from their effects, vicious acts can embody high perfection.” However, this may be attributable to Hurka’s 
determination to shoehorn eudaimonism (what he prefers to call “narrow” or “pure perfectionism”) into an 
idiosyncratic hybrid consequentialist–deontological framework, rather than a theory of virtue. Scant attention to 
eudaimonism among consequentialists and deontologists may be the neglect that Hurka has in mind when he 
laments “philosophers’ long neglect of perfectionism,” despite the fact that nascent virtue ethicists had revived 
interest in eudaimonism decades prior. Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
190, 5. 
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In this first chapter, I treat eudaimonia and the unity of the virtues separately from one 
another. Although these are commonly presented together (especially in Aristotelian virtue 
ethics), I show that each doctrine independently ensures that any particular, genuine virtue must 
invariably conduce to the good in some way. I review and examine objections to both doctrines 
from within and without the virtue ethics tradition. 
Eudaimonia 
The Aristotelian doctrine that all specific virtues have a common end in eudaimonia 
(variously translated as blessedness, happiness, or human flourishing) is essentially a 
specification of the intuition that all virtues uniformly conduce to the good. In place of a generic 
good, however, eudaimonia is the good that is good for humans, not externally or instrumentally, 
but internally and inherently. For instance, it is better that humans have food than that they not, 
but food is not part of eudaimonia. However, both the pleasure derived from food and the virtue 
by which humans enjoy food appropriately (sophrosyne or temperance) are often held to be part 
of eudaimonia. In contradistinction to the hedonists and utilitarians, Aristotle is fairly consistent 
that eudaimonia is not the end result of a human living a life that is consistently pleasant or 
conducive to the pleasure of the community; in contradistinction to deontologists, Aristotle is 
very clear that eudaimonia is not the result of a dutiful life. Rather, eudaimonia is the result of a 
human life excellently or nobly lived within a context that admits of such excellence or nobility. 
Beyond this, the meaning behind eudaimonia is vague. Aristotle tends to appeal to and 
subsequently adapt received opinion about eudaimonia; with the passage of time, Aristotle’s 
interpreters have rendered eudaimonia in various ways and with different emphases among 
them. Thomas Aquinas and the moral theologians who followed him deliberately altered 
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Aristotelian eudaimonia to reorient it toward an end that Aristotle (and many present-day neo-
Aristotelian ethicists) would not have shared: the Christian God. 
In this section, I first rehearse Aristotle’s use of eudaimonia in his best-known work on 
ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics. Second, I review some notable present-day neo-Aristotelian 
interpretations of eudaimonia. Third, I acknowledge Aquinas’s theological revision of 
eudaimonia. Finally, I review complaints against the concept of eudaimonia. 
Two words of caution are in order at the outset: the first concerns my philosophical 
exegesis, while the second concerns my historical comprehensiveness. I have taken care to 
present credible interpretations of the figures I include, but this dissertation is not primarily 
interested in expositing and defending a single, correct interpretation of Aquinas, Aristotle, 
Plato, or any other seminal figure in ethics. For instance, the “Aristotle” I present is the Aristotle 
that seems most plausible to me on the basis of my non-specialist reading of his works and the 
commentators I cite, who are (of necessity) only a minute sample of those who have read and 
commented upon Aristotle’s works throughout the centuries. Similarly, I make no claim to 
historical comprehensiveness with regard to the exposition of either eudaimonia or the unity of 
the virtues. I have selected figures either because they are obviously central (Aquinas, Aristotle, 
Plato) or because their angles on the ideas seem to me to be importantly different from those of 
the best-known champions of eudaimonia and the unity of the virtues. I am only imperfectly 
insulated against claims that I have somehow misunderstood the major figures and ideas that I 
examine. But I have ensured that if I have fallen prey to misunderstanding, I am at least in good 
company. 
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Aristotle's Account Of Eudaimonia 
Aristotle acknowledges early in his Nicomachean Ethics that eudaimonia is central to 
many accounts of the sorts of traits or habits persons ought to cultivate, that is, eudaimonia is 
central to accounts of good character. Aristotle also acknowledges from the beginning that 
opinions about eudaimonia markedly differ. 
Some people take it to be something visible and obvious, such as pleasure or wealth or honor, and different 
ones say different things, and even the same person often says different things; when sick one thinks it is 
health but when poor, that it is wealth, and when they are conscious of ignorance in themselves, people 
marvel at those who say it is something grand and above them.8 
Aristotle’s own account of eudaimonia is something less visible and obvious than 
pleasure, wealth, or honor. Aristotle first distinguishes eudaimonia from the ends set before 
plants and animals. Aristotle observes that all life is capable of nutrition and growth, and so these 
are hardly exhaustive ends for human living. Aristotle allows that animals in general improve 
upon plants by exhibiting perception of and response to their context, but Aristotle thinks that 
bare perception and reaction, common to all animals, is hardly appropriate for humans, either. 
Aristotle distinguishes humans from all other life on the basis of speech and reason, and so finds 
that eudaimonia, whatever it is, must “put[] into action that in us that has articulate speech; of 
this capacity, one aspect is that it is able to be persuaded by reason, while the other is what has 
reason and thinks things through.”9 Eudaimonia, then, is peculiar to humans on Aristotle’s 
account. 
However, establishing eudaimonia as specific to reasoning humans is hardly adequate for 
the work of ethics. Some patently deplorable things seem peculiar to human reason: organized 
genocide, for instance. Moreover, human reason enables many less offensive things that we 
                                                            
8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a (in Sachs, 3). 
9 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a (in Sachs, 11). 
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would hardly wish to identify with ethics or the good. However much insight was required to 
recognize and exploit the potential of pumpkin pie seasoning in the mid-2000s, we would 
probably not congratulate the producers of now-ubiquitous “pumpkin spice” coffees, pastries, 
alcohol, candles, candies, and air fresheners for those producers’ contributions to the moral 
improvement of humanity. Although Aristotle never had to endure “pumpkin spice” season, he 
did recognize that human reasonableness was in itself hardly satisfactory as a definition for the 
end at which human action ought to aim. Thus Aristotle proposes a narrower account of 
eudaimonia: 
[I]f […] we set down that the work of a human being is a certain sort of life, while this life consists of a being-
at-work of the soul and actions that go along with reason, and it belongs to a man of serious stature to do 
these things well and beautifully, while each thing is accomplished well as a result of the virtue appropriate 
to it — if this is so, the human good comes to be disclosed as a being-at-work of the soul in accordance with 
virtue, and if the virtues are more than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue. But also, 
this must be in a complete life, for […] one day or a short time does not make a person blessed and happy.10 
At first blush, Aristotle here seems to define eudaimonia as a life lived “in accordance with 
the best and most complete virtue[,]” so that eudaimonia is equivalent with a life that is entirely 
virtuous (the view sometimes attributed to the Stoics). But closer examination shows that 
Aristotle is not arguing for quite this position. Aristotle urges that eudaimonia is made known in 
the finished lives of those who live out all the virtues, not that eudaimonia simply is the sum of 
virtue. And it turns out that several of the particular virtues, through which the happy and 
blessed person is to disclose valuable information about eudaimonia, are available only to people 
who, in more modern parlance, are lucky enough to have the opportunity to exhibit them. Close 
friendship is one such contingent virtue,11 while magnificence is another.12 Aristotle is persuaded 
                                                            
10 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a (in Sachs, 11-12). 
11 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1156b (in Sachs, 148). 
12 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1122a-1123a (in Sachs, 63-66). 
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that very few people will actually be fortunate enough to encounter other people deserving of 
close friendship. By definition, few people will be in situations to exhibit the virtue of 
magnificence, concerned as it is with tasteful employment of extreme wealth. Most people, even 
if thoroughly virtuous to the extent that their circumstances allow, will not be able to inform us 
about those features of eudaimonia having to do with close friendship, and probably still fewer 
will be able to inform us about those features of eudaimonia having to do with magnificence. 
Thus Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia construes virtue in the way mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter: all genuine virtues reliably conduce to the human good of eudaimonia, but 
eudaimonia is not necessarily co-extensive with the sum of any particular person’s virtue, or even 
with virtue per se insofar as the opportunity possess some virtues is apparently dependent on 
externalities. The thoroughly virtuous person may still, by fate or chance, be in circumstances in 
which specific virtues are totally inaccessible to her/him. Only those who are themselves reliably 
virtuous and who are lucky enough to be born into the right circumstances can give more 
comprehensive insight into eudaimonia in their finished lives. 
Aristotle’s provisional account of eudaimonia would seem to depart somewhat from his 
commitment to the centrality of human reasonableness, in that it refers to the excellent activity 
of virtue or of specific virtues, rather than to reasoning per se. While the particular virtues that 
Aristotle uses to fill in his early outline of eudaimonia are always connected in execution to 
human reasoning or judgment (on which more later in this chapter), these particular virtues do 
not have reasoning as their end. The virtue of magnificence, for instance, is concerned with 
making “lavish expenditures” well. While the “magnificent person seems like someone with 
knowledge, for such a person is able to contemplate what is fitting and to spend great amounts 
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in a harmonious way[,]” the virtue of magnificence is ultimately concerned with making tasteful 
use of extreme wealth, not with, say, using extreme wealth to advance human reason and 
knowledge.13 
Ultimately, Aristotle does return to a definition of eudaimonia that links it closely to what 
Aristotle originally identified as the distinctively human capacities, our ability to be persuaded 
by reasons and to think things through, though now it is linked closely to the specific virtues such 
as friendship and magnificence. Eudaimonia’s crowning glory is contemplation of truth, the 
activity characteristic of philosophy, which “is the most powerful (since the intellect is the most 
powerful of the things in us, and the things with which the intellect is concerned are the most 
powerful of the things that can be known); it is also the most continuous, for we are more able to 
contemplate continuously than to act in any way whatever.”14 Aristotle goes further and 
analogizes to the divine, arguing that it becomes clear that eudaimonia must be a contemplative 
activity, because this is the only characteristic activity of gods would be contemplation, who 
neither act for worldly advantage nor to make things for their use.15 Even so, Aristotle is quick to 
point out that humans are not gods; having bodies and existing in society, the virtues that 
concern feelings and political existence are pertinent to eudaimonia, even if neither would be 
important to gods.16 Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia features contemplation very prominently, 
but includes full realization of all the particular virtues and, necessarily, the external conditions 
that would allow a person to actually develop all of those virtues. 
                                                            
13 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1122a-1123a (in Sachs, 63-66). 
14 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a (in Sachs, 191-192). 
15 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1178b (in Sachs, 194-195). 
16 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1178a-1178b (in Sachs, 193-195). 
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Neo-Aristotelian Interpretations of Eudaimonia 
Subsequent interpreters of Aristotle have sought to clarify — and in clarifying, to alter — 
Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia in ways that serve their convictions about what should and 
should not count as virtue. Thomas Nagel defends an explicitly intellectualist interpretation of 
eudaimonia. Nagel reinforces Aristotle’s conviction that eudaimonia needs to be distinctively 
human so that contemplation is not only privileged in eudaimonia, but is finally exclusive of 
other aspects of flourishing. Aristotle flirts with identifying the human good with that of gods, so 
that contemplation is most important, but draws back and avers that in point of fact humans are 
not gods, so that human flourishing will be more than contemplation. Nagel embraces this 
identification: “Occasionally [reason] may have to serve as the janitor or the pimp of the 
passions, but that is not basically what it is for. On one plausible view reason, despite its continual 
service to the lower functions, is what human life is all about.”17 Nagel does not identify them, 
but it is likely that this account of eudaimonia would put much more emphasis on certain specific 
virtues (the intellectual virtues, in particular) at the expense of others (temperance and other 
virtues concerned with bodily pleasure, for instance). How an intellectualist account of 
eudaimonia would impact overtly political virtues such as justice would depend on how 
persuaded one was by arguments for the inherent reasonableness of a fair and just society. But 
shifting eudaimonia toward the intellectual would certainly de-emphasize some virtues that 
Aristotle thought important to eudaimonia while playing others up.18 
                                                            
17 Thomas Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1980), 11. 
18 See J. L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1980), 15–33, for a thorough argument in support of the view that Aristotle does 
not identify eudaimonia with reason. 
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John McDowell, who is more Platonist than Aristotelian with respect to the unity of the 
virtues, finds Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia credible, provided it is grounded on an account 
of human nature that is, roughly speaking, commensurate with preference-maximizing 
consequentialism. McDowell thinks that the best sense that can be made of eudaimonia is “the 
most satisfying life possible for its subject, circumstanced at each point as he is.”19 Even this, 
McDowell recognizes, is not sufficiently consistent from person to person to guarantee which 
virtues would constitute eudaimonia for any one person. Human nature inevitably constrains 
what humans will prefer, but as a matter of empirical fact, it leaves a lot to individual variation: 
“our common human nature […] limits what we can find intelligible in the way of theses about 
how human beings should conduct their lives, and underlies such possibilities as there are of 
resolving such disputes, or at least of stably adopting one of the competing positions for oneself 
in a reflective way (aware that there are others).”20 If we accept McDowell’s account of 
eudaimonia, we substitute the advantages and problems of preference maximization for the 
problems of Aristotle’s specific account of human flourishing. It is not clear to me that this trade 
preserves enough of the distinctive features of virtue to justify the sacrifice: one of the major 
merits of virtue is its ability to commend an excellent character, not just a sequence of 
preference-maximizing actions, and conflating eudaimonia with preference-maximization 
erodes the distinction. 
Rather than adapt Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia specifically, Rosalind Hursthouse — 
one of the foremost present-day virtue ethicists — prefers to track the broader ancient Greek 
                                                            
19 John McDowell, “The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amélie 
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 370. 
20 Ibid., 371. 
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sense of the word. But Hursthouse finds no satisfactory equivalent to the Greek concept 
eudaimonia in modern English, and so works to weave a web of meaning from several apparently 
disparate English terms. Hursthouse seriously considers two options drawn from conventional 
renderings of the term eudaimonia in English translations of Aristotle’s works: “happiness” and 
“flourishing.” Both have merits and demerits. “Happiness” is deficient insofar as it suggests that 
one’s subjective experience of happiness or contentment is relevant to eudaimonia, when in fact 
eudaimonia is more nearly “the sort of happiness worth having.”21 But Hursthouse acknowledges 
that this is a distinction that survives, albeit not unscathed, in the modern period. We do still 
talk about people who seem, from all outward appearances, subjectively happy and seem to have 
all manner of reasons to be so, and yet we believe that in fact they are not truly happy. Think of 
the familiar archetype in Jane Austen novels, the young woman who marries for some temporal 
gain at the expense of genuine passion or legitimate respect. This young woman is usually 
“happy” to get married and “happy” in her ill-advised marriage initially. But we, the readers, know 
that she is not truly happy, not happy in the ways that the more prominent, wiser, pluckier single 
female character is or will be. Even so, the term “happiness” now carries an almost ineliminable 
taint of subjectivity: if we feel “happy,” it now seems dour if not incoherent to interrogate whether 
we are feeling real happiness or just feeling really happy. Thus Hursthouse thinks “happiness” a 
very imperfect rendering of eudaimonia. “Flourishing” is vexed, too, because we may sensibly talk 
about flourishing vegetable gardens, while only rational beings (humans) can have eudaimonia. 
But unlike “happiness,” “flourishing” does at least suggest, consistent with eudaimonia, that our 
subjective experience can be mistaken, which according to Hursthouse is an advantage. Just as 
                                                            
21 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 10. 
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a person can be mistaken about her/his health or physical flourishing — think of a person with 
undetected, asymptomatic cancer — so too can a person be, on a eudaimonist account, mistaken 
about her/his flourishing with respect to virtue: a person might mistakenly think he is generous 
when in fact he is simply too timid to say “no” to people who ask him for favors. While there is 
no one English word that will suffice, the two notions together suggest that eudaimonia is at least 
integral to human flourishing and is the objectively-valid happiness we ought to want to have as 
humans.22 What Hursthouse accomplishes by her own reflection is primarily theoretical: 
eudaimonia becomes a standard that whose specifics can be debated even while reliably serving 
two functions, particularizing the debate to humans and affirming moral realism. Hursthouse’s 
account of virtue, like those of most neo-Aristotelians, is intimately bound up with eudaimonia. 
According to Hursthouse (whom I take to be representative), “[a] virtue is a character trait a 
human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well.”23 The virtues are (even collectively), 
on Hursthouse’s account, necessary but not sufficient conditions for eudaimonia.24 This is an 
important point insofar as it insulates Hursthouse from the claim that she neglects the role of 
contingency in human happiness and flourishing, but it does nothing to evade the possibilities 
that eudaimonia is circular, in the sense that perhaps the virtues are just those habits you need 
for eudaimonia, and eudaimonia is just that end at which your virtues aim. Hursthouse chooses 
to supplement this, as many neo-Aristotelians do, with a meta-ethically naturalist backstop for 
eudaimonia: eudaimonia can be read, at least in part, from the pages of human nature.25 This will 
encounter, however, the same problems that McDowell sought to solve for Aristotle’s account of 
                                                            
22 Ibid., 9-10. 
23 Ibid., 167. 
24 Ibid., 167-177. 
25 Ibid., 192 ff. 
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eudaimonia, to wit that human nature may not be sufficiently stable from person to person to 
specify the virtues; holding that eudaimonia is distinctively human flourishing as disclosed in 
human nature still leaves many diverse and contradictory patterns of life open, so that the 
specific virtues would not necessarily coordinate with one another. 
Thomas Aquinas's Theological Revision of Eudaimonia 
In the work of Thomas Aquinas, it is expressly the case that all genuine virtues contribute 
to the ultimate end of human beings. Aquinas reprises much of Aristotle’s account of virtues.26 
Aquinas also holds that “Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power[;]”27 that “virtue is a habit 
which is always referred to good[,]” distinct both from habits which could sometimes direct us 
toward the good and at other times toward evil and from habits that direct us invariably toward 
evil, that is, vices;28 and that “one cannot make bad use of virtue” as part of one’s habits or 
character.29 So far, Aquinas tracks Aristotle very closely. But Aquinas’s theological convictions 
lead him to add further elements to his account virtue that make clear that any particular, 
genuine virtue must conduce to the ultimate human good. The infused virtues that God implants 
in humans as part of God’s redemptive work come from a perfect being, and all direct us toward 
our own human perfection, contemplation of God’s glory in the beatific vision. God infuses the 
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, and Aquinas reasons that charity, then hope, and 
then faith are perfected.30 With these, other moral virtues, including the infused versions of the 
                                                            
26 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, first part of the second part, question 64, article 1 (in Thomas Aquinas, 
Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas: The Summa Theologica, The Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. Anton C. Pegis 
[New York: Modern Library, 1948],  605-608). 
27 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, first part of the second part, question 55, article 1 (in Pegis, 561). 
28 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, first part of the second part, question 55, article 4 (in Pegis, 563). 
29 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, first part of the second part, question 55, article 4 (in Pegis, 565). 
30 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, first part of the second part, question 62, article 4 (in Pegis, 596). 
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virtues of justice, fortitude, temperance, prudence, are infused by God so that these, too, can be 
perfected in directing us toward our supernatural, perfect end in God.31 Aquinas’s theological 
convictions supplement Aristotle’s own notion of the innate and unvarying excellence of genuine 
virtue with the idea that the infused virtues are not only all perfectible, but also have a perfect 
end. This expands the sense in which genuine virtue reliably conduces to the good: in fact, all 
genuine virtues reliably conduce to what is perfect. Take the infused, theological virtue of faith, 
for example: it is simply not possible to have too much faith in God if in fact God is perfect and 
one’s ultimate end. So too with the infused equivalent of fortitude: it is not possible to endure too 
much to realize one’s perfect end in God. It is not only credible, but indeed appropriate, to aspire 
not only to perfectly achieve the mean that is virtue, but also to realize the end of this virtue 
infinitely. 
Present-Day Theorists Dissatisfied with Eudaimonia 
Aristotelian eudaimonia has come in for significant critique over the years. But probably 
the most potent criticisms are variations on the conviction that (unlike in Aristotle’s context) 
there now exist radically divergent patterns of life, mutually incompatible and, apparently, 
equally valuable to those who live them. John McDowell sought to avert these by substituting 
preference maximization for eudaimonia, but unless all preferences are commensurable — an 
article of faith in consequentialism but a decidedly contestable one — even this sacrifice will not 
yield a singular eudaimonia. If there is not a single eudaimonia, there cannot be a unified end for 
all the virtues. Or so the line of reasoning proceeds. This is among the conditions of modernity 
that Alasdair MacIntyre laments in his well-known book After Virtue. MacIntyre famous opines, 
                                                            
31 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, first part of the second part, question 63, article 3 (page 602). 
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“The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so much of it is used to 
express disagreements; and the most striking feature of the debates in which these 
disagreements are expressed is their interminable character. […] There seems to be no rational 
way of securing moral agreement in our culture.”32 MacIntyre offers all too familiar examples of 
moral disagreement in the modern period that seem to be totally intractable and incapable of 
resolution, arguing that it is not people’s pig-headedness, but the inadequacy of their moral 
frameworks, that is to blame. MacIntyre attributes the incoherence of virtue and of moral 
discourse more generally in the modern era to two features of modern thought: modern 
thought’s abandonment of “the concept of narrative unity and the concept of practice […] with 
goods internal to itself[.]”33 By this MacIntyre means, among other things, to lament the lack of 
consensus “as to the place of virtue concepts relative to other moral concepts, or as to which 
dispositions are to be included within the catalogue of the virtues or the requirements imposed 
by particular virtues.”34 And MacIntyre means also to lament the ostensibly modern innovation 
of human disagreement about the content of the good and about whether that good was shared 
by definition or only by agreement: 
For it was in [the modern] period that men came to be thought of as in some dangerous measure egoistic 
by nature; and it is only once we think of mankind as by nature dangerously egoistic that altruism becomes 
at once socially necessary and yet apparently impossible and, if and when it occurs, inexplicable. On the 
traditional Aristotelian view such problems do not arise. For what education in the virtues teaches me is 
that my good as a man is one and the same as the good of those others with whom I am bound up in human 
                                                            
32 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1984), 6. 
33 Ibid., 226-227. 
34 Ibid., 226. 
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community. There is no way of my pursuing my good which is necessarily antagonistic to you pursuing 
yours because the good is neither mine peculiarly nor yours peculiarly – goods are not private property.35 
MacIntyre is thus arguing that a fundamental requirement for coherent moral reflection 
is exactly what Aristotle called eudaimonia: a shared good common to all humans that is to be 
realized in unified human lives. MacIntyre ultimately suggests that there is no salvaging coherent 
discourse about morals until the Aristotelian tradition, or at least the two aforesaid concepts, 
are restored as the norm by which moral discourse is to be evaluated.36  
One common rejoinder to MacIntyre is that there really is more moral agreement across 
space and time than his rather dour portrait of modernity suggests. It may well be that we no 
longer share exactly the same conception of eudaimonia, but we may share a common set of 
virtues we think central to any conception of it. Stuart Hampshire offers a plausible explanation 
of how this might work and how it might be obscured: 
Which are the most admired, the most noble and praiseworthy and desirable, human characteristics and 
activities, after reasonable argument and reflection? The arguments are always imprecise and inconclusive; 
but still there is a convergence upon a list of generally recognized and familiar human virtues, which are 
differently ranked and stressed at different times and in different places. Put together in one definite order, 
they can constitute one ideal way of life, a distinct ideal of perfection and completeness, one among 
others.37 
While specific ideals differ, the virtues out of which they are built are largely the same. As 
I am inclined by general disposition to emphasize points of agreement over points of conflict, 
this line of reasoning is very appealing to me. It is practically appealing as well: it suggests that 
addressing a specific virtue held in common may well be helpful to people holding different “ideal 
way[s] of life.” Even if courage, for instance, plays a different role in Adam’s life than in Betty’s, 
the courage of both can inform and improve the courage in each. Hampshire’s position, or one 
                                                            
35 Ibid., 229. 
36 Ibid., 259. 
37 Stuart Hampshire, Two Theories of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 40. 
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like it, will help preserve virtue as useful in the face of disagreement about the particular forms 
that human life ought to take. But Hampshire’s suggestion is less successful in salvaging 
eudaimonia as a guarantee that all virtues conduce to a compatible good. By positioning 
eudaimonia as an idiosyncratic assemblage from a common pool of virtues rather than a 
singular, integrated unity, eudaimonia no longer ensures that all virtues will reliably coordinate 
to the same good. A person’s particular ordering of the virtues might in fact order them in such 
a way that they could conflict with one another, or might so privilege one particular virtue that 
the person’s character and life would suffer dramatically. 
It is possible to assemble a formal account of virtue without reference to eudaimonia at 
all. Christine Swanton, who traces her account of virtue primarily to sources other than Aristotle, 
provisionally defines virtue as “a good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to 
respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way.”38 
Explicitly and deliberately excluded from this definition is any reference to eudaimonia or human 
flourishing, because Swanton believes, as I do, that not all virtues, even genuine ones, conduce 
to human flourishing. However, some of Swanton’s evidence that genuine virtue does not 
conduce to human flourishing rests either on an understanding of eudaimonia so deflated that 
arguing from it borders on begging the question, and on this point Swanton and I part company. 
Swanton construes eudaimonia to refer to “a broader notion than flourishing, and is ambiguous 
between (at least) living a flourishing life, a life of worthwhile achievement, an admirable life, and 
a meaningful life.”39 By playing these categories off of one another, Swanton attempts to show 
that some virtues are recognizably so without necessarily contributing to human flourishing. For 
                                                            
38 Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 19. 
39 Ibid., 81. 
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instance, an apparently courageous life may be admirable but still bring one to a painful and 
early demise, and so not achieve eudaimonia even though virtuous.40 But Swanton has gone 
wrong from the start, because eudaimonia is not ambiguous between these four things: 
eudaimonia is by definition all four of these things simultaneously and without contradiction. A 
eudaimonist could simply reply either (a) that a eudaimon life need not be long or conventionally 
pleasant to still manifest eudaimonia or (b) that we can be sure that this was specious courage, 
not the genuine article, precisely because it didn’t conduce to eudaimonia. What I take from 
Swanton here is that attempting to argue against a mutually-reinforcing, potentially circular set 
of concepts like eudaimonia and eudaimonist virtue is not likely to succeed, a point which 
Swanton eventually implicitly admits by asserting the objective reality of a vast field of values 
that she forbids virtue to ignore, whatever might be the protests of eudaimonia.41 And many of 
these values that Swanton insists upon including in various virtues’ fields of response are frankly 
incompatible with any version of eudaimonia because they have no end at all that Swanton will 
acknowledge.42 This seems right to the extent that it stresses that there is more to the moral life 
than just virtues that aim at the perfect realization of character. If there is such a thing as 
eudaimonia, a eudaimon life would either not be coextensive with a moral one (if eudaimonia is 
excellent only in the sense of being the sum of the virtues) or would be more than just a virtuous 
one (if eudaimonia is to be a morally excellent human life). 
Swanton’s effort to offer an argument against eudaimonia underscores what is the 
fundamental issue: eudaimonia can be logically useful in the context of a theory of virtue, but this 
                                                            
40 Ibid., 81. 
41 Ibid., 89. 
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logical credibility depends on a certain circularity with a definition of virtue, one that defines all 
genuine virtues as those that aim at eudaimonia and eudaimonia as a condition for which 
genuine virtue is a necessary, though not always sufficient, condition. The empirical credibility 
of eudaimonia is another matter: this credibility may be a matter of personal conviction more 
than rational argument. It seems to me, has seemed to many others, and according to MacIntyre 
is the very modern condition that eudaimonia, as a doctrine that can ensure all virtues always 
conduce to the good, is no longer self-evident. MacIntyre urges that this is so much the worse for 
virtue and for us. It is my hope that virtue can be treated sensibly and made useful even without 
presupposing that all genuine virtue conduces to the good, but the proof of this will have to be in 
the doing of it. 
The Unity of the Virtues 
The doctrine that all genuine virtues share a common end in eudaimonia seeks to ensure 
that all genuine virtues conduce to the good by definition: each specific virtue itself aims at the 
same eudaimonia as all the others. The second, prominent support for the intuition that all 
genuine virtues reliably conduce to the good, the unity of the virtues thesis, argues not from 
definition but instead from the practical experience of living out the virtues. There are two 
traditional accounts of the unity of the virtues and two distinct lines of argument concerning the 
thesis’s plausibility. The first account of the unity of the virtues traces its roots to Plato, while the 
second account has its roots in Aristotle. At least as I present them, the Platonic argument for 
the unity of the virtues is more direct than is the Aristotelian. The Platonic unity of the virtues 
reasons that it is impossible to properly exercise any one virtue without comprehensive true 
knowledge, so that anyone who genuinely possesses one virtue in fact possesses them all. Where 
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the Platonic unity of the virtues diffusely applies to any and all specific virtues at once, the 
Aristotelian unity of the virtues specifies the site of unity: the virtue of phronesis, eventually 
assimilated to Roman prudentia and variously rendered in English as practical judgment, 
practical reasoning, practical wisdom, and prudence. 
I begin this section with an examination of the Platonic version of the unity of the virtues, 
starting with Plato and jumping quickly to selected present-day exponents of the full Platonic 
version of the unity of the virtues. I then present what seem to me to be the most pertinent 
criticisms of the Platonic version of the unity of the virtues. I then turn to the Aristotelian 
account of the unity of the virtues, emphasizing Aristotle’s own highly flexible account of the 
unity of the virtues in phronesis and briefly rehearsing subsequent Aristotelian accounts of the 
unity of the virtues in phronesis, including that of Thomas Aquinas. I follow this exposition with 
criticisms of the Aristotelian version of the unity of the virtues. I conclude my consideration of 
the unity of the virtues thesis by rehearsing what I believe to be the most compelling iteration of 
the thesis, a limited unity of certain virtues. 
Plato's Account of the Unity of the Virtues 
Plato’s account of the unity of the virtues is expressed through the character of Socrates, 
primarily in Protagoras and Laches.43 Because he writes through the character of Socrates and 
adopts Socrates’s famously indirect, non-doctrinal approach to philosophy, Plato’s account of 
the unity of the virtues is, at times, frustratingly unclear. As Aristotle’s account of the practical, 
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mutual entailment of all virtues is much more clearly expressed than is Plato’s, I will here 
concern myself with Plato’s thesis (one not endorsed by Aristotle) that all of the apparently 
specific virtues are simply different manifestations of the same, singular entity, so that all virtues 
are in fact one thing, coextensive with the good. The unitary nature of the good may have been a 
very widespread assumption in Plato’s time, so Plato may not have been developing a novel thesis 
about unity so much as attempting to specify in what that widely-assumed unity consisted.44 But 
certainly Plato’s argument for the unity of virtue in Protagoras and Laches is different from 
Aristotle’s argument for the unity of the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics; in order to more 
clearly distinguish it from the Aristotelian argument for the unity of the virtues, Plato’s position 
is sometimes labeled the “identity of the virtues.”45 
In Protagoras, Socrates recounts a wide-ranging discussion with a famous sophist, the 
titular Protagoras. In characteristic fashion, Socrates gradually maneuvers Protagoras — who is 
evidently inclined to believe that virtues are many, not one — into accepting that any particular 
idea can have only one opposite, and that the opposite of both temperance and of wisdom is folly. 
Socrates then springs his trap: 
Then which, Protagoras, of our propositions are we to reject—the statement that one thing has but one 
opposite; or the other, that wisdom is different from temperance, and each is a part of virtue, and moreover, 
                                                            
44 John M. Cooper, Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 76-83. 
45 This distinction is frequently under threat from interpreters who, in the words of Michael Ferejohn, “dilute” 
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a different part, and that the two are as unlike, both in themselves and in their faculties, as the parts of the 
face? […] Then temperance and wisdom must be one thing?46 
Protagoras quickly comes to realize that he is snared, and reluctantly acquiesces, in 
response to Socrates’s repeated prompts, that not only temperance and wisdom, but also justice, 
holiness, and courage are all, in essence, the same virtue. Socrates interrupts his narrative to note 
that by this point Protagoras had grown frustrated and changed the topic.47 Plato’s implication 
is clear: had not Protagoras ducked out, Socrates might well have continued indefinitely and 
established that all apparently particular virtues are, in fact, the same, singular thing. 
How, exactly, all specific virtues might plausibly be regarded as the same thing is made 
more clear in Laches. In Laches, Socrates is much more in agreement with the intuitions of his 
interlocutors (here, two generals) than in Protagoras. Socrates suggests, and one of the generals 
agrees, that “courage is knowledge of what is to be dreaded and dared[.]”48 It is critical that 
courage be knowledge, because according to both Socrates and the general, “rashness, boldness, 
and fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it,” hardly deserve the label courage.49 To be 
courageous, one must understand and appreciate the risks one is running, not merely run those 
risks without regard to their gravity. Socrates then suggests, and his conversation partners agree, 
that knowing what is to be dreaded and what is to be dared consists in integration of past and 
present experience and the ability to accurately predict which risks a given course of action will 
incur. If these three are truly known, Socrates suggests to general agreement, they are all the 
same knowledge. Thus courage consists in knowledge, and, making the necessary changes, so 
                                                            
46 Plato, Protagoras 333a-b (in Plato, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical 
Library 165 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924], 167). 
47 Plato, Protagoras 333b-e (in Lamb, 167-169). 
48 Plato, Laches 196c-d (in Lamb, 67). 
49 Plato, Laches 197a-b (in Lamb, 69). 
 
28 
too with all the other virtues. All specific virtues are merely appearances of the same unity, true 
and comprehensive knowledge.50 What distinguishes the peculiarly Platonic unity of the virtues 
is just this identification: that virtue is, at root, knowledge or wisdom, so that a person who knows 
truly is also, by definition, virtuous.51 This position has enduring appeal, but also difficulties 
related to apparent failure of motivation in the presence of sound knowledge, of which Plato’s 
theory does not admit but which seems to be a commonplace of experience. Subsequent 
adapters of the Platonic thesis have both carried this problem forward and sought to address it. 
Present-Day Platonic Accounts of the Unity of the Virtues 
John McDowell is a more recent proponent of the Platonic version of the unity of the 
virtues. McDowell defines any one particular virtue as “a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of 
requirement which situations impose on behaviour.”52 By McDowell’s own account, this is hardly 
adequate to guarantee “the attractive idea that a virtue issues in nothing but right conduct.”53 
McDowell examines the potential conflicts between the virtue of kindness (as per McDowell, a 
reliable sensitivity to the moral import of others’ feelings) and the virtue of fairness (a reliable 
sensitivity to others’ rights) to illustrate his point. A kind person without the virtue of fairness 
could act rightly in circumstances in which others’ feelings exhausted the morally-relevant 
features of that circumstance. Unfortunately for the would-be virtuous agent in possession of 
kindness but not fairness, others’ rights often intermingle with others’ feelings in the complex 
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situations of actual life. A kind person who lacked the virtue of fairness would be sensitive to 
others’ feelings, but not to their rights, and so would miss morally-relevant features of the 
situation. Because neglect of those others’ rights would hardly be right conduct, and because 
genuine kindness must issue in nothing but right conduct or fail to be genuine at all, McDowell 
concludes that kindness entails fairness. What is more, nothing about moral experience suggests 
that others’ feelings and others’ rights exhaust the moral features of lived experience, so if 
kindness or fairness is to be genuine, it must be accompanied by still other virtues. Because there 
is no a priori limit to the moral features of a situation, any one virtue, if it is to be genuine (in the 
sense of issuing in nothing but right conduct), entails all other virtues. With Plato, McDowell 
takes virtue to be single and unified: we may talk about particular virtues for purposes of 
convenience, but all particular virtues are finally labels for “similarities and dissimilarities 
among the manifestations of a single sensitivity which is what virtue, in general, is[.]”54 
Gary Watson thinks that McDowell’s updated version of the Platonic unity thesis is 
insufficiently robust and urges a still stronger account of the unity thesis. Watson’s complaint 
against McDowell’s version of the unity thesis is that it only establishes that to possess some 
particular virtue genuinely, one needs awareness of the moral requirements identified by all 
other virtues. Watson worries that, within McDowell’s framework, an agent could appreciate the 
requirements of those other virtues without necessarily possessing the will to act upon those 
requirements.55 By way of illustrating Watson’s read of McDowell, consider a military 
commander who is uncontroversially courageous, that is, cognizant of and motivated to fulfill 
the requirements that critical, dangerous situations impose on behavior. As per Watson, 
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McDowell shows that by dint of this commander’s genuine possession of the virtue of courage, 
this commander would also be aware that, among other things, his soldiers have some right to 
security in their persons, albeit not an insuperable right. This sort of awareness of rights is (on 
McDowell’s view) constitutive of the virtue of justice, so the genuinely courageous commander 
is also a just one. But if Watson is correct, McDowell has left open the possibility that the 
commander, though aware of his soldiers’ right to security in their persons, might lack the 
motivation necessary to respond to that right even while aware of it: according to Watson, the 
commander’s awareness of his soldiers’ right would not prevent him from blithely disregarding 
that right and leading the soldiers in a brave but suicidal, tactically-futile maneuver. Watson’s 
point is that we would hardly wish to claim that this reflects justice on the part of the commander 
toward his soldiers. What is needed, Watson thinks, is a mechanism that ensures that 
appreciating the ancillary moral requirements that arise in the context of exercising one virtue 
will lead to acting upon those other requirements. Watson suggests that those defending the 
unity thesis follow Plato and conflate understanding moral reasons with possessing the will to 
act upon them.56 Watson’s account of the unity of the virtues opens the door to considerably 
more complex accounts of character. This may or may not be an advantage over McDowell, but 
Watson certainly does hold an advantage in avoiding a question-begging account of the avowed 
unity of the virtues. McDowell circularly reasons that, because all particular virtues are in fact 
the same virtue, the particular virtues are by definition unified (or, perhaps more rightly, 
identical). Watson, in considering the complex interactions of particular virtues, find that 
defining them as individual “sensitivities” is insufficient to guarantee this analytic identity, and 
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so strengthens each particular virtue to guarantee that they must be unified as knowledge, which 
Watson assimilates to will. 
Aristotle's Account Of Phronesis 
Aristotle proposes an account of the unity of the virtues that trades upon their apparent 
mutual interdependence, and all the particular virtues’ interaction with phronesis. The phronesis 
that Aristotle describes in his Nicomachean Ethics is at once impossible without the other 
genuine virtues and integral to those other virtues. Aristotle distinguishes phronesis from 
deinotes, that is, cleverness. Cleverness is nothing more and nothing less than the ability to 
reason from ends to means. A clever person is adept at determining what ought to be done in 
order to achieve a particular end that he/she has, either one he/she has set for herself/himself or 
set to her/him by someone else. Whether or not this capacity of cleverness is praiseworthy or 
blameworthy depends on the clever person’s end: “if one’s object is something beautiful, this 
capacity is to be praised, but if it is base, it is shamelessness.”57 Phronesis includes cleverness, in 
that phronesis entails apt reasoning from ends to means. However, phronesis supplements 
cleverness with the additional requirement that the only ends acceptable to phronesis are the 
ends of the particular virtues. According to Aristotle, a person who is adept at reasoning from 
ends to means but who is not otherwise virtuous is merely clever, while someone who adept at 
reasoning from ends to means and is otherwise virtuous possesses the virtue of phronesis. 
Cleverness is, on Aristotle’s account, merely a capacity, but phronesis is a virtue, in part (but only 
in part) because its ends are always good by definition. 
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Aristotle posits that phronesis, in addition to being dependent upon the other virtues, is 
also central to the exercise of all particular virtues. This makes good sense: if all particular virtues 
are concerned with living one’s life in accordance with those virtues’ ends, if doing so requires 
reasoning from the virtues’ ends to means appropriate to achieving them, and if phronesis is the 
specific virtue by which virtuous people reason from ends to means, then there is no possibility 
that any particular virtue could be exercised without phronesis. In this way, phronesis is integral 
to each and every other virtue, for without phronesis, no one can actually exercise (and so 
possess) any other virtue.58 
Aristotle is explicit in the Nicomachean Ethics that phronesis guarantees the unity of the 
virtues. Indeed, phronesis is his mechanism for securing this unity and, depending on whose 
interpretation of Aristotle one prefers,59 phronesis may even be the mechanism that unifies the 
essentially human as a coherent self. The virtuous person cannot exercise virtue without 
phronesis, so any genuinely virtuous person will possess the virtue of phronesis. But because no 
one can possess phronesis (as opposed to cleverness) without possessing all the other virtues, 
anyone who possesses phronesis must also possess all the other particular virtues as well. 
Aristotle concludes, “all virtues will be present together when the one virtue, [phronesis], is 
present.”60 Aristotle is also clear that phronesis is not multiple virtues that enable the operation 
of other, specific virtues or of families of other virtues, but rather that phronesis is a single virtue: 
phronesis is “the virtue of a part of the soul,”61 that is to say (roughly) that it is a singular virtue 
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by which part of the human essence achieves its proper end. Although Aristotle does not 
elaborate, the implications of this are worth specifying more concretely. The genuinely virtuous 
person, by Aristotle’s definition, will possess the virtue of phronesis and so will be adept at 
reasoning from ends to the means appropriate for achieving them. This will be true of not just 
some virtues, but of all virtues, so that the genuinely virtuous person, courageous and just 
(among other virtues), will be equally excellent at reasoning from the ends of courage to the 
means appropriate to courageous behavior as he/she will be at reasoning from the ends of justice 
to the means appropriate for executing justice. This would be equally true of every other 
particular virtue. The virtue of phronesis, possessed by every genuinely virtuous person, ensures 
that every genuinely virtuous person possesses all the virtues and will be excellent at practical 
reasoning with regard to all of them. 
Later Aristotelian Accounts of Phronesis 
Philippa Foot follows Aristotle in distinguishing two parts of phronesis, though Foot gives 
the second part a slightly different valence: “In the first place the wise man knows the means to 
particular goods ends; and secondly he knows how much particular ends are worth.”62 Foot is 
confident that the first part of phronesis is very familiar; there are certain goods that are widely 
praised as ends of human striving, and the practically wise person achieves these praiseworthy 
ends in an excellent way. To ensure that phronesis remains widely accessible to all moral agents, 
Foot further limits practical wisdom so that it excludes any ends or strategies for achieving them 
that only unusually clever or well-trained persons could acquire. This certainly appears to be 
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notably more democratic than Aristotle was prepared to be: Aristotle is not above describing 
virtues (including the means by which they are properly exercised) that very few people would 
be able to access. However, Foot takes a less democratic approach to the second feature of 
practical wisdom, writing that as a matter of fact, most people prize many goods they ought not 
and achieve those goods at too high a cost: “it makes good sense to say that most men waste a 
lot of their lives in ardent pursuit of what is trivial and unimportant[.]”63 Foot’s suggestion that 
the means one should expect phronesis to identify should be fairly accessible would seem to be a 
considerable advantage in a more egalitarian context that expects virtue of more than simply the 
elites: what use is a virtue that unifies the others if only a few people can ever have it? Foot’s 
negative spin on the second part of phronesis, that it is reliably directed at virtuous ends, is 
different in emphasis but not in content from Aristotle: Aristotle thought that phronesis needed 
all the virtues to operate, and here Foot is simply observing that many whom we recognize as 
excellent in achieving their ends lack the virtues necessary to focus on ends of which we (or Foot, 
at least) would approve. 
Thomas Aquinas’s development of Aristotelian phronesis, in the guise of prudentia, is 
surely the most influential of subsequent interpretations of Aristotle’s argument for the unity of 
the virtues (though it is arguable that Aquinas owes as much to Cicero as to Aristotle with regard 
to prudentia).64 Aquinas found it necessary to revise Aristotle’s account of phronesis for much the 
same reason Aquinas found it necessary to revise Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia: consistency 
with Christian orthodoxy. For Aristotle, phronesis had a credible claim to be the site of 
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integration of all virtue for, without phronesis, there was no mechanism by which the particular 
virtues might be directed to their end. But Christian orthodoxy has a different means by which 
virtues can be directed: the revelation of God. And the end of virtue in Aquinas is God, not 
practical ends, so something as thoroughly human as phronesis could not be expected to direct 
all virtues to their ends.65 Phronesis, at best, can direct humans to their natural ends, but their 
better end (their true eudaimonia) is God, and phronesis will not be able to direct humans there. 
The theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are responsible for directing human life and 
character to their supernatural end in God, and (with Paul the Apostle) Aquinas affirms that 
charity is primary, effectively demoting phronesis: “charity is the mother and the root of all the 
virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all[.]”66 Aquinas does affirm that a person who lacks 
the infused, theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, phronesis will unify their virtues to the 
extent that they can be unified. It is only with the infusion of the theological virtues, however, 
that full unity of all genuine virtues can be achieved, and this unity is located in charity.67 As a 
strategy for guaranteeing the unity of the virtues, this has an important defect in a pluralistic 
context: the theological virtues are precisely that: theological, and infused by God, not an 
inherent component of all humans’ characters. One unpromising strategy for retaining a high 
priority for phronesis within a Thomistic frame essentially deflates Aristotelian phronesis down 
to Aristotelian cleverness, but this is to omit much of Aristotle’s argument and does nothing to 
recenter the unity of the virtues on phronesis.68 A different, more promising strategy may salvage 
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some unifying role for phronesis in Aquinas by closely focusing on ethical conduct in earthly life,69 
but this seems to me to neglect the decidedly theological turn in Aquinas’s thought. However 
important phronesis may be for earthly life in Aquinas, it cannot be thought to guarantee the 
unity of the virtues that a human can and should possess in the way phronesis does in Aristotle.70 
Peter Geach offers an account of phronesis that manages to guarantee that phronesis will 
itself coordinate with (and so in a limited sense unify) all virtue, but it is by direct appeal to the 
theological revision of eudaimonia, in the guise of providence. Geach defines phronesis as an 
awareness of those “moral precepts that are never to be broken” and stipulates that these moral 
precepts are the will of God. The person with phronesis will thus possess all virtue, in that he/she 
will never violate the will of God.71 This is a fairly blunt unification of the virtues around phronesis, 
and certainly it is not phronesis that is the site of that unification, but God. Two obvious problems 
arise in connection with such an account. First, it is not particularly congenial to a pluralistic 
environment in which people have different ideas about the divine and the divine will; second, it 
rests upon a fairly high level of confidence in people’s ability to comprehend the will of God. More 
generally, Geach’s version of phronesis is susceptible to all the concerns that afflict any other 
eudaimonist account of virtue.72 
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Present-Day Complaints against Phronesis 
Some present-day virtue ethicists influenced by Aristotle reject outright what they take 
to be his account of phronesis. Julia Peters understands the paradigm case of phronesis’s 
operation to be “one where an agent explicitly reflects and deliberates on all practical options in 
her current situation and eventually chooses wisely between them.”73 As a matter of empirical 
fact, Peters thinks that this is not how humans end up behaving consistently, which — when that 
behavior is consistently moral — is how humans are virtuous, according to Aristotle and Peters 
alike. For consistency in their actions and lives, humans depend upon habit and habituation, 
which eventually become unreflective. Peters is impressed by psychological research arguing 
that habits tend not to be matters of conscious thought, but Peters is also persuaded that habits 
are ethically useful for many non-empirical reasons as well. Most notable among these is the 
decreased response time required when actions are habitual rather than deliberate; just as it 
would impossibly complex to dribble a basketball if one had to reflect upon each component 
action with each bounce, so too there are routine or time-sensitive situations that call for prompt 
action, to which habits are better suited than is deliberation. Following and expanding upon Bill 
Pollard, Peters argues that habitually excellent behavior is a significant component of most 
virtues: though virtue may still require the overt manifestation of phronesis when the virtuous 
person encounters apparently novel situations, it may actually be more excellent in many 
instances not to have to overtly exhibit the reflective judgment that is, according to Peters, 
avowedly characteristic of phronesis.74 
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There is at least one plausible objection to Peters’s lines of reasoning against phronesis. It 
is not clear that Peters’s paradigm case of phronesis sufficiently reflects the flexibility present in 
Aristotle’s account of phronesis. Conspicuously absent in Aristotle’s well-known account of 
phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics is any clear indication that it must be reflective. On the 
contrary, it is the virtue by which the virtuous person (with virtuous ends) reasons aptly from 
those ends to the best and most virtuous means by which to achieve those ends. Aristotle is 
explicit that both the capacity of cleverness and the virtue of phronesis are distinct from the 
intellectual faculty concerned with contemplation of truth and wisdom.75 It may well be that 
phronesis sometimes requires conscious reflection on the whole range of options, but nothing 
Aristotle’s account demands conscious reflection at all times. Aristotle’s paradigm case for 
phronesis does not seem committed to the kind of ponderous deliberation to which Peters 
objects. Thus I doubt that Peters’s argument tells against Aristotle’s phronesis as strongly as it 
does against later, neo-Aristotelian applications of phronesis. 
But Peters’s complaint against inordinate reflection in virtuous action does weigh against 
phronesis, even Aristotle’s flexible view of it, in another way. Peters observes that “it is sometimes 
a sign of moral deficiency in an agent if she engages in (a certain kind of) moral deliberation.”76 
Peters’s study for this sort of morally-deficient deliberation is the shopworn example of 
deliberation about torturing animals for fun: it should never even cross the virtuous person’s 
mind to torture animals for fun. Within Aristotle’s framework, it would not be phronesis’s work 
to exclude torturing animals for fun as an end: only virtues set ends for phronesis, and it is fairly 
clear that no virtue would set torturing animals for fun as an end. In Aristotle, unlike Peters, the 
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situation would never arise in which a virtuous person could ever consider torturing animals for 
fun. But Peters’s general point is more about Aristotle’s own distinction between, on the one 
hand, continence and, on the other hand, genuine virtue operative through phronesis. Aristotle 
is fairly clear that those who act appropriately in the face of contrary inclinations are not 
genuinely virtuous, but merely continent or self-restrained.77 Those who are genuinely virtuous 
will not entertain vicious ends, nor will the virtuous person consider vicious means to virtuous 
ends. This narrows phronesis’s field of operation considerably: what is left for phronesis to 
adjudicate if all the means and ends of which the virtuous person is aware are, by definition, 
excellent already? It may be that phronesis would still have some scope of action if, among those 
excellent means to virtuous ends, some means were more excellent than others, so that phronesis 
might still need to pick among those means. If phronesis’s work is limited to choosing among 
means that are all guaranteed to be virtuous, there is no longer any clear distinction between 
cleverness, a mere capacity, and phronesis, the virtue: “phronesis” becomes a mere honorific for 
cleverness when cleverness occurs in virtuous people. But Aristotle is explicit that this is not so. 
Even if Peters’s complaints against the deliberation required in phronesis do not quite square 
with the claims that Aristotle makes for phronesis, Peters nevertheless reveals that phronesis, 
seemingly the nexus of moral action in Aristotle, may have little distinct existence once the other 
particular virtues have specified the ends and constrained the means that phronesis may even 
contemplate. 
Robert Adams posits a parallel criticism of phronesis from outside the Aristotelian 
tradition: that phronesis is a trivial way of describing the means and ends of which other, specific 
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virtues will approve. On Adams’s account, many neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, when pressed to 
account for how the ends appropriate to virtue are disclosed, 
identif[y] the right ends, and the right ways of feeling, choosing, and acting in relation to them as those that 
are approved by practical reason [i.e, phronesis]. That is the point on which I am […] skeptical. The 
conception of practical reason or practical rationality of which I think I can make the best sense simply 
identifies it with excellent thinking about practical matters. And a conception of virtue as responding in 
ways, and for ends, that would be approved by excellent thinking is uncontroversial to the point of 
triviality.78 
As does Peters’s argument, Adams’s argument tells more strongly against neo-
Aristotelian uses of phronesis than it does against Aristotle’s own use of the concept. Aristotle 
does not concern himself, in the Nicomachean Ethics, with providing the sort of foundational 
justifications for moral value that came to the fore in twentieth-century, English-speaking moral 
philosophy in the form of meta-ethics. But as does Peters’s argument, Adams’s argument points 
back to a lingering problem present even in Aristotle’s highly flexible account of phronesis: that 
phronesis may reinforce the unity of the virtues, as Aristotle expects that it should, in only a trivial 
sense. It is fairly intuitive that if there is a single virtue that consists in excellent thinking about 
all practical matters, then that virtue would require its possessor (as Aristotle thinks) to also 
possess all the other particular virtues, without which the virtuous person’s thinking about 
practical matters would be less excellent. However, this conditional statement signifies nothing 
in the absence of the factual premise that there does exist such a single virtue that consists in 
excellent thinking about all practical matters. Adams’s brief complaint against phronesis rightly 
suggests that it is still less promising to proceed in reverse, from possession of all the particular 
virtues to possession of a unifying virtue of phronesis. It is (trivially) true that if one possesses 
and exercises all the particular virtues, then one will think excellently about all those particular 
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virtues. But this trivially true statement does not specify what this excellent thinking will consist 
in from virtue to virtue. This specification is the substance needed to get somewhere from the 
trivially true observation that possessing all the particular virtues will require excellent thinking. 
Unless it can be shown that excellent thinking consists in essentially the same thinking across all 
the particular virtues, that excellent thinking will in no way cohere into a unifying virtue of 
phronesis. 
There are good reasons to believe that this sort of excellent thinking does not consist in 
the same thinking across all particular virtues. Consider excellent thinking with regard to the 
virtue of honesty as opposed to the excellent thinking with regard to interpersonal fidelity. I 
might have exceptionally good reasoning about how to communicate the truth. And this 
excellent thinking specific to honesty might be very different from excellent thinking specific to 
interpersonal fidelity: even as I’m very honest, I might be appallingly bad at establishing and 
maintaining personal relationships. If phronesis is not a unified virtue of excellent thinking about 
matters of virtue, there is no inconsistency here: I can be genuinely honest and excellent at 
reasoning through how to be honest, even while I am faithless and nearly incapable of reasoning 
through how to be faithful to another person. But if phronesis is one faculty, my honesty is less 
honest because I am faithless, and my thinking through honesty is impaired because I cannot 
think through faithfulness. It seems to me more plausible to prefer the former view, if only 
because we do know people who are habitually honest and who, sometimes due to that honesty, 
struggle to maintain interpersonal relationships with persons who may not always appreciate 
hearing the truth about themselves. 
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Present-day moral theories that are not markedly influenced by Aristotle are very unlikely 
to utilize phronesis as a unifying virtue. Writing in 1991, Douglas Den Uyl identified five aspects 
of English-language normative theory since the nineteenth century that make it inhospitable to 
the robust, unifying phronesis that Aristotle defended. Four of these features echo MacIntyre’s 
more famous complaints about contemporary ethics, but one bears further attention in that it 
tacitly contradicts MacIntyre. Den Uyl, unlike MacIntyre, avers that a communitarian turn will 
not benefit prudence in the classic sense: according to Den Uyl, prudence will not rise to the level 
of genuine virtue “[i]f our relations with others are given foundational importance in ethics[.]”79 
In broad strokes, Den Uyl urges that phronesis is finally concerned with the perfection of the 
character of the individual, while much of contemporary ethics thinks it better that ethics 
concern itself with goods in public life and only secondarily with the personal characteristics 
(most notably altruism or at least regard for others) required to achieve those public goods. This 
goes somewhat beyond MacIntyre in alleging that it is not just our particular contemporary 
community that is inhospitable for Aristotelian virtue, but rather any community that privileges 
the community’s moral development over the moral excellence of its individual parts without 
regard to the whole. It is possible to overdraw this distinction: Den Uyl agrees that the phronemos 
will value relations with others, and a person of good character, on the Aristotelian account, of 
course will be just, that is, will habitually distribute goods equitably among members of the 
community. But Den Uyl seems correct to observe that if appropriate concern for the others in 
one’s community is the most important criterion for ethical living and the boundaries of the 
normative, then prudence is typically the handmaid to justice. If inter-personal justice matters 
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most, then the only part of prudence that particularly matters for morality is the part that 
apportions just means to just ends in a way that is cumulatively just. This is obviously a far cry 
from the robust, unifying phronesis articulated and defended by Aristotle. 
Surely the strongest repudiation of the Aristotelian project around virtue is that of the 
“situationist” critics of virtue. These situationists, drawing on the research findings of 
experimental psychologists such as Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo, argue that there is 
almost certainly no feature of human personality worthy of the label “virtue” and that the 
empirical evidence conclusively disproves the possibility of any unity of the virtues. Stated 
bluntly, the situationist critique is that psychological experiments, such as Milgram’s shock 
experiments and Zimbardo’s prison experiment, demonstrate that many people whom we might 
otherwise credit with “virtue” or even with being generally “virtuous” are in fact only so because 
of the stability of their contexts, and that in fact most people do not have anything that would 
pass muster as a stable trait or disposition of character that could survive radical alterations to 
that person’s circumstances. If there are no stable traits or dispositions of character that are 
durable across any alterations to circumstance, the reasoning goes, the reliable “character” 
toward which virtue supposedly directs us is a figment of the environment in which persons live. 
In fact, there can be no virtues at all, as there are no stable traits or habits and it is in these that 
virtue is supposed to consist.80 
This line of reasoning has come in for considerable criticism over the years, not least for 
straw-manning virtue ethics as a whole on the basis of certain theses to which only some virtue 
ethicists are committed. But whether or not one thinks this sort of reasoning disproves virtue 
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per se, so long as one accepts that particular virtues may be frail and significantly dependent on 
circumstance, the unity of the virtues becomes an unlikely and for that reason unhelpful 
requirement for virtue. If virtue tends to be a malleable and contingent thing, as much of the evil 
of the modern period would seem to suggest, then it is unlikely that many people will have a lot 
of the specific virtues. If few people have many of the virtues, it is still less likely that anyone has 
all the virtues. If having all the virtues is a requirement for any of those virtues to be genuine, no 
one has any genuine virtue at all. And this is precisely what the unity of the virtues is committed 
to arguing. 
One possible way to insulate the unity of the virtues is to suggest that experimental 
psychology and empirical observations will simply never turn it up even were it to exist, so that 
what is implausible is not the concept of the unity of the virtues, but rather that concept’s reality. 
Although the intent with which it is offered differs, Peter Vranas’s argument against making 
moral evaluations of oneself or others could protect the unity thesis along these lines. Vranas 
argues, on the basis of the same evidence motivating Doris and Harman, that the overwhelming 
majority of people are “fragmented,” meaning that they “would behave deplorably […] in an open 
list of actual or counterfactual situations and admirably […] in another such open list.”81 A 
fragmented person does not have a unified character, that is, they would not be genuinely 
virtuous on a very stringent read of Aristotle’s unity requirement. Vranas estimates that the 
probability of encountering a person with a unified, virtuous character is so low that there is no 
epistemic justification for ever calling anyone good, bad, or somewhere at the level of that 
person’s character as a whole. Vranas avers that the lack of epistemic warrant for crediting 
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someone with a unified, virtuous character does not spill over to a matter of fact, so that a person 
could in fact possess the unity of the virtues. But again, this is so implausible that it ought never 
be attributed.82 
Vranas’s argument is extreme, but it is the sort of strategy that would be required to 
defend a comprehensive unity of the virtues as a requirement for genuine virtues in the face of 
overwhelming evidence that few persons, if any, have unified the virtues in themselves. It may be 
that the unity of the virtues is an ideal to which character should aspire, rather than a necessary 
requirement for the possession of any genuine virtue. But as an ideal to which genuinely virtuous 
people might aspire, the unity of the virtues would no longer be a guarantee that all virtues would 
coordinate for the good. Rather, it would be a recommendation that those virtues should try to 
get along, and perhaps that the ideal end-state of the virtues would be harmonious 
interoperation. But it would still permit genuine, specific virtues that were disconnected from 
the other virtues that might help direct them to the good in practice. 
Limited Unity of the Virtues 
Robert Adams’s account of the virtues also takes the situationist critique of the unity of 
the virtues seriously, but Adams also takes seriously (as the situationists) the idea that virtues 
might still have meaning across a whole person even in the absence of perfectly integrated 
character. Adams argues that the human virtues are real, though at times frail and tenuous, and 
that some virtues do sometimes interoperate. Adams affirms that some virtues do need other 
virtues to be more adequately realized, and that these particular virtues that require one another 
may organize into unities among themselves without implying comprehensive unity of the 
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virtues. Thus Adams defends a limited unity of some virtues among themselves while 
repudiating the comprehensive unity espoused on different grounds by Plato, Aristotle, and their 
subsequent followers. 
Adams’s clearest example of a virtue that can be relatively free-standing is military 
courage. Adams holds that military courage is only one species (Adams prefers the term 
“module”) of the virtue of courage; these species have clear family resemblances to one another 
but can exist separate from one another. Military courage, according to Adams, would be “an 
admirable strength of self-government” in light of the goals of military success and the personal 
perils required for the realization of those goals.83 Adams urges that fighter may be genuinely 
courageous in facing dangers so long as the fighter faces those dangers in a way that reflects 
her/his reliable prioritization of her/his military’s goals over her/his fear and safety, even if those 
goals are not ones that the fighter unequivocally endorses and even if those goals are goals the 
fighter does not understand or care to understand. This parallels common usage. Our society 
seems to expect and praise exactly this sort of courage in its military personnel. We do not, to 
my knowledge, require that prospective recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor 
demonstrate a thorough understanding of the causes that motivated the wars in which they 
fought, let alone to endorse those causes. Rather, the medal is awarded for exceptional 
commitment to achieving military objectives in the face of enormous peril (typically, near-
certain death), irrespective of who set those military objectives, the merit of those objectives, or 
the recipient’s endorsement of those objectives. Adams holds that this military courage would 
be genuine even if the overarching aims for which the soldier fought were incompatible with 
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justice, wisdom, temperance, love, hope, or overall good character more generally. Adam would 
regard a courageous soldier fighting valiantly for a deeply unjust cause as courageous, but not 
virtuous generally. As common-sensical as this seems, both the doctrines of the unity of the 
virtues and of the common end of all virtues in eudaimonia would require, instead, that not only 
the soldier’s character, but also her/his courage, be deficient, defective, or specious in some way. 
I think Adams is right, and I will follow him, in affirming that some specific virtues can be genuine 
without requiring all the others. 
If the existence of specific virtues independent of other virtues, of overall good character, 
and of the human good were the whole of Adams’s theory, he would simply be retreading the 
assumption underlying all those moralists throughout history who have treated specific virtues 
without reference to all the other specific virtues. Adams’s contribution is to put this in tension 
with the conviction that many (perhaps most) specific virtues actually cannot exist independent 
of others. Kindness is Adams’s example of a virtue that cannot be genuine in the absence of many 
other virtues. Adams defines kindness as the reliable condition of “being effectively motivated by 
a concern for the well-being of other people, and in particular for their enjoyment and comfort 
in the near future.”84 Adams thinks that kindness can be genuine even absent the perfection of 
other virtues that would greatly improve kindness’s exercise: “[a]n action wholly or 
predominantly motivated by kindness may be imprudent, unfair, or untruthful in a way that 
makes it wrong, all things considered.”85 Adams does not supply an example, but grandparents 
who fawn over and spoil their grandchildren would seem to be a plausible one: these 
grandparents are no less kind (though probably somewhat imprudent) for allowing their 
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grandchildren to consume a second piece of sugary cake right before handing the grandchildren 
back to their parents, no less kind (though probably somewhat unfair) when they secure some 
coveted experience for their own grandchildren at the expense of other children, and no less kind 
(though probably somewhat untruthful) when they praise their grandchild’s disjointed clanking 
at the piano. 
Adams is strongly committed to avoiding any requirement that even genuine virtue “get 
it right,” which Adams associates with deontology, on Adams’s account a much narrower 
standard for morals than the excellences of character with which virtue is concerned.86 Thus 
Adams stops short of saying that the only people who are genuinely kind are those who get that 
kindness right. But Adams does think that kindness (and presumably virtues that are structurally 
similar to it) cannot be genuine if “too deeply undercut by particular motives, beliefs, attitudes, 
actions, or allegiances that are closely related to it.”87 Adams does not connect this with virtue 
directly, but it can be and indeed tacitly is in Adams’s own examples. It is the work of some 
version of the virtue of sympathy to fashion one’s motives so that one does care about others, not 
capriciously but steadily; it is the work of some version of the virtue of loyalty to be able to form 
sincere, dependable allegiances. Adams states kindness’s need for some species of the virtues of 
sympathy and loyalty negatively: one cannot completely lack the virtues of sympathy and loyalty 
and still genuinely possess the virtue of kindness. But it could be stated positively as well: one 
must have at least some measure of the virtues of sympathy and loyalty in order to have the virtue 
of kindness. Specific, taxing circumstances may add other virtues that would be needed for a 
person to possess the virtue of kindness. Adams’s examples, drawn from Nazi Germany, all 
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position kindness so that, under the circumstances, kindness required some measure of the 
virtue of courage as well.88 But it seems clear that even in less trying circumstances, the virtue of 
kindness is such that it will require anyone possessing it to possess some measure of the virtues 
of sympathy and loyalty as well. 
Julia Annas thinks that this sort of selective clustering of the virtues creates more 
problems than it solves. Annas acknowledges the same difficulty that I identified with Aristotle’s 
account of phronesis above, that Aristotle does not make clear why each virtue should have the 
same characteristic reasoning from ends to means, thus unifying the virtues with phronesis. 
Annas makes explicit what she believes may be implicit in Aristotle, that discrete units of 
phronesis would preclude action in accord with any virtue: 
[Aristotle] is assuming the unacceptability of the alternative, which would be that each virtue had its own 
little practical intelligence, limited to the area of that virtue. This might be the case at the very start of 
learning about virtue, with young children, but it clearly does not work as a picture of the development of 
virtue. Life is not compartmentalized, and so learning to deal with the mixed situations that confront us is 
not a matter of getting ever better at extracting and then confronting the claims of different virtues.89 
Annas marshals several arguments against the adequacy of virtues that are separated 
from any others at the level of phronesis, some of them theoretical and others practical. Annas’s 
theoretical arguments beg the question; Annas is persuaded that full virtue requires holistic 
integration across a unified human character, so of course all particular virtues will have to be 
unified at the level of reasoning (phronesis) and at every other level, but this is circular: full virtue 
requires comprehensive integration, so all full virtues are integrated with one another.90 There is 
probably no evading this sort of reasoning without recourse to an equally-contentious moral 
anthropology. But Annas’s practical cautions against the limited unity of the virtues are telling 
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even without granting her theoretical concerns. Many virtues seem to require other virtues in 
order to be dependable and so, on most accounts, genuine virtues. By way of example, Annas 
writes, “The compassionate person might well need courage to insists that a victim be treated 
properly, or to stand up to a bully on someone else’s behalf. If he lacks courage, his compassion 
will be flawed too; victims can’t rely on it, and others generally can’t rely on him to be 
compassionate in appropriate circumstances.”91 But this example only carries so far. In this 
example, it shows that it is plausible to think that genuine compassion needs to be courageous 
as well. Even granting this as true, it remains a one-way street: compassion may require courage, 
but it is hardly obvious that this entangles the two virtues so that courage implies compassion 
as well. On the contrary, a person might be legitimately courageous without reference to 
compassion. Imagine a world-class solo rock-climber who routinely tests her mettle on the 
deadliest mountains in the world. Surely we would not want to deny that she is courageous as 
she ascends, with peril in every piton she hammers into the cliff face. The rock climber needs 
courage in abundance, but nothing about the courage she has cultivated over years of rock-
climbing demands compassion to be excellent. This is not to say that she might not also be 
compassionate in other circumstances. In fact, it is not difficult to imagine that a rock-climber, 
courageous in the face of death on the cliff’s edge, could be more excellent in her compassion also 
by her appropriate management of fear in addressing the urgent needs of others. But there is no 
necessary linkage from the practical reasoning enabling her to express her courage and the 
practical reasoning enabling her to express her compassion. Not knowing whether the rock 
climber is as compassionate as she is courageous, we might reasonably hesitate to say that she 
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is “virtuous” without further specification, but as she hazards her life for the thousandth time, 
we would be stingy if we refused her the label “courageous.” 
This connects with Annas’s most compelling reason for insisting upon the unity of the 
virtues. Annas rightly cautions that it becomes difficult (and typically inappropriate) to issue 
evaluations of others’ overall character if we do not insist upon the unity of the virtues. Annas 
observes, 
We often make heroes or celebrities of people for their virtues (not just their actions) in one area of their 
lives. Later we discover feet of clay in other areas of their lives, and we are disproportionately disillusioned. 
[…] If we admire people for their virtue on the basis merely of one area of their lives, we risk being 
prematurely satisfied in our heroes and role models, and this will frequently lead to later disappointment, 
not just with the particular person but with the whole project of becoming brave, generous, or whatever.92 
Annas may overstate the case somewhat with regard to heroes and role models, but then 
again, she may not: for every manufactured scandal over a politician’s character, there are 
probably scores of truly crushing disappointments closer to each of our hearts. Annas is surely 
right that great disillusionment can arise from over-hasty characterizations on the basis of a 
single conspicuous virtue. I think Annas is also correct that the unity of the virtues is an 
appropriate ideal standard to which to hold character before we honor it with the unmodified 
label “virtuous.”93 We could say that the rock climber is courageous, and that her character is 
more praise-worthy specifically with regard to courage than it would be if she less bravely sat at 
home on a couch out of fear of death on the cliffs. But we should expect much more from her 
than her courage before we ascribe generally good character to her. 
Nevertheless, the thesis that the unity of the virtues is the right ideal for a person’s 
character is separable from the thesis that any genuine virtue is unified with all other genuine 
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virtues. We probably should expect a person of good character to possess at minimum a certain 
set of core virtues, and possibly all the virtues. And we should probably expect, before crediting 
that person with a singular character rather than a fragmentary identity, that these virtues 
should interoperate smoothly and inform one another. However, evaluations of virtue at the level 
of a person’s character are on a different scale than are investigations of specific virtues. There 
is no inconsistency in expecting genuinely good character to integrate the virtues and averring 
that specific virtues can be genuine without being integrated with others. 
Chapter Conclusion 
In rehearsing the classic sources of, and some recent variations upon, the doctrines that 
all virtues have a common end in eudaimonia and that any genuine virtue necessarily entails all 
other genuine virtues, I make no pretense of conclusively disproving either. But each thesis is 
seriously troubled in theory. And each thesis would, if true, make it much less likely that the 
apparent virtues we admire in others are genuine. With regard to eudaimonia, this is so because 
of fundamental disagreement about what human flourishing looks like; with regard to the unity 
of the virtues, this is so because of the implausibility of persons possessing all the virtues. 
These concerns, while not dispositive, seem especially pertinent in the context of clinical 
medicine. Clinicians, particularly those in high-intensity settings, encounter patients and 
families whose understanding of human flourishing may differ not only from those of their 
clinicians’, but also from the beginning of a hospitalization to its end. Patients who begin with 
the insistence that clinicians “do everything” because extended life is most important and who 
transition to comfort measures when “everything” turns out not to make sense do not agree with 
themselves across a hospitalization about the nature of their flourishing and their distinctively 
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human good. And the generally-acknowledged need to avoid overt paternalism on the part of 
clinicians suggests that the clinicians’ own judgment of what does or does not constitute 
distinctively human flourishing cannot be assumed as normative for their patients as well. It 
seems to me that the virtues will get further in clinical ethics if they do not need to continually 
appeal to an unshared and possibly inscrutable yard-stick such as eudaimonia to acquire their 
content. 
The unity of the virtues is even more troublesome than eudaimonia in clinical medicine. 
Patients, their families, and their clinicians alike are often not at their very best during high-
intensity or extended hospitalizations. The unity of the virtues, in the strong forms defended by 
Plato and Aristotle, would lead us to what I think is a self-evidently unfair conclusion: that most 
if not all patients, patient family members, and clinicians have no real virtue at all, in that they 
manifestly lack at least one virtue (and probably many). But in fact we see patients and clinicians 
who, despite their obvious deficits with regard to some virtues, are nevertheless apparent 
exemplars with regard to others. A completely immodest clinician may also be overwhelmingly 
benevolent. A completely dishonest patient may nevertheless be very kind. 
Suffering is ubiquitous in clinical medicine, and moral disagreements and failures are 
almost as common. It is no great feat in clinical ethics to identify shortcomings and deficiencies, 
and the simplest (perhaps only) way to eliminate these entirely would be to empty hospitals of 
patients and clinicians alike. A Pyrrhic victory for pure virtue is no victory at all. Thus I prefer an 
account of virtue that can acknowledge genuine virtues alongside all-too-real vices and in so 
doing see reasons for hope and grounds for praise in patients and clinicians, even those with 
mixed characters and discrepant ideas about human flourishing.
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CHAPTER 2 
WANDERING VIRTUES 
Surveying the Terrain beyond the Landmarks of Eudaimonia and the Unity of the Virtues 
Eudaimonia and the unity of the virtues often function as two major landmarks within 
theories of virtue, references by which dispositions and habits can be triangulated as virtues or 
vices and toward which all aspiring virtue ought to be oriented. The prospects of the virtues once 
these two landmarks vanish off of the map might seem very poor, but experience suggests that 
this need not be so. Robert Adams has observed that even without an assumed unity of all virtues, 
persons who are themselves committed to growing in the virtues, becoming more virtuous in 
general, will nevertheless seek to integrate numerous virtues. This integration is central to, if not 
identical with, the development of coherent moral character. And Adams pithily observes that 
“the moral integration of a person is not the integration of a theory, though the latter may 
contribute to the former. Persisting tensions that would be fatal to the consistency of a theory 
are not necessarily fatal to the moral unity of a person.”94 The disagreements at the level of theory 
between the virtues of justice and mercy have not prevented some persons from being 
recognizably both just and merciful. 
But it is my contention that there are some virtues that were tremendously simplified at 
the level of theory by assuming the truth of eudaimonia and the unity of the virtues. These virtues 
become much more complex when those analyzing them cannot simply say, “Make sure that this 
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strange virtue x is directed at human flourishing”95 or “Know that this habit y is only a virtue 
when it is unified with all the other virtues.” My suspicion is that these virtues always were more 
complex than theory gave them credit for, and that by the same token these virtues’ threats to 
character and to flourishing were chronically underestimated. The better to recognize and 
analyze these virtues, this second chapter first settles on a working definition of virtue in general. 
Second, this chapter offers a formal definition of these strange, “wandering virtues.” Third, this 
chapter compares the concept of wandering virtue to several similar existing concepts in ethics. 
A General Definition of Virtue 
Before identifying a special type of virtue, I first need to offer a working definition of 
virtues in general, whether those virtues are prone to wandering or not. To this end, I will first 
complete the outline of Aristotle’s definition of virtue in his Nicomachean Ethics I began in 
chapter one. Second, I will sketch David Hume’s description of virtue in his Enquiry Concerning 
the Principles of Morals. These two accounts of virtue, one ancient and the other early modern, 
are major historical points of reference for later definitions of virtue. Third, I will examine the 
definitions of virtue offered by two contemporary ethicists interested in virtue, Christine 
Swanton and Judith Andre. Fourth, I will adapt elements of each of these four descriptions into 
my own working definition of virtue. 
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Aristotle's Definition Of Virtue 
Aristotle’s definition of virtue is not confined to the affirmations of eudaimonism and of 
the unity of the virtues as I rehearsed in chapter one. In book two of his Nicomachean Ethics: 
Aristotle writes, 
[V]irtue is an active condition that makes one apt at choosing, consisting in a mean condition in relation 
to us, which is determined by a proportion and by the means by which a person with practical judgment 
would determine it. And it is a mean condition between two vices, one resulting from excess and the other 
from deficiency, and is also a mean in the sense that the vices of the one sort fall short and those of the 
other sort go beyond what is appropriate both in feelings and in actions, while virtue both discovers and 
chooses the mean.96 
Aristotle’s working definition of virtue contains two separable elements. First, a virtue is 
an active condition, something that is part of a person and that makes that person choose well 
consistently. Second, all particular virtues exist on a continuum running from total deficiency, 
which would be vice, to total excess, which would also be vice. Aristotle takes every particular 
virtue to be the mean between these. One of Aristotle’s famous examples is of courage, which 
Aristotle regards as the mean condition between the deficient vice of cowardice and the 
excessive vices of fearlessness and rashness.97 Aristotle affirms in this same section that with 
genuine virtues, “the mean is in a certain way an extreme[.]”98 I understand Aristotle to intend 
by this that there is no way to be too thoroughly habituated into a particular virtue or too 
excellent in its practice: one could not be too thoroughly courageous, for example. The excellence 
of a virtue is extreme, but even as it is an extreme of moral excellence, it remains a mean 
condition between deficiency and excess. The best way I know to visualize this is by analogy to a 
bell-curve. 
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Figure 1: Virtue Simultaneously as a Mean and an Extreme 
The horizontal axis runs from deficiency at left to excess at right, while the vertical axis 
runs from the total absence of moral excellence at bottom up to maximal moral excellence. 
Virtue is at once a mean with respect to deficiency and excess and a maximum with respect to 
moral excellence. This visualization is slightly misleading in two respects. First, the bell-curve 
ordinarily implies some sort of statistically-meaningful distribution, and Aristotle makes no such 
claims about the quantifiability of virtue. Second, Aristotle does not think that all virtues are just 
crude averages that fall precisely in the middle of total deficiency and total excess: a given virtue 
might seem closer to its corresponding vices of excess than to those of deficiency, while another 
virtue might seem closer to its corresponding vices of deficiency than to those of excess. But the 
maximum of moral excellence lies wherever the mean between deficiency and excess lies, and 
the virtuous person will reliably situate her/his choices at that mean. 
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David Hume's Description of Virtue 
Where Aristotle proceeds from received opinion about the virtues and refines it (often 
altering it significantly in the process), David Hume’s account of the virtues in his late Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals seeks instead to identify existing commonalities in widely-
recognized virtues. Hume at one point famously defines a virtue as “a quality of the mind 
agreeable to or approved of by every one, who considers or contemplates it.”99 Elsewhere, Hume 
elaborates that this approval derives from the virtue’s utility for society or for the virtue’s 
possessor.100 Fortunately for the virtues, it is evidently not necessary to establish the utility of a 
particular quality of mind on a case-by-case basis: the approval of society vouchsafes the status 
of these individual qualities of mind as virtues. It is not sufficient, however, for a large number of 
people to approve. Virtues and vices are not “sentiments, peculiar to [an individual], and arising 
from [that individual’s] particular circumstances and situation.”101 Rather, Hume is clear that the 
level of approval required for a quality of mind to qualify as virtue is the approval of a “common 
point of view, […] the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs.”102 
As Tom Beauchamp observes in his introduction to the Enquiry, there are two 
components to Hume’s account of virtue that are distinct but equally important: “(1) a mental 
quality in the person contemplated, and (2) a perception by those who contemplate the 
person.”103 The first component, though, is somewhat ambiguous. A mental quality of the sort 
that Hume describes certainly could include something as sophisticated as habits, with which 
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one becomes more proficient with practice. But Hume’s mental qualities might also be satisfied 
by dispositions, reliable inclinations that are not necessary something one becomes more 
practiced, or even those inclinations themselves. (Hume’s mental qualities would not describe a 
person’s actions, establishing that their closest analogy in contemporary normative theory is 
virtue.) Hume’s particular contribution comes with the second: Hume is confident that 
humanity’s cumulative approval or disapproval is an adequate basis for distinguishing virtue 
from vice. This is a superfluous requirement for eudaimonistic virtue ethics, but it is one of the 
more promising options for distinguishing virtue from vice in the absence of eudaimonia. 
Christine Swanton's Humean Virtue 
Although in chapter one I did not find Christine Swanton’s arguments against 
eudaimonia persuasive, her working definition of virtue as “a good quality of character, more 
specifically a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an 
excellent or good enough way”104 is promising. In defining and analyzing virtue, Swanton departs 
explicitly from the neo-Aristotelian tradition, preferring Hume and Nietzsche as the basis for her 
virtue ethic. Swanton does not pretend that either Hume or Nietzsche would have been aptly 
characterized as virtue ethicists in their own time — though it is unlikely that even Aristotle 
would have recognized that label — or even as specifically concerned with virtue (as opposed to 
morality in general), but Swanton is confident that their insights can be usefully applied to 
contemporary debates about the nature of virtue.105 Swanton further specifies Hume’s appeal to 
the approval of humanity by observing that it would be compatible both with Hume’s account of 
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virtue specifically, and with Hume’s body of work generally, to affirm the existence of “moral facts 
which are constituted not by eternal immutable fitnesses but by ‘natural fitnesses’” and that 
“[s]uch facts cannot be recognized by theoretical reason as such, by understanding, but they can 
be recognized by an emotionally constituted ‘moral sense.’”106 I am not persuaded that Hume 
— despite his frequent remonstrances with rationalists — is quite so averse to theoretical 
reasoning about morality, of which he does a good deal himself. But Swanton is right to stress 
that the moral facts that enter into Hume’s reflection, and that enter into our own, are not 
narrowly intellectual, and that there is nothing particularly inimical to virtue in expecting that 
emotion will play a significant part in our moral evaluations of ourselves and others. Swanton 
neatly summarizes what is quite disparate in Hume, and makes clear what makes a quality of 
character “good” and how emotions can rightly figure into that evaluation. However, for reasons 
I will discuss in connection with consequentialist satisficing near the end of this chapter, I 
cannot so quickly endorse a definition of virtue that explicitly appeals to “good enough” as 
opposed to excellent, nor am I persuaded that this suffix is necessary if the evaluation of 
humanity is itself responsible for determining whether a quality of character is sufficiently good 
to qualify as virtue. 
Judith Andre's Contemporary Buddhist Virtue 
In her book Worldly Virtue, Judith Andre develops an account of virtue that proceeds to a 
significant extent from her “generically Buddhist tradition.”107 In service of her careful analysis 
of several under-examined (and often under-appreciated) virtues, Andre defines virtues as 
                                                            
106 Swanton, Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 12. 
107 Judith Andre, Worldly Virtue: Moral Ideals and Contemporary Life (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 5. 
 
61 
“habits of understanding, perception, emotion, and behavior that promote the welfare of their 
possessor or of the community, and ideally of both.”108 Andre explicitly rejects both the 
Aristotelian doctrines that all virtues are means between vices and that all the virtues unify, 
averring that some virtues can conflict with one another. Andre adds that “many virtues can be 
usefully understood as skills, […] learned capacit[ies] to do something that requires thoughtful 
attention.”109 And Andre, citing Linda Zagzebski approvingly, expects that most virtues must 
achieve their ends consistently, if not always.110 
Andre’s overall tenor when she writes about what is true of most virtues is very congenial 
to my project here, which is concerned with some of those quirky virtues that are not like most 
virtues. The exceptions that Andre’s definition permits would, for the most part, allow me to 
affirm her account of virtues without too much further elaboration. The only difficulty, however, 
is an important one: Andre is persuaded that virtues are those habits that “promote the welfare 
of their possessor or of the community[.]”111 Were I adapting Andre’s definition directly, I would 
need to add that virtues have the potential to promote welfare, not that they necessarily do 
promote that welfare, since some of the difficulty with wandering virtues is that they may not 
promote welfare, after all. There is tension within Andre’s definition along these lines. Andre’s 
agreement that not all virtues reliably achieve their aims, it seems strange to require that all 
virtues should (succeed in) promoting welfare. 
                                                            
108 Ibid., 6. 
109 Ibid., 7. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., 6. 
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A Working Definition of Virtue 
I have identified elements in all of the foregoing definitions of virtue that are valuable for 
my project here, and also elements in each that I wish to avoid. With an eye on all four definitions, 
I propose the following as my working definition of any particular virtue: 
A virtue is a habit (or a set of interoperating habits) or a disposition (or a set of interoperating 
dispositions) that responds to and generates norms within a particular field of concern. 
To avoid needless wordiness going forward, I will use “habit” and “disposition” 
interchangeably in their connections with virtue and assume that “habit” also implies a set of 
habits and “disposition” a set of dispositions. 
It will help clarify each part of this definition to offer more specific attribution to the 
scholars I have reviewed above. As does Andre, I expect that virtues are often habits (often aptly 
analogized to skills that can be learned and steadily improved). Those virtues that are not 
obviously learned must at least be reliable dispositions, as Hume and Swanton allow. With all of 
the authors, these virtues are responsive: an appropriately habituated, skilled, or disposed 
person with a certain virtue will perceive the implications of that virtue in the context of that 
person’s life. The stipulation that virtues are also generative is a nod to Hume’s and Swanton’s 
criteria by which virtues and vices are distinguished from one another. Virtues do not merely 
issue in private, inscrutable attitudes, but manifest themselves. And those manifestations are 
subject to public evaluation and scrutiny. “Justice” that issues in activities and moral 
expectations that consistently draw the censure of humanity is probably not justice. This is not 
to say that societies cannot be mistaken about matters of virtue, but it is to say that virtues are 
open to, and almost always improved by, the input and feedback of the societies that form our 
moral context. 
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Some apology must be made for the ethical argot “norm” in the definition. My aim is to 
avoid both debates concerning, and over-drawn distinctions between, the character and content 
of what makes good people good and right actions right, and I believe that this placeholder can 
accommodate most meta-ethical theories. A response to the norms associated with the virtue of 
justice could be the dutiful action of giving true but damning witness against a friend in court, 
to the satisfaction of deontologists. One might “generate” norms associated with the virtue of 
justice by inculcating the virtue of justice in one’s own children, propagating the virtue of justice 
to the satisfaction of virtue ethicists. A hybrid response to, and generation of, norms associated 
with the virtue of justice might be an effort to pass reform legislation to adjust sentencing 
guidelines to the benefit of those whose incarceration is less than just, a response that 
consequentialists would endorse. This would reshape the most proximate norms of just 
sentencing in response to the injustice of those prevenient norms’ consequences. My use of 
“norms” can accommodate good consequences, obligations, and virtues alike and acknowledge 
them as valuable to the project of virtue. Additionally, the term “norm” has the further merit of 
allowing the flexibility with regard to potential promotion of wellbeing that I recommended in 
connection with Andre’s definition of virtue. I do not think it plausible to label something a norm 
that has no prospects of improving wellbeing: it seems obviously immoral to promote outcomes, 
obligations, or habits by which everyone involved is fully expected to suffer without the 
consolation of offsetting benefits. These disastrous outcomes, obligations, or habits would not 
be norms at all. But there is no paradox in affirming that credible norms may not always promote 
welfare. The status of a norm as a norm, as I conceive it, depends on humanity’s positive 
evaluation of the norm, not on that evaluation’s perfect accuracy. Finally, the requirement that 
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virtues respond to and generate norms does avoid the theoretical problems of eudaimonia: we 
do not need to agree on the shape of human flourishing or the ultimate human good to agree on 
norms closer to hand. 
The “particular field of concern” of a specific virtue is the most convenient mechanism 
by which I can envision distinguishing one virtue from another, but there are several 
misunderstandings that I am keen to avoid. First, the fields of concern for particular virtues 
routinely overlap. Most or all of the field of concern of the virtue of generosity will also fall within 
charity’s ambit. Other virtues, such as justice and mercy, will overlap less without necessarily 
implying a conflict between them. I am agnostic as to whether there are ethical norms that fall 
outside the fields of all virtues, going beyond ethics, so to speak. Not even Søren Kierkegaard 
seems to have been prepared to affirm the existence of norms falling outside the field of any 
virtue in Fear and Trembling, since Abraham is responding (however disturbingly) to the norms 
he discerned within the field of concern of the virtue of faith.112 
Defining Wandering Virtues Constructively 
With a general definition of virtue in hand, I now turn to those virtues that manifest 
strange tendencies in the absence of eudaimonia and the unity of the virtues. After 
acknowledging the unlikely source of my terminology, I offer a formal definition of “wandering 
virtues” and then review the requirements I stipulate for wandering virtue in those requirements’ 
application to the virtues of charity, courage, and hope. 
                                                            
112 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), 75-81. 
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The Source of the Label 
G. K. Chesterton — in the midst of comparing the writers Henry James, George Bernard 
Shaw, and Émile Zola unfavorably to the inquisitor Tomás de Torquemada — offers a memorable 
diagnosis of the roots of modern moral decline: 
The modern world is not evil; in some ways the modern world is far too good. It is full of wild and wasted 
virtues. When a religious scheme is shattered (as Christianity was shattered at the Reformation), it is not 
merely the vices that are let loose. The vices are, indeed, let loose, and they wander and do damage. But the 
virtues are let loose also; and the virtues wander more wildly, and the virtues do more terrible damage. The 
modern world is full of the old Christian virtues gone mad. The virtues have gone mad because they have 
been isolated from each other and are wandering alone. Thus some scientists care for truth; and their truth 
is pitiless. Thus some humanitarians only care for pity; and their pity (I am sorry to say) is often 
untruthful.113 
Chesterton was neither the first nor the last to lament the disintegration of the religious 
ties that once ostensibly bound Europe together or to criticize the zealousness of scientists and 
progressive activists. I do not think Chesterton is correct about the dangers of the virtues of 
honesty or sympathy. As I will argue further down, many (if not most) virtues are exempt from 
the liability he attributes to modern virtues. Chesterton seems also to be describing overbearing 
principles, rather than virtues in a sense that Aristotle, Hume, or any of their inheritors would 
recognize. But however accidentally, Chesterton identifies the way in which some virtues can 
wander off and carry us with them when we jettison unifying beliefs that we might more 
conveniently take for granted. 
I will not pause here to ruminate over the historical roots of modern pluralism, to debate 
whether the European worldview was ever as unified as Chesterton assumes, or to assess 
whether such a hegemony was better abandoned. For the theoretical and practical reasons I 
rehearsed in chapter one, virtue can no longer assume that all the virtues will unify in a common 
                                                            
113 Gilbert K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (London: The Bodley Head, 1908), 38-39. 
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ideal of human flourishing or in an integrated human character. We need not lay the blame — if 
blame it is — at the feet of the Reformation to recognize that in the absence of eudaimonia and 
the unity of the virtues, some virtues can, in principle, be true virtues and still do harm to human 
flourishing and to integrated character. And Chesterton’s depiction of this harm as a sort of 
wandering seems to me particularly apt. Certain virtues, loosed from the dubious requirements 
that were supposed to bind them to human flourishing and the other virtues, really can stray 
from the other virtues, and may carry us with them, to the detriment of our flourishing or our 
character. With apologies to Chesterton for using his terminology for work to which he would 
likely object, I call these peculiar virtues “wandering virtues.” 
A Formal Definition of Wandering Virtues 
Anthropomorphic descriptions of certain virtues as “wanderers” will not suffice for a 
formal definition, or even to identify the family resemblance that unifies them. Any particular 
virtue, I have suggested, might be well characterized as the habit by which we respond to and 
generate norms in a particular field of concern. As a definition of wandering virtues, I propose 
the following three conditions, individually necessary and jointly sufficient for identification as 
a wandering virtue. A wandering virtue 
1. Encourages its possessor to neglect one or more of that person’s other virtues, 
2. Possesses no clear coordinate vices other than those that describe a deficiency of the 
virtue,114 and 
                                                            
114 R. E. Ewin describes a similar feature in connection with loyalty, one of the virtues I will consider later on. “It 
might be replied that jingoism is not a case of loyalty at all, just as foolhardiness is not a case of courage, but that 
could be so only if loyalty had built into it as part of itself a capacity for judgement that excluded such excess. (It is 
the capacity that is at issue; mistake in a particular case is a possibility for even the most virtuous.)” I do not favor 
Ewin’s language of built-in judgment, mostly because this seems likely to be a means by which to insinuate 
phronesis into virtue, for me a concerning strategy that oversimplifies certain virtues. As it happens, loyalty’s 
anemic judgment weighs heavily against counting loyalty as a virtue in Ewin’s thinking. R. E. Ewin, “Loyalty and 
Virtues,” Philosophical Quarterly 42, no. 169 (October 1992): 405. 
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3. Lacks intrinsic references to the values of others considered as actual individuals. 
To be clear, the encouragement required in (1) is not insuperable or dispositive. It is key 
to my understanding of wandering virtues that it is possible, albeit tenuous and challenging, to 
possess a wandering virtue and not neglect other specific virtues. But wandering virtues do 
encourage neglect of other virtues, make that neglect more likely, and make that neglect more 
difficult for the wandering virtue’s possessor to discern. The strength of this encouragement 
toward neglect of other virtues is directly proportional to the proficiency or excellence with 
which a person possesses or lives out the wandering virtue: the more virtuous one is with regard 
to a wandering virtue, the stronger will be the wandering virtue’s encouragement to neglect other 
virtues and the less likely it is that one will discern that neglect if and when it transpires. 
The notion of a coordinate vice also require some unpacking. A vice is coordinate to a 
virtue when the virtue resists that vice (and the vice resists the virtue) more-or-less by definition. 
Like virtues, vices are habits by which persons respond to and generate norms within a certain 
field of concern, with the variation that the vicious responses and generated norms warrant 
censure, not praise. Because they are independent habits, coordinate vices are recognizable 
without direct comparison with the virtue or virtues with which they coordinate: Ebenezer 
Scrooge is obviously a miser despite the dearth of wealthy philanthropists in A Christmas Carol 
with whom to compare him. All virtues have one or more coordinate vices representing a 
deficiency in the virtue: a deficiency of generosity is miserliness, a deficiency of thrift is profligacy, 
and so on. Other virtues seem also to have a coordinate vice representing undue extremity. For 
instance, the vice representing deficiency of the virtue of sexual propriety is lewdness, while 
excessive concern for sexual propriety is recognizably the vice of prudery. As discussed earlier, 
Aristotle held that all virtues are means between a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess, but this 
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doctrine is now widely rejected, largely on empirical grounds. Some virtues resist numerous, 
distinct coordinate vices, vices not only of deficiency and excess but also vices representing other 
defects: charity, which I discuss below, is a good example of a virtue that has numerous 
coordinate vices distinct from vices of deficiency and excess. However, other virtues seem to have 
all their coordinate vices on the side of deficiency, with no clear coordinate vices describing 
excessive realizations of the virtue. It now seems incoherent to talk about an excess of the virtue 
of justice: one can certainly be unjust, but one cannot become too just. Those virtues whose 
coordinate vices all fall on the side of deficiencies in the virtue will meet the second requirement 
for wandering virtues. 
The special stress in the third requirement’s “intrinsic references to the values of others 
considered as actual individuals” is on “actual.” Some virtues, by definition, require their 
possessors to consult the actual values that others presently hold. The virtue of kindness, for 
instance, obliges its possessor to consult the values and preferences of those to whom the kind 
person aims to be kind. There is something defective in the kindness of a tract-society missionary 
whose “kindness” consists in distributing only Bibles to starving children: however great a 
benefit may accrue to those who read the Bible diligently in the mind of the missionary, it is 
unlikely that this is a high priority in the minds of the children. We would expect, instead, that a 
kind missionary would inquire after the children’s most fundamental needs and supply those 
first. Virtues that have intrinsic references to the values are sometimes quickly labeled “other-
regarding” virtues, but it is well to be cautious here: some apparently other-regarding virtues do 
not concern themselves with values that other persons actually hold, but only with those values 
that we think those other persons should hold. Any virtue that does not refer to the values of 
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others at all because it looks inward at the virtue’s possessor will meet the third requirement for 
wandering virtues. So too will any virtue that refers only to the values that others should have 
without considering whether those others do have those values. 
Such virtues, I think, are rare among the virtues from a numerical standpoint: few of the 
many virtues we could rattle off would meet the three conditions above and thereby qualify as 
wandering virtues. But wandering virtues are not, I think, particularly rare in the persons around 
us. The virtues of modesty, patience, and loyalty (all of which I argue are wandering virtues) are, 
thankfully, on fairly frequent display. What wandering virtues lack in number, they make up for 
in prominence in moral experience. But they are numerically rare, and in order to avoid unduly 
anticipating my later chapters, I will here consider a virtue that is emphatically not a wandering 
virtue (charity), one that is almost a wandering virtue (courage), and one that may be a 
wandering virtue (hope) in order to clarify the three components of a wandering virtue. 
Charity, an Antithesis of Wandering Virtue 
Charity is one of the most celebrated virtues in the Christian tradition courtesy of Paul’s 
commendation of charity in 1 Corinthians 13:13. Charity is also the antithesis of a wandering 
virtue. In order to formalize charity along the lines I have proposed for virtue in general, let 
charity be the habit by which we respond to and generate norms with regard to the long-term 
welfare of others. While I am loath to argue from definition, this is a fairly uncontroversial 
definition of charity that also makes it self-evident that charity makes intrinsic reference to the 
values of others, failing the third requirement for a wandering virtue. Charity does not motivate 
its possessor to neglect one or more of its possessor’s other virtues, at least not so far as I can tell: 
charity as defined seems not only compatible with, but also improved by, such disparate virtues 
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as courage, honesty, and temperance. Charity is more perfect if the one who habitually concerns 
herself/himself with the welfare of others is not shy about running risks to achieve that welfare, 
if he/she is honest with herself/himself and others about her/his plans and their efficacy, and if 
he/she is able to moderate her/his efforts in the short-term to ensure that resources remain 
available for long-term benefit. We could multiply examples of virtues not only compatible with, 
but also enhancements to, charity, while I doubt we could identify any uncontroversial virtue 
that charity encourages us to neglect. Not for nothing does charity vie with justice for the crown 
of queen of the virtues.115 Thus charity fails the first requirement for wandering virtues. With 
regard to the second requirement, the virtue of charity is delimited on all sides with coordinate 
vices. One whose regard for the welfare of others is divorced from those others’ own estimates of 
their welfare is a busy-body or meddler. One whose charity is insufficiently consistent is a fair-
weather friend. One whose charity is insufficiently practical is at best “well-meaning” (in the 
most dismissive sense of that phrase) and at worst mawkish. One whose charity is deficient is 
callous or even cruel. Genuine charity can be readily triangulated with reference to the numerous 
vices that bound it. Charity is so firmly rooted in the other virtues and in the flourishing of others 
that it is unlikely to adversely affect the character of its possessor (and unlikely to adversely affect 
human flourishing except under extreme circumstances), even without reference to eudaimonia 
or to the unity of the virtues. 
                                                            
115 See Timothy P. Jackson, The Priority of Love: Christian Charity and Social Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2003). 
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Courage, Almost a Wandering Virtue 
Courage is a notoriously troublesome virtue, both for the reasons I mention in chapter 
one and many others beside. Let courage be the habit by which we respond to and generate 
norms with regard to dangers to ourselves. Courage is not quite a wandering virtue: it satisfies 
the first and third requirement but fails the second. Courage does encourage its possessor to 
neglect other virtues, such as benevolence. A courageous person will likely find it easier to be 
courageous if he/she is less benevolent than he/she might be, particularly if others will be 
endangered by the risks the courageous person proposes to run. A lieutenant in the First World 
War who courageously volunteers himself and his unit to spearhead the charge into the no-man’s 
land between trenches will have an easier time living out his courage if he does not particularly 
concern himself with the lives and welfare of the men under his command. In this same way, 
courage does not have intrinsic references to the values of others, satisfying the third 
requirement for wandering virtue. It might be that the men under the lieutenant’s command are 
all equally enthusiastic about leading the charge, or (more likely) that some might prefer not to 
be volunteered, but the lieutenant’s courage will not impel him to consult the values and 
preferences of the men under his command, let alone the values and preferences of the enemy 
soldiers whose lives the lieutenant hopes to take. Not all courage is this way, of course, but the 
point with wandering virtues is that there is nothing inherent in the virtue itself that entails 
consideration of the values of others.  
But the lieutenant’s courage does fail the second requirement: there are well-known and 
widely accepted coordinate vices that bound the virtue of courage: cowardice and rashness. 
Neither cowardice nor rashness is, by definition, courage, though all three are closely related. 
Cowardice is the absence of courage and rashness is enthusiasm for risk that has slid from 
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courage into vice by abandoning concern for risk altogether. Both of these vices are attributable 
without direct reference to courage. We might differ significantly with regard to what constitutes 
courage’s highest excellence, but we would still quickly agree that fraternity brothers lighting 
fireworks inside their underwear are not courageous, but rash. Similarly, we would not need to 
agree on the substance of courage to identify cowardice. Courage is tempted to neglect both 
other virtues and the values of others, but is ultimately somewhat constrained by its own terms: 
the vices that courage abhors prevent courage from wandering too far. None of this is to 
downplay the challenge that the virtue of courage presents to virtuous life more generally, but it 
is to say that courage’s challenge to human flourishing and good character is not the same as the 
challenges posed by wandering virtues. 
Hope, Possibly a Wandering Virtue 
Hope, depending on how it is construed, may be a wandering virtue. Suppose hope is the 
habit by which we respond to and generate norms related to the uncertainties of the future. This 
is an approximation of everyday hope, the sort of hope we observe in the adult daughter of a 
“frequent flyer” in the intensive care unit. The daughter, by habit and repeated experience, hopes 
that her mother will rally once more and return to her assisted living facility to live out another 
few months in comparative health. Despite all the scares and all the bad news, this daughter is 
hopeful: she has the virtue of hope. But the daughter’s hope can wander and come to harm both 
the well-being of the patient and the character of the daughter. Hope can encourage neglect of 
other virtues, perhaps none more so than attentiveness. The daughter’s hope may inspire her to 
downplay or ignore clear signs that this admission is different for her mother, to disagree with 
and antagonize physicians who bring unwelcome news about her mother’s disease process. 
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Hope may thus satisfy the first requirement for a wandering virtue. It also satisfies the second. 
Everyday hope is only bounded on one side by one vice: despair, habitual pessimism with regard 
to the possibilities of the future. And like a fence-rail, this only prevents the virtue of hope from 
straying in one direction. Extreme hope for the deeply improbable is harder to peg as a vice, in 
part because the improbable is not the impossible. Intensive-care clinicians with even a few 
years’ experience begin to accumulate stories of patients who seemed certain to die despite all 
medical interventions, but who rallied and returned to rude health within months of discharge. 
With only one clear coordinate vice to steer it negatively, the virtue of hope is free to wander in 
almost any direction but toward its own oblivion. And this everyday hope is all too prone to 
neglect the values of others. Hope that the patient will recover if only clinicians can buy a little 
more time has justified countless families in pursuing highly aggressive plans of care for patients 
who, it turns out, were explicit when capacitated that they did not want any aggressive treatment 
to prolong their biological lives under such circumstances. Everyday hope, then, may be a 
wandering virtue: it motivates neglect of other virtues, lacks references to coordinate vices that 
would clearly delimit it, and lacks intrinsic reference to the values of others. 
But I am not committed to the definition of hope I offer here, and I grant that the 
theological hope valorized in Christian theology is probably not a wandering virtue. Christian 
hope will not encourage the Christian to neglect other virtues, inasmuch as a Christian’s hope is 
often for, among other things, a morally perfect or even super-moral future in which God’s love 
and sovereignty are made fully manifest. Christian hope is typically given a definite object, God’s 
eschatological triumph, so that Christian hope is better bounded by the sin of idolatry (which, 
among other things, implies misplaced hope) than is everyday hope, which is less hemmed in. 
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And Christian hope is directed at God, whose regard for the value of all creation is often treated 
as if it were analytic, entailed in God’s goodness in creation and present redemptive purpose. It 
is unsurprising that Christian hope should be free of the problems of a hope that does not 
presuppose Christianity: God’s providence or designs for humanity not infrequently play the role 
of eudaimonia in Christian virtue ethics. My purpose here is to consider virtues without reference 
to eudaimonia or to the unity of the virtues, but the virtue of hope in U.S. medical contexts is 
often entangled with theological doctrines that entail eudaimonia. However, if we do not 
presuppose eudaimonia or something analogous to it, hope is a fair example of a wandering 
virtue.116 
Defining Wandering Virtues Critically 
Any time that someone proposes a supposedly novel concept in a field as well-trod as 
ethics, we are very reasonable to ask if there is not some existing, more familiar concept that 
would serve as well or almost as well. I will argue that wandering virtues are not well described 
by existing concepts in ethics and will define wandering virtues in contrast with concepts that, 
though similar to wandering virtues, are in fact distinct from wandering virtues in important 
ways. As I am proposing a concept within the theory of virtue, most of my focus is on apparently 
similar, existing concepts in theories of virtue: I will argue that wandering virtues are not better 
described as splendid vices, feelings and passions, natural virtues, executive virtues, virtues-in-
                                                            
116 Judith Andre suggests a very different strategy by which hope can escape from the difficulties associated with 
wandering virtues. While Christian hope escapes the difficulties that trouble wandering virtues by specifying 
hope’s right or proper object, Andre instead proposes an “open hope” that is not object- or goal-oriented at all. 
Andre’s open hope does not hope for (that is, anticipate) any particular desideratum, but rather “keep[s] in mind 
the possibilities of good” that exist in any situation and that one can recognize as long as one is not particular 
about which goods those should be. Andre’s redefinition and reorientation of hope has strong appeal, but 
consciously excludes much of the sense that “hope” has in U.S. healthcare contexts, and perhaps in most non-
Buddhist contexts as well. See Andre, Worldly Virtue, 37-40. 
 
75 
excess, partial virtues, or virtues in feedback loops. In addition to concepts from theories of 
virtue, I will also contrast wandering virtues with superficially similar concepts in deontology 
and consequentialism. These contrasts will not only show what wandering virtues are not, but 
also afford opportunities to make the positive meaning of wandering virtues more clear. 
Splendid Vices 
Some authors appear at first blush to agree that virtues may sometimes stray, but turn 
out on closer examination to regard such virtues as vices in disguise. Philippa Foot seems to trace 
a distinction between virtues that are not prone to straying and those that are when she writes, 
“[W]hile wisdom always operates as a virtue, its close relation prudence does not, and it is 
prudence rather than wisdom that inspires many a careful life. Prudence is not a virtue in 
everyone[.]” But it turns out that this troublesome “prudence” is not true prudence on Foot’s 
account, but “is rather an over-anxious concern for safety and propriety[.]”117 This sort of 
“prudence” that is not a virtue in everyone is no virtue at all, according to Foot. Although Foot 
does not do so, we might characterize Foot’s suspect “prudence” as an interoperation of the vices 
of cowardice and prudery. 
Although Foot’s specious “prudence” may be explained in terms of recognized vices, the 
impulse to denigrate specific instantiations of apparent virtue when we find its consequences or 
possessors disagreeable is pervasive. This impulse is also deleterious, both to our conception of 
virtue and to our ability to appreciate our own virtues and those of others. In Putting on Virtue, 
Jennifer Herdt persuasively argues that Augustinian skepticism with regard to apparent virtue 
                                                            
117 Philippa Foot, “Virtues and Vices,” in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002), 18. 
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gave rise to “deracinated forms of Christian ethics on the one hand and truncated forms of 
secular ethics on the other” by the early modern period.118 One of Herdt’s overarching themes is 
that medieval and early modern exaggerations of Augustine’s response to Aristotle’s account of 
how virtue is acquired — the hyper-Augustinian critique of virtue acquired by human effort — 
diverted moral reflection away from practical considerations such as learning and living out 
virtue and toward passive inquiry into whether apparent virtue was genuine or specious. 
Although Herdt credits Augustine with more nuance than his later interpreters preserve, she 
agrees that “[f]or Augustine, love of God and love of virtue are interdefined in such a way that 
those who fail to love God are unable truly to choose virtuous actions for their own sake. 
Habituation [in apparent virtue] simply anchors them more deeply in pride and self-love.”119 
From a later distortion of this arises the hyper-Augustinian position that all virtues not directed 
at the ultimate good (that is, God) were merely “splendid” or “glittering” vices:120 whatever their 
apparent benefit, these splendid vices would only harm the character of their possessor. Herdt 
argues that Augustine’s heirs, witting and unwitting, in the early modern period tended to 
overreact to Augustine’s skepticism about outward, apparent virtues and consistently erred on 
one side or the other. Figures such Luther and the Puritans found outward virtue so suspect that 
they became leery of any virtue seemingly increased by or manifested in human effort: Luther 
made true virtue a pure gift from God that was essentially inscrutable, while the Puritans became 
preoccupied with scrutinizing their own virtue and that of others for evidence of hypocrisy, a less 
constructive task than striving to become more virtuous. More cynical moralists proved too 
                                                            
118 Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting On Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 4. 
119 Ibid., 45. 
120 Ibid. 
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quick to trivialize the difference between, on the one hand, virtue for virtue’s sake and, on the 
other hand, the facade of “virtue” for the sake of base self-interest.121 Herdt’s most self-evident 
example is La Rochefoucauld, who famously begins his Reflections with the pessimistic assertion, 
“Our virtues are most frequently but vices disguised[,]”122 then proceeds by turns to castigate 
almost all virtues as mere dissimulation and to criticize people who are deficient in these same, 
evidently shabby virtues. 
To avoid both passivity and cynicism, Herdt recommends that the discipline of ethics 
adapt and recover the Augustinian distinction between genuine and apparent virtue. Though 
she devotes more space to the benefits this rehabilitation would provide for theological ethics, 
Herdt suggests that even secular ethics would benefit from a similar reappraisal of Augustine’s 
distinction. Specifically, Herdt believes that the reappraisal would allow secular ethicists to 
simultaneously affirm three desirable theses about virtue that are likely to seem incompatible so 
long as virtues acquired or manifested by human effort still suffer from hyper-Augustinian 
skepticism. The first thesis is “that virtue is properly pursued not for the sake of external goods 
[…] but for its own sake”; the second, that self-interest is basically compatible with, but should 
finally give way to, altruistic concern for one’s community; and the third, that true virtue 
“emerges out of a complex array of relationships and institutions,” showing that virtue is always 
learned and that the virtuous cannot take sole or even primary credit for their moral 
excellence.123 
                                                            
121 Ibid., 72-73, 173 ff., 197 ff., 248 ff. 
122 François duc de La Rochefoucauld, Reflections; Or, Sentences and Moral Maxims, trans. J. W. Willis Bund and J. 
Hain Friswell (London: Sampson Low, Marston, & Co., 1898), 1. 
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I would be willing to affirm all three of these theses (likely with clarification), but all three 
operate at a remove from the practical concerns with specific virtues that interest me here. I 
would like to see virtue justified on its own terms at the meta-ethical level, and I would like to 
ensure that we settle on a moral anthropology in which genuine virtue can be learned and 
acquired by human effort without pretending that the virtuous person is ever independent of 
her/his context. Here I simply assume that all of that is true. However, there are other lessons to 
learn from Herdt’s account of the problems that overdrawn distinctions between genuine and 
apparent virtue inflict upon the virtues in general. 
Herdt ably demonstrates that skepticism about the genuineness of one apparent instance 
of a virtue can easily spill over into skepticism about that virtue as a whole, or even about human 
virtue in general. Reconsider Foot’s skepticism about “prudence” above. As Foot investigates an 
apparent virtue that has, in some people, disagreeable consequences for character, Foot elects 
to portray that virtue as counterfeit. Foot evidently does not want to characterize all concern for 
“safety and propriety” as inappropriate, as she labels the concern for these in counterfeit 
“prudence” as “overanxious.”124 But it would seem to be the work of Foot’s prudence, even the 
genuine article, to worry or at least concern itself with safety and propriety. The trouble with 
counterfeit prudence is, in a sense, only that it fulfills prudence’s mandate too well for Foot’s 
liking. I am skeptical of any account of a virtue that defines the genuine article in terms of getting 
things exactly right. 
I am skeptical for one of the reasons that Herdt raises several times in her thorough 
analysis: if the only version of virtue that is genuine is virtue that is already perfect in the 
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important respects, it is impossible to ever meaningfully improve in virtue. But improving in 
virtue is exactly what we would expect as people acquire the habits of virtue, that is, learn that 
virtue or grow in it. The true alternative is theological (or, without reference to God, magical) 
thinking about the acquisition of virtue: vicious people acquire genuine virtue when suddenly 
and for no humanly intelligible reason they manage to get a virtue exactly right. Luther may have 
been satisfied with this line of thinking: he could appeal to God’s inscrutable grace to bestow 
perfect virtue without human activity. But in the pluralistic and practical context of clinical 
ethics, we will despair of finding, let alone encouraging, virtue if it must be already perfect. 
Herdt’s account of the splendid vices shows, among other things, that it is not helpful to 
the virtues or to imperfect humans to urge that an apparent virtue that worries us is probably a 
splendid vice. Even if we are troubled by the mischief that wandering virtues can work, that is no 
good reason to rush to call them vices in disguise. 
Feelings And Passions 
Vice, however, is not the only contrast to virtue available. Non-virtuous passions or 
feelings, such as anger, frustration, or pity, may also inconvenience the virtues, and it might be 
that what I am calling “wandering virtues” are not virtues at all, but are rather passions or 
feelings. Joseph Butler, reflecting on why humans would have such inconvenient characteristics, 
writes in one of his sermons, 
As God Almighty foresaw the irregularities and disorders, both natural and moral, which would happen in 
this state of things, he hath graciously made some provision against them, by giving us several passions and 
affections, which arise from, or whose objects are, those disorders. Of this sort are fear, resentment, 
compassion, and others; of which there could be no occasion or use in a perfect state: but in the present we 
should be exposed to greater inconveniences without them; though there are very considerable ones, which 
they themselves are the occasions of. They are incumbrances indeed, but such as we are obliged to carry 
about with us through this various journey of life: some of them as a guard against the violent assault of 
others; and, in our own defence, some in behalf of others; and all of them to put us upon and help to carry 
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us through a course of behaviour suitable to our condition, in default of that perfection of wisdom and 
virtue, which would be, in all respects, our better security.125 
There are echoes of the wandering virtues in Butler’s description of the passions and 
affections granted by God. Just as wandering virtues only arise when we cease to assume the a 
priori perfection of true virtue, the passions and affections are hallmarks of imperfection. And 
just as the passions and affections give rise to significant difficulties while averting still worse 
ones, so too may wandering virtues. But wandering virtues differ from Butler’s passions and 
affections in that wandering virtues are habits that we may adopt and grow more proficient in, 
while passions and affections, though morally-relevant experiences, are not the sort of thing in 
which one becomes more expert. One may become better at dealing with anger, frustration, or 
pity — and in Butler, virtue’s work seems often to be restraint of these passions and affections126 
— but one does not thereby become more proficient in being angry, frustrated, or pitiful. More 
generally, the passions and feelings, as Butler describes them, are not habits that tend toward 
improvement, but felt concessions to the imperfection of the world. For instance, one might 
argue that we are better off because we can be frustrated, but only because frustration registers 
challenges we might otherwise underestimate. All the same, frustration’s worldly benefits do not 
inspire us to praise people for their high levels of frustration. Wandering virtues, though, are 
often things we do praise in others, and this is, I think, because they are virtues, even if some of 
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them tend to complicate “that perfection of wisdom and virtue, which would be, in all respects, 
our better security.”127 
Natural Virtues 
Even if it is not apt to assimilate wandering virtues to feelings or passions, it may still be 
the case that apparently “wandering” virtues are simply immature or nascent virtues that would 
not stray with greater practice and proficiency. Aristotle draws a distinction between natural 
virtues and virtues that are, in fact, genuine, true, and perfect. Aristotle grants that children and 
animals seem to possess something like virtue: children and dogs can seem to be loyal, for 
instance, and often to each other. As a courtesy, Aristotle identifies these as “natural” virtues. But 
Aristotle argues that the natural virtue of children and animals is merely apparent virtue, 
because unlike true virtue, children and animals lack phronesis. The absence of phronesis is 
Aristotle’s explanation for why these pseudo-virtues “are obviously capable of doing harm[,]”128 
something true (that is, perfect) virtue would never do. Having rejected appeals to a unifying 
virtue of phronesis as question-begging, plainly I will not be persuaded by this distinction 
between apparent, natural virtue and genuine virtue on the basis of phronesis. Moreover, putting 
weight on these sorts of distinctions between merely apparent virtue — even apparent virtue 
flattered with the label “natural” — and genuine virtue distorts the character of the virtues 
themselves as habits into which one grows no less than does the distinction between specious 
virtues (the splendid vices) and genuine ones. This dovetails with another reason that this 
distinction between natural and true virtue will not adequately explain the wandering virtues. 
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Any and all genuine virtues may be as yet incompletely realized by their possessors, but only a 
small subset of virtues are prone to the wandering I have identified. The charity of most 
recognizable charitable people, for instance, may still have some room for improvement: a 
person who is conspicuously and reliably charitable may still sometimes entertain contrary 
inclinations and perform contrary acts. But charity is not a wandering virtue, even without a 
global virtue of phronesis and without a global end for all virtues in eudaimonia. What makes 
wandering virtues different and difficult is not that their possessors may be habituated into them 
in varying degrees: this is true of all virtues, at least on my (decidedly non-Aristotelian) account. 
Executive Virtues 
While sketching a substantially different account of virtue than the one I use here, Onora 
O’Neill proposes a category of virtues that, at first blush, might seem to explain the peculiarity of 
the wandering virtues. O’Neill labels as “executive virtues” those virtues that 
are manifested in deciding on, controlling and guiding action, policies and practices of all sorts. Executive 
virtues might include self-respect, self-control and decisiveness; courage and endurance, as well as 
numerous contemporary conceptions of autonomy; insight and self-knowledge, and various traits that are 
both cognitive and practical, such as efficiency, carefulness and accuracy.129 
O’Neill thinks executive virtues are different from others because executive virtues are 
not properly moral: “these virtues are important […] for doing ill and for doing good[.]”130 Among 
O’Neill’s list of examples, we observe several of the troublesome virtues, including courage and 
decisiveness, that seem to cause far more harm than good when possessed by people committed 
to deplorable ends. It is tempting to try to explain away the peculiarity of the wandering virtues 
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by appealing to a distinction between virtues that shape our goals and virtues that help us realize 
our goals, whatever those goals may be. 
However, conflating wandering virtues with executive virtues would abandon some of the 
distinctiveness of both. Many executive virtues, as O’Neill describes them, would satisfy my third 
requirement for wandering virtues: they lack intrinsic references to the values of others. 
Decisiveness, courage, endurance, self-knowledge, and accuracy can all be narrowly confined to 
the self, omitting reference to the values of others. Accuracy seems not to refer to the values of 
others and not to be bounded by coordinate vices, either, satisfying the second and third 
requirements for wandering virtues. The vices of inaccuracy or sloppiness may describe a dearth 
of accuracy, but there seem not be recognizable vices that characterize preoccupation with 
accuracy that is prima facie inappropriate. But accuracy is not a wandering virtue because it does 
not encourage neglect of other virtues. Efficiency, meanwhile, may satisfy the first and third 
requirements for wandering virtues, but will still fail the second. Efficiency may encourage 
neglect of more humane virtues such as charity and justice — witness hedonistic utilitarianism’s 
contortions to establish its compatibility with charity and justice — and by the same token fail 
to consult the values of others. But the virtue of efficiency is bounded by at least the coordinate 
vices of inefficiency and hastiness. 
Still other executive virtues do not satisfy any of the requirements of wandering virtues. 
For example, carefulness does not encourage neglect of other virtues: carefulness would actually 
seem to encourage the opposite. Carefulness is bounded by the coordinate vices of fussiness and 
carelessness. And carefulness does consult the values of others, with regard to which a careful 
person will take care, even if only to protect herself/himself. From the side of the wandering 
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virtues, at least one wandering virtue, loyalty, is not concerned with “deciding on, controlling 
and guiding action,”131 as the executive virtues are. The category of executive virtues, though 
useful in its own right, overlaps at most partially with the wandering virtues: consolidating the 
two categories would diminish the usefulness of both. 
Virtues-In-Excess 
Although James Wallace’s “virtues-in-excess” are conceptually close to wandering virtues 
with respect to one of the requirements I have stipulated for wandering virtues, that one 
requirement is the only one that virtues-in-excess consistently meet. Wallace’s discussion of 
virtues-in-excess takes place in connection with his analysis of generosity, which Wallace 
construes along economic lines. Generosity, Wallace writes, is the virtue exhibited by persons 
who, in order to benefit another person, gives that person something whose monetary value is 
greater than required by morality or social convention. Wallace observes (I think rightly) that all 
the vices opposed to generosity of this sort are concerned with deficiencies of generosity. Wallace 
offers up stinginess and meanness as well-established opponents of generosity, but any 
“excessive concern for one’s things” would be a vice opposed to generosity,132 and (importantly) 
opposed to it in the same way: stinginess, meanness, and any other excessive concern for one’s 
things would all fall far short of generosity. Turning to the far side of generosity, Wallace writes, 
“It is less clear, however, what an excess of concern for the good of others would be and whether 
such an excess would be incompatible with generosity.”133 Wallace explicitly denies that acts in 
which a person sacrifices so much that he/she is incapable of addressing her own needs would 
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be such an excess of the virtue of generosity; rather, these acts would reflect the vice of 
irresponsibility. Other overly-generous gifts might arise from givers underestimating their own 
needs, so that even having considered her/his responsibilities, the giver simply gets the estimate 
wrong and gives more than he/she can actually afford to give. Even excluding these two mistaken 
sorts of giver, Wallace is persuaded that there could still exist 
a person who is excessively concerned for the good of others. Such a person would take care of himself, his 
possessions, and his obligations, showing a normal degree of concern for such things, except in situations 
in which he thought he could promote the good of someone else. Then, in pursuing this course, he would 
neglect these other things, though with some regret. […] [T]his does not constitute a character trait 
incompatible with generosity. Rather, […] it seems quite properly described as an excess of generosity — 
being generous to a fault. Such a character trait is not quite a vice incompatible with generosity. Such a 
person would frequently do just what a generous person would do. His behavior, which exhibits an excess 
of generosity, however, can be faulted. Of such excessively generous acts, something good can be said and 
something bad can be said. This is characteristic of other kinds of virtues-in-excess — being too honest, 
being honest to a fault, for example.134 
I would lift Wallace’s caveats and say, simply, that such generosity is not a vice at all, but 
a virtue, and while the external consequences might be less than optimal, the person’s character 
(with which virtue is more closely concerned) cannot be faulted for this sort of generosity except 
to the extent that the generosity leads to disregard for the virtue of responsibility. So far from 
merely escaping censure as a vice, this generosity-in-excess is indeed an excellent realization of 
the virtue of generosity per se: the person who is generous “to a fault” would not only “frequently 
do just what a generous person would do,” the person who is generous-in-excess will do what a 
generous person would do even more consistently and habitually than a generous person who is 
still fettered by a more consistently-felt “normal degree of concern” for “himself, his possessions, 
and his obligations[.]”135 
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Gary Watson’s opposition to the legitimacy of Wallace’s virtues-in-excess is one of the 
primary motivations for his argument for the unity of the virtues, as rehearsed in chapter one.136 
But if we do not assume the truth of, or are not persuaded by the arguments supporting, the unity 
of the virtues, by Watson’s own admission there is nothing to preclude some small number of 
virtues that are not clearly bounded by coordinate vices from becoming virtues-in-excess. But 
even if virtues-in-excess are plausible, they are still not identical with wandering virtues, and to 
my mind they are on average less troublesome than wandering virtues. Virtues-in-excess clearly 
satisfy the second requirement for wandering virtues: they lack intrinsic references to coordinate 
vices by which they might clearly be bound. As is typical of wandering virtues, virtues-in-excess 
do have a limiting vice or vices with regard to deficiency: the lack of the virtue is one or more 
vices. Conversely, the “excessive” realization of a virtue still looks and acts just like the virtue 
itself, without sliding into a vice on the opposite side of deficiency. However, Wallace’s virtues-
in-excess do not consistently meet the first or third requirements for wandering virtues, and for 
that reason are less nettlesome. Generosity may be able to exist and even thrive alongside the 
other virtues, and does not encourage neglect of them. Excessive generosity and the constraints 
of time may together demand a few tough choices, but nothing in generosity-in-excess itself 
recommends this, as Wallace himself acknowledge by saddling his exemplar of generosity-in-
excess with regret. And generosity does not meet the third requirement for wandering virtues, 
that of lacking intrinsic references to the values of others: by definition, generosity-in-excess is 
exceedingly concerned with the values of others and doing well by them. 
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I do not doubt that virtues-in-excess could give rise to trouble for their possessors. But 
because they may still coexist peacefully with other virtues and because they do consult the 
values of others, in practice the trouble will usually be comparatively constrained. For 
generosity-in-excess to lead to wretched outcomes, the excessively generous person would need 
both (1) to have stumbled into the virtue of generosity without picking up many others along the 
way and (2) to have landed in a community so vicious that no one would have enough 
compassion or decency to set the overly-generous person straight. This is possible, as the hard-
luck tales of past lottery winners sometimes bear out. But wandering virtues are structured in a 
way that they can actively encourage both neglect of other virtues and disinterest in other 
persons’ actual values, greatly increasing the wandering virtues’ likelihood of causing harm. 
Partial Virtues 
Michael Slote describes a group of virtues that I need to clearly distinguish from 
wandering virtues. Slote presents what he calls “partial virtues” as a critique of neo-Aristotelian 
eudaimonism and the unity of the virtues more generally. Drawing on Freud, Slote characterizes 
these virtues as existing as “paired opposites”, “tendencies that work against one another in 
various ways.”137 Slote’s illustration of this is the paired opposition of frankness and tact, which 
are naturally seen as paired and opposed because there are so many situations in which a choice has to be 
made between being tactful and being frank, situations in which one cannot exemplify both of these 
qualities of character. But an Aristotelian take on such issues would want to hold that whenever there is a 
choice between tact and frankness, there is a completely right choice in the matter.138 
This is not as strong a critique of neo-Aristotelian eudaimonism and the unity of the 
virtues as it might appear. Slote is attacking Aristotelian virtue on the grounds that it fails to do 
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justice to both sides of a binary that Aristotelian virtue probably would not recognize as a binary 
at all. On a neo-Aristotelian conception, a virtuous agent with phronesis who found herself in this 
situation could simultaneously be tactful in exactly the right way and be frank in exactly the right 
way. And even if this meant apparently favoring one virtue over another, this is no problem for a 
eudaimonist conception of virtue, in which eudaimonia is not overtly acting out all the virtues 
all the time in some riot of excellence, but full habituation into all the virtues and exhibiting each 
and every one of them at all the appropriate times and in the appropriate ways. 
Whether Slote’s partial virtues provide him with leverage for criticizing eudaimonia and 
the unity of the virtues, partial virtues diverge from wandering virtues in both motivation and 
substance. With regard to motivation, wandering virtues are not intended as a line of criticism 
against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: wandering virtues are something that are only coherent in 
the absence of eudaimonia and the unity of the virtues, but this is not a direct argument against 
the validity of those two characteristic Aristotelian doctrines. Wandering virtues are simply an 
important difficulty in theories of virtue that do not share Aristotle’s overarching framework. 
With regard to their substance, wandering virtues do not exist as the directly opposed pairs that 
characterize Slote’s partial virtues. The relationship between, on the one hand, wandering 
virtues and, on the other hand, the virtues whose neglect wandering virtues encourage is not one 
of direct opposition. Rather, wandering virtues encourage neglect of others virtues, making one 
less aware of the norms in those other virtues’ respective fields. Nor is a wandering virtue 
typically paired off with just one virtue whose neglect the wandering virtue encourages; often, a 
wandering virtue will encourage the neglect of several virtues. 
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Feedback Loops 
It may be tempting to suggest that what makes apparently wandering virtues 
troublesome is not actually that they “wander off” but that they monopolize our attention, 
forming a closed feedback loop in which the practice of the troublesome virtue furthers our 
excellence in the same troublesome virtue and motivates us to continue to practice this virtue, 
as opposed to others. According to this hypothesis, the problem with virtues deprived of 
reference to eudaimonia and to the unity of the virtues is that they become self-reinforcing. In 
this line of argument, a person who appears to unduly privilege the virtue of everyday hope — 
the daughter making decisions for her incapacitated, hospitalized mother, for instance — may 
not be falling prey to hope’s tendency to neglect other virtues. Rather, such a person is exercising 
one of the virtues in which he/she is most proficient, which in her/his case happens to be hope. 
But in the context of medical decision-making for her incapacitated mother, hope ought not to 
be the operative virtue. 
This “feedback loop” hypothesis joins two separable theses about the virtues, one of 
which is plausible and one of which is not. The first thesis is that the possessors of specific virtues 
find it progressively easier to exercise the specific virtues in which they are already proficient. 
This seems a plausible, and even inoffensive, characterization of how all individual virtues are 
supposed to function as they are acquired or learned. Like all habits, virtues are rooted in some 
preliminary disposition toward the aims of that virtue, but are progressively acquired and 
become progressively easier. For example, being temperate is extremely challenging for those 
who have no practice in it. One may be inclined toward the aims of temperance, healthy 
consumption and utilization of physical goods, without possessing the virtue of temperance, 
those habits by which we respond to and generate norms with regard to healthy consumption 
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and utilization of physical goods. Witness first-year college students who are obliged to purchase 
unlimited dining plans served up from buffet lines. Coming from environments in which both 
the number and the volume of meals were more restrained, many of these first-year students 
have comparatively little practice with temperance with regard to food and so find it challenging 
to limit their intake. Rapid weight gain during the first year of college, however, underscores the 
importance of temperance, and with practice — repeated trips to the dining hall during which 
the student selects reasonable portions of comparatively wholesome food — the student 
becomes more and more temperate. After a few years, it may even be easy for the student to 
decline excessive amounts of food, out of habit as much as of the durable memory of the 
displeasure at the original weight gain. This self-reinforcing nature of virtue is the basis of its 
acquisition. Some virtue ethicists even argue that when a person fully possesses a specific virtue, 
that person’s exercise of that virtue is automatic, that is to say, the virtue is so habitual that it is 
devoid of both conscious reflection and moral effort.139 I am not committed to this extreme view 
of mature virtue, but it points in the right direction: it is no failure of the virtues when they 
become considerably easier with practice. Whether increasing facility with a specific virtue 
becomes a source of difficulty will depend on the characteristics of that virtue, not on the virtues’ 
universal tendency to become more habitual as they are exercised. 
The second thesis, less credible than the first, is that a person who possesses multiple 
virtues will inevitably exercise the virtue in which he/she is most proficient irrespective of 
circumstance. This seems unlikely on the basis of experience alone. Even people whom we might 
tentatively credit with good character are often observably stronger in one virtue than another, 
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and yet manage to exercise multiple virtues, including the one in which they are relatively less 
excellent. Imagine a capable American gynecologist who, in addition to all good she does for her 
insured patients, also provides a significant amount of uncompensated care to uninsured 
patients through a local free clinic. The gynecologist does this without hesitation or regret at the 
opportunity costs she incurs by providing care at the free clinic when she might otherwise 
schedule patients in her private practice; the gynecologist does not pride herself on the free 
services she provides and conscientiously avoids playing it to the advantage of her reputation. 
Suppose this gynecologist also regularly volunteers to travel to war-torn areas with Doctors 
Without Borders in order to provide uncompensated gynecological care, but when she does so, 
she is more afraid than she thinks she ought to be of the dangers she will encounter. We would 
likely credit this gynecologist with the virtues of charity and also of courage, but her charity is 
recognizably more excellent and thoroughgoing than is her courage. Even so, the gynecologist 
still exercises both virtues: she does not forsake her dangerous work in war-torn areas with 
Doctors Without Borders solely because she is somewhat more excellent in charity than in 
courage, even though she has ready opportunities to exercise her charity without exercising her 
courage. 
Principles 
I suspect that the intuition that someone who is excellent in one virtue will inevitably 
deprecate other virtues comes from confusing virtues with principles. And in fairness, my 
proposal of a category of conspicuously strange virtues invites the suspicion that the problems 
of these strange virtues may be better solved in another family of normative theory altogether. If 
the virtue of charity were instead the principle “Be charitable” and that principle was inviolable, 
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then it would make sense to expect that person whose most notable characteristic was her/his 
charity would be overborne by that charity. This version of charity begins to resemble Kant’s 
“perfect duties.” Kant defines perfect duties as those that admit of no exceptions because to will 
contrary to them is to contradict the categorical imperative, the universal moral law of nature. 
Perfect duties will tend to be proscriptions. As two examples of this sort of unexceptionable, 
perfect duty, Kant gives both the duty not to commit suicide and the duty not to lie. Imperfect 
duties are those duties that proscribe disagreeable maxims that would not directly contradict 
the categorical imperative. These imperfect duties are the antitheses of maxims that are logically 
conceivable but that are so craven that no rightly-ordered person would actually will them as 
universal laws of conduct. These imperfect duties will tend to be prescriptions. As examples of 
these imperfect duties, Kant cites the duty to strive toward excellence and the duty to aid others 
in need, which are the antitheses of the maxims (possible in principle, but repugnant in practice) 
that one need only enjoy oneself in life and that one ought only look after oneself, respectively.140 
Wandering virtues are neither perfect nor imperfect duties. All virtues are positive states 
of character, not prohibitions, so there is no distinction between proscription and prescription. 
And both because I forgo appeals to eudaimonia as the universal end of virtue and because the 
habits of living persons are not the sort of thing that can be identified a priori, I do not see that 
any sort of virtue, wandering or otherwise, would be self-evident in the way that Kant thinks 
perfect duties are. 
But Kant’s extreme account of duties is not the only, or even the most common, version 
of deontology in medical ethics today. Although Kant’s account of duty does not illuminate 
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wandering virtues, the difficulties I attribute to wandering virtues might still be addressed with 
reference to principles. Taking the example of hope, would it not avoid the difficulty I allege if 
“Be hopeful” were a good general principle of action that will typically obtain (all other things 
being equal) but not a virtue that ought always be active? But turning wandering virtues into 
something akin to W. D. Ross’s prima facie duties141 would neglect wandering virtues’ character 
as moral habits. Virtues describe a characteristic way of being in the world, rather than a reliable 
reason that impels right action that is (at least theoretically) independent of the shape of a 
person’s life. I am sympathetic when Beauchamp and Childress aver that while “[i]t is often 
assumed that a virtuous health care professional who embodies a wide range of virtues will both 
discern what he or she should do and be motivated to do it in particular circumstances […] this 
expectation is overly optimistic.”142 Beauchamp and Childress are themselves persuaded that 
while virtues and principles have “close connections”, there is no one-to-one correspondence of 
principles and virtues and so no way that they can be the same thing.143 The alterations necessary 
to move from, say, the principle of beneficence to the virtue of charity are significant: at a 
minimum, it is a move from something that is action-guiding to something that is an excellent 
habit and a characteristic of a person. Although the language and outcomes of virtues and 
principles may overlap at times, virtues and principles are thoroughly distinct. While I am 
arguing that wandering virtues are odd sorts of virtues, wandering virtues are not so odd that 
they abandon the habitual character that they share with all other virtues. 
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Consequentialist Satisficing 
Deontology is not the only rival to virtue ethics, of course. Even if wandering virtues are 
not a problem better solved in deontology than in virtue, wandering virtues may still be more 
clearly analyzed in the context of consequentialism. The difficulties I have attributed to 
wandering virtues find a consequentialist doppelgänger in the consequentialist debate between 
maximizers and satisficers. In broad strokes, value maximization is the principle that to act 
rightly, one must produce the greatest possible surplus of value over disvalue; by extension, to 
live rightly, one must always strive to produce the greatest possible surplus of value over disvalue. 
The problem with maximization is that of demandingness: it seems to ask far more of humans 
than common sense morality can accept or than anyone could actually accomplish. Various 
defenses of value maximization have been offered, but some consequentialists have developed a 
retrenchment with respect to demandingness, “satisficing.” Satisficing replaces maximization 
with the principle that “an act might qualify as morally right through having good enough 
consequences, even though better consequences could have been produced in the 
circumstances[.]”144 On such a view, right actions are right because they produce a satisfactory 
surplus of value over disvalue, irrespective of whether a greater surplus might have been 
achieved. 
One might argue that wandering virtues are simply virtues that would benefit from an 
analogous retrenchment with regard to demandingness. More specifically, since the wandering 
virtues are virtues that tend to generate conditions in which they neglect other virtues and 
realize themselves excessively, their difficulties could be eliminated by stipulating that with 
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these specific virtues, we should recommend no more than bare possession. Returning to the 
example of everyday hope, a satisficer might suggest that if one is hopeful at all, one thereby 
safeguards effectively against hopelessness, and that one ought not strive to become any more 
hopeful than is required to avoid hopelessness. 
There are at least two reasons that this comparison to satisficing yields an unsatisfactory 
account of wandering virtues. First, demandingness has exactly the inverse relationship to habit 
that it would need to have if satisficing were to constrain wandering virtues. Habits, including 
virtues, should become easier and easier as one adopts them, not more and more demanding, so 
one cannot know when one has become “virtuous enough” to get by. If being hopeful is equivalent 
to having hopeful beliefs, it makes sense that having a few hopeful beliefs would be enough to get 
by and avoid hopelessness: a satisficer might then credibly recommend only a little hope, more 
hope than none… but not much more, lest it give rise to difficulties. But the virtue of hope is not 
the aggregate of one’s hopeful beliefs. Rather, the virtue of hope is a habit or something akin to a 
habit, something one either has or does not have. The virtue of hope does admit of degrees, but 
only degrees of proficiency. The virtue hope does have degrees of possession: a person who 
possesses the virtue of hope — as opposed to a person who happens to harbor a few positive, 
wishful beliefs about the future — habitually responds to the uncertainties of the future by acting 
to keep happy possibilities open and by treating belief in a better future as an obligation. And the 
more the hopeful person practices the virtue of hope, the more proficient he/she will become in 
it. Hope will become easier, rather than harder, as it is habituated in greater degree: the 
demandingness of “one thing too many” will not arise to check the virtue of hope in the way that 
satisficing expects. 
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The second reason that applying satisficing to virtue is an unpromising strategy is that 
satisficing faces serious challenges from within consequentialism with regard to its moral 
seriousness, challenges that virtue would do well not to assume as its own. Even in its more 
plausible formulations, satisficing seems to permit obviously immoral acts that have a “good 
enough” result. Adapting an example from Ben Bradley,145 suppose exchanging $50 for a week’s 
worth of groceries for one person counts as a “good enough” use of the money. As a favor, George 
asks Harriet to take $50 in cash to a local food bank as an anonymous donation. The food bank 
can use the $50 to buy a week’s worth of groceries for two families of four, a significantly better 
yield than a week’s groceries for one person. Satisficing seems to be at a loss to explain why 
Harriet ought not steal the cash and use it to buy groceries for herself, since Harriet would 
thereby achieve a good enough result. The food bank will not miss money it never had, and 
George will be out $50 either way. If we are worried about the disvalue created when Harriet 
breaks an implicit promise to George, we can offset this by painting Harriet in a more flattering 
light: we might stipulate that if Harriet does not steal the cash, she will not have money to buy 
groceries and will have to go to the food bank herself. Satisficing seems to lack the means to 
explain why Harriet’s diversion of the $50 is wrong because it cannot direct Harriet to the better 
results of delivering the $50 to the food bank. 
Critics of satisficing have suggested that satisficing may even justify avoidable harms. 
Tim Mulgan offers a variation of the notorious trolley problem in which a bystander can (a) 
throw a large sandbag into the path of a runaway trolley heading toward a cliff, preventing the 
deaths of all the trolley’s occupants, or (b) throw a small sandbag, slowing the trolley enough that 
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only a couple occupants of the trolley die. It seems uncontroversial that, in the absence of the 
larger sandbag, throwing the smaller sandbag would not only be good enough, but best, given 
that the alternative is the death of all the passengers. This would seem to show that throwing the 
the smaller sandbag is a “good enough” action. But adding in the larger sandbag seemingly makes 
throwing just the smaller sandbag not only insufficient, but absolutely reprehensible. Mulgan’s 
point is that even common-sense morality often expects not a “good enough” choice, but the best 
choice available under the circumstances, while satisficing would seemingly want to credit the 
bystander with doing the right thing if he/she threw the smaller sandbag, regardless of the 
availability of the larger bag. With this and related examples, Mulgan urges that satisficing 
consequentialism must permit obvious and avoidable immorality, a result so repugnant that, 
whatever the defects of maximizing, maximizing is at least superior to satisficing.146 
For similar reasons, a satisficing model is not an adequate solution to the challenges 
posed by wandering virtues. At first blush, it seems straightforward enough to adapt satisficing 
to virtue; we might say, with Horace, “Let the wise man bear the name of madman, the just of 
unjust, should he pursue Virtue herself beyond due bounds.”147 But in virtue ethics, the virtues 
are themselves the arbiters of due bounds, just as in utilitarianism, utility is the definition of 
adequacy. In consequentialism, it seems wrong to say that someone who does something that is 
marginally good, “good enough,” is doing the right thing when they might readily have done 
something far better. In the same way, it seems wrong to think that a person who aims to be just 
hopeful enough to qualify as “hopeful” is really hopeful at all. We would not celebrate the hope 
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147 Horace, Epistles 1.6.15-16 (in Horace, Satires, Epistles, The Art of Poetry, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb 
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of someone who was constantly aiming to suppress that hope; in fact, it seems contrary to the 
virtue of hope to try to suppress itself. Wandering virtues will not be dissolved or ameliorated 
with analysis in terms of satisficing. 
Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have identified a type of virtue, wandering virtue, that will arise in a 
theory of virtue that does not presume (or is not persuaded by arguments in favor of) eudaimonia 
or the unity of the virtues. I have defined wandering virtues as those virtues that (1) encourage 
their possessors to neglect one or more other virtues, (2) possess no clear coordinate vices other 
than those that describe deficiencies of virtue, and (3) lack intrinsic references to the values of 
others considered as actual individuals. I have reviewed several established concepts in theories 
of virtue that bear similarities to wandering virtues and have shown that none of these concepts 
adequately describe wandering virtues. I have also examined the closest analogs to wandering 
virtue in deontology and consequentialism in order to show that the problems of wandering 
virtues are not plausibly solved by transposing wandering virtues into another family of 
normative theory. In the chapters that follow, I turn to in-depth analyses of three different 
wandering virtues and their connections with clinical medicine, with the expectation that these 
analyses will continue to clarify the notion of wandering virtues and show their usefulness for 
moral reflection in the practical environment of medicine.
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CHAPTER 3 
MODESTY 
Delimiting the Virtue of Modesty 
Any treatment of the virtue of modesty will be complicated by modesty’s diverse lexical 
associations. Depending on context, “modesty” can evoke hemlines, shrinking violets, or quiet 
confidence. The last of these is relevant to (but not coextensive with) the virtue of modesty with 
which I am concerned here, while the first two are not. The first sort of modesty that I am 
excluding from my analysis, “modesty” as cultural standards for attire, does have applications to 
clinical medicine. Clinicians’ attire should be professional and hygienic, while patients’ hospital-
issued garments are seemingly designed to maximize both convenience and ugliness, but norms 
of attire are not properly in modesty’s field of concern. Due concern for professionalism is 
independent from modesty, hygiene is largely a matter of fact, and the attractiveness or ugliness 
of clothing would fall within the fields of concern for the virtues of aesthetic appreciation or taste, 
not the virtue of modesty. The second sort of modesty that I exclude, the modesty by omission 
that we associate with overwhelmingly shy persons, is not the same as the virtue of modesty. A 
reticent person may or may not entertain inward views of herself/himself that are aptly 
characterized as modest: a vain person who does not advertise her/his vanity is no less vain for 
keeping quiet about it. 
I define the virtue of modesty as a habit (1) that responds to and generates norms with 
regard to one’s own attitudes toward one’s abilities, accomplishments, and failures (2) by 
emphasizing human limits. There have been efforts to separate this into discrete virtues of 
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modesty and humility, so that modesty would be concerned with one’s attitudes toward one’s 
abilities and accomplishments, while humility would be concerned with one’s attitudes toward 
one’s failures. Although it will not be my emphasis in rehearsing their arguments later in this 
chapter, Judith Andre and Julia Driver both accept this distinction, with Andre focusing on 
humility and Driver on modesty. Similarly, while commending humility, the bioethicists Joseph 
Fletcher and Edward Spencer apparently split modesty and humility along similar lines: “The 
virtuous clinician understands the limits of medical knowledge and technique and recognizes 
her or his fallibility.”148 But the distinction between modesty and humility, clear enough in theory, 
is often difficult to sustain in practice. One’s attitudes about one’s accomplishments (and 
potential for future accomplishments) may be grotesquely inflated by one’s obliviousness 
toward, or outright denial of, one’s past and present failures. Conversely, preoccupation with the 
failures that accompanied one’s accomplishments can inappropriately diminish one’s 
assessment of those accomplishments and also one’s likelihood of accomplishing worthy goals. 
For these and related reasons, I think it better to treat modesty and humility together. I prefer 
“modesty” over “humility” as the overarching label because modesty’s troublesome connotations 
are more easily distinguished from it than are humility’s. Except where an author’s usage or 
conceptual clarity requires the distinction, I will use “modesty” to refer to both sides of the 
proposed distinction. 
My analysis of the virtue of modesty proceeds in three steps. First, I review several 
important accounts of modesty. These accounts span a continuum of sorts. I begin with David 
                                                            
148 John C. Fletcher and Edward M. Spencer, “Clinical Ethics: History, Content, and Resources,” in Fletcher’s 
Introduction to Clinical Ethics, ed. John C. Fletcher, Edward M. Spencer, and Paul A. Lombardo, 3rd ed. 
(Hagerstown, MD: University Publishing Group, 2005), 15. 
 
101 
Hume, who thinks that modesty is a vice, not a virtue; proceed to G. K. Chesterton, who thinks 
that modesty was once a virtue but has become a vice; continue to Julia Driver, who grants that 
modesty is a virtue but believes it is a virtue that shows why consequentialism is the proper home 
of the virtues; and end my review with Judith Andre, who thinks that humility is definitely a 
virtue, but whose account requires more adaptation than others to accommodate modesty’s 
positive aspect.149 Second, I present an account of modesty as a wandering virtue, an account 
that does justice to the strangeness that troubles Chesterton and Driver while allowing a greater 
range of activity than does Andre. Third, I examine some of the ethical problems surrounding 
medical prognosis in light of the wandering virtue of modesty. Treating modesty as a wandering 
virtue helps make ethical sense of these problems and suggests some possible steps to ameliorate 
them. 
                                                            
149 I have selected these accounts of the virtue of modesty/humility because they agree that modesty is troubled in 
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troublesome once humility is properly understood. Greenberg defines true (Kantian) humility as “that meta-
attitude which constitutes the moral agent’s proper perspective on herself as a dependent and corrupt but capable 
and dignified rational agent. Through her proper appreciation for the role of moral principles in her life, the 
humble agent clears the static of undue self-love […] and thus has the value of herself in the proper place in her 
overall hierarchy of value.” [emphasis added] (Jeanine Greenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of 
Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 133) Richards defines true 
humility as “having an accurate sense of oneself, sufficiently firm to resist pressures toward incorrect revisions.” 
(Norvin Richards, Humility [Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992], 5) Linda Zagzebski makes a different 
argument that humility is accurate by definition. Zagzebski argues that “the moral and intellectual virtues differ 
[no] more than one moral virtue differs from another.” (Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry 
into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996], 158) Zagzebski further reasons that like the moral virtues, the intellectual virtue of humility is not properly 
virtue apart from a unifying phronesis to direct it. (Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 219-231) Zagzebski’s argument 
will not be persuasive, however, if we already have reason to be suspicious of such a unifying virtue of phronesis. 
Greenberg’s, Richard’s, and Zagzebski’s definitions of humility make a good deal of sense in the context of their 
respective arguments. But all three definitions seek to establish by definition what I think cannot be shown in 
experience, that true modesty/humility cannot go wrong. 
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Is Modesty A Vice? 
Granting the definition of modesty that I have proposed, not all commentators agree that 
this habit is actually a virtue. David Hume lumped humility in with “[c]elibacy, fasting, penance, 
mortification, self-denial, […] silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues […] every 
where rejected by men of sense[.]”150 Hume’s justification for this proceeds from his convictions 
about the basis of all virtues in utility. The monkish virtues, Hume writes, are properly vices 
because they “neither advance a man’s fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable 
member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor encrease his 
power of self-enjoyment […] We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable 
ends[.]”151 Hume’s opposition to celibacy, fasting, penance, and mortification is closely related to 
his hostility to “the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion[,]”152 just as are his 
reproaches of the “gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, [who] after his death, may have a place in 
the calendar; but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by 
those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.”153 But Hume’s enmity toward humility stems 
as much from Hume’s high level of confidence in human pride as a motive for morals as from his 
disdain for much of the Christianity of his time. Hume writes, 
We never excuse the absolute want of spirit and dignity of character, or a proper sense of what is due to 
one’s self, in society and the common intercourse of life. […] A certain degree of generous pride or self-value 
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is so requisite, that the absence of it in the mind displeases, after the same manner as the want of a nose, 
eye, or any of the most material features of the face or members of the body.154 
According to Hume, pride is the virtue by which persons resist the debasing impulses to 
sacrifice their good names and characters in pursuit of material gain. Modesty and humility that 
might constrict this healthy pride would not be virtues at all, but vices conducing to human 
debasement. 
Hume’s point that pride can be a virtue is well expressed, but even if we concede the point, 
modesty and its complement, humility, would still be worthy of consideration as a virtue in the 
context of clinical medicine. Hume’s repudiation of humility (alongside the other vices of gloomy 
religion) depends on a narrower reading of the requirements for the status of virtue than Hume 
elsewhere employs. Hume expects that all genuine virtues will contribute to utility, public or 
personal. But Hume’s criticism of humility seems to be based on a narrower reading of utility 
than elsewhere: in castigating the monkish virtues, Hume lampoons their deleterious effect on 
the sort of social graces that give immediate pleasure in another’s company. Jeremy Bentham 
famously collapses all utility into the immediate experience of pleasure,155 but Hume’s usage 
throughout his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals seems far more diverse than this. Even 
in connection with pride, Hume celebrates examples of pride — Alexander the Great’s 
abandonment by his armies, the Athenian statesman Phocion’s execution — evidently approved 
by Hume’s version of utility but not made more pleasant by pride.156 Similarly, there are many 
situations in clinical ethics in which it makes little sense to speak of making a situation more 
pleasant or even more bearable, so that few virtues would apply were the expectation that they 
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should reliable conduce to pleasure. End-of-life care and decision-making for an incapacitated 
patient with widely metastatic cancer is never going to become pleasant. The patient’s loved 
ones are unlikely to find the patient’s decline more bearable for a clinician’s pride, however hard-
earned; neither would pride be a praiseworthy affect on the part of the clinician, even for the 
clinicians’ own sake. 
Hume’s meaning with regard to the characteristic usefulness of virtues is typically much 
broader than immediate pleasure. Even consequentialists who would claim Hume as a forebear 
grant that he is not a hedonistic utilitarian (or even consequentialist) with regard to virtue.157 
Hume is explicitly concerned with the goods of social cohesion as well and, fundamentally, with 
the evaluations of others. In this connection, modesty (Hume would prefer humility) certainly 
has claim to be a virtue. Friedrich Nietzsche, not generally noted for his personal modesty, could 
still give instrumental reasons in favor of modesty, even to those who might otherwise be 
prideful. In one of the aphorisms collected in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche defines modesty 
as “the knowledge that we are not the works we create” and as “absolute irresponsibility (even 
for the good [one] creates).”158 Nietzsche reasons that others will come to despise even a great 
person who preens herself/himself on her/his accomplishments to the neglect or diminution of 
others’. Whether or not Hume would endorse Nietzsche’s latent fatalism, it seems plausible that 
even Hume might approve of modesty and humility on similar grounds of social utility as long as 
modesty and humility were not to the point of gloominess or depression. What Hume seems to 
be objecting to above all is not modesty or humility that restrains unbecoming or insufferable 
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pride, but rather to carrying modesty or humility to the point of self-abasement, a practice Hume 
clearly associates with the demeanor of those narrowly devoted to religion at the expense of their 
humanity. 
G. K. Chesterton On Modesty 
Although G. K. Chesterton may be the opposite of Hume in many respects, Chesterton at 
least agrees with Hume that modesty has become a vice for reasons related to religion. However, 
Chesterton believes that it is the decline of religion that has transformed the perfectly serviceable 
religious virtue of modesty into a vice that is antithetical to religion, of which Chesterton is far 
more fond than is Hume. The beneficial versions of modesty and humility — Chesterton uses 
them interchangeably — were “largely meant as a restraint upon the arrogance and infinity of 
the appetite of man.”159 According to Chesterton, Victorian intellectuals redirected modesty 
away from humans and toward the truth: modesty as a curb on human ambition became 
modesty as an excuse for human incomprehension. Chesterton derides the intellectual modesty 
of his contemporaries, writing, “We are on the road to producing a race of men too mentally 
modest to believe in the multiplication table.”160 
What worries Chesterton most of all about lazy skepticism is that it is so easily replicated: 
one generation of lazy skeptics may very easily pass an accidental nihilism on to successive 
generations. In particular, Chesterton is worried about anarchism, determinism, moral 
relativism, nominalism with respect to categories, and pragmatism. The common thread 
running through these disparate doctrines is their tendency to diminish the plausibility of purely 
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objective facts about the world and our confidence in our ability to know them. Chesterton 
writes, “[M]adness may be defined as using mental activity so as to reach mental 
helplessness[,]”161 and he sees modern modesty with regard to truth tending in that direction. 
It is difficult to know whether the specific doctrines that Chesterton reproaches have 
made inroads since the early twentieth century; certainly all are still familiar. However, with the 
benefit of a century since Chesterton wrote, we know that, at a minimum, the multiplication 
table is still widely endorsed despite the persistence of modesty with regard to truth. More 
generally, Chesterton’s anxieties about the viciousness and deleterious effects of modern 
modesty now seem significantly overblown. But Chesterton was right to think that one of 
modern modesty’s central features is its emphasis on the limits of our ability to know facts, in 
addition to its well-established concern with our attitudes toward our own accomplishments 
and failures. Nevertheless, modesty’s extension to knowledge is not as unnatural as Chesterton 
supposed. Naive realism with regard to our perception of the external world had been sharply 
criticized for centuries before Chesterton. Experimental psychology concurrent with and 
subsequent to Chesterton thoroughly substantiated these worries that what we perceive may be 
inconsistent with the perceptions of others or what we might otherwise acknowledge as the facts 
of the matter. When even perception is subject to error, knowledge of facts becomes an 
accomplishment itself. And our attitude toward our accomplishments is uncontroversially part 
of the scope of modesty. 
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Is Modesty the Achilles's Heel of Virtue Ethics? 
Modesty fares better in Julia Driver’s assessment than in Hume’s or Chesterton’s: Driver 
at least regards modesty as a virtue, not a vice. But Driver argues that modesty is a virtue that 
proves that consequentialism is preferable to virtue ethics. Driver classifies modesty with “blind 
charity, impulsive courage, and a species of forgiveness, as well as of trust” as “virtues of 
ignorance[,]” virtues “that actually require[] that the agent be ignorant.”162 Driver defines the 
virtue of modesty as the disposition to unknowingly, sincerely “underestimate […] self-worth to 
some limited degree.”163 (This definition seems readily extensible to humility as well.) Driver’s 
hypothetical example is Albert Einstein, who, according to Driver, would have manifested her 
sense of modesty if he had regarded “himself as a great physicist, just not the greatest physicist 
of the 20th century[.]”164 Driver does not elaborate, but she is clear that serious underestimations 
do not qualify as modest: if Einstein had regarded himself as a mediocre physicist, he would no 
longer be modest, but rather depressed. And Einstein would have to be perfectly sincere in his 
slightly lower than accurate self-evaluation. It would not qualify as modesty on Driver’s account 
if Einstein, responding to the question “Are you the greatest physicist of our time?”, politely 
replied, “I am a great physicist, but I do not know if I am the greatest” while privately believing 
himself the greatest physicist of his generation. To be modest, Einstein would need to believe in 
earnest that he was not the greatest physicist of his generation, and Einstein would be wrong so 
far as he believed this. Driver concludes that modesty “rests upon an epistemic defect.”165 
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If modesty depends on its possessor being in error, it is a fatal problem for accounts of 
virtue that assume that all virtues will necessarily interoperate harmoniously: Driver’s modesty 
is plainly incompatible with intellectual virtues such as accuracy, and possibly with moral virtues 
such as honesty, if we understand honesty to be the virtue exhibited by persons committed to 
communicating true understandings to others. Most virtues will be much worse for involving 
errors: justice, for instance, promptly deteriorates when the agent’s grip on the facts of the 
situation slips. But other virtues, such as modesty, cannot exist without errors. Driver writes, 
“[A]ny account of virtue must be able to tolerate some actual mistakes […] as long as those 
mistakes systematically promote the good more than not.”166 Neither perfectly reliable 
functioning nor perfectly reliable good intentions can account for why these virtues of ignorance 
should count as virtues, but their avowed tendency to good outcomes (despite their errors and 
associated unreliability) can supply such an account. This, in turn, opens the door to Driver’s 
modified definition of a moral virtue as “a complex psychological disposition (or disposition 
cluster) to feel, behave, and/or act well” so as to “systematically produce more actual good than 
not.”167 Such an overtly consequentialist account, Driver argues, allows for why modesty and 
other virtues of ignorance should be virtues despite the errors they entail. 
Translating the virtues into a consequentialist framework will also benefit 
consequentialism by accounting for the ambivalence that attends consequentialism’s beloved 
hard moral cases. Importantly, Driver does not think that virtue, even translated into a 
consequentialist framework, defines what is right. The right thing to do, for Driver, remains what 
it is for many maximizing consequentialists: the act that will produce the greatest surplus of 
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good consequences over bad.168 But virtue will at least explain why performing such acts often 
seems so dreadful. Considering the case of a gentle and generally virtuous man Marvin who 
cannot bring himself to assassinate the cruel tyrant who has taken over his country, Driver 
suggests that it is exactly Marvin’s virtue — his disposition that ordinarily conduce to good 
consequences — that prevents him from doing the right thing, while a deeply vicious person 
might not hesitate to do what is right. In connection with McCloskey’s case of the utilitarian 
forced to choose between the death of one innocent person or the deaths of twenty people in a 
riot that will break out if the first person is not handed over to a mob to be lynched,169 including 
virtues alongside consequentialism essentially allows Driver to explain that the utilitarian 
should do the right thing and sacrifice the first innocent, even though the utilitarian’s ability to 
contemplate that sacrifice, let alone make it, will reveal that the utilitarian’s character is 
substantially defective.170 
It seems clear that Driver’s consequentialist cooptation of virtue is an improvement as 
far as utilitarianism is concerned. Driver can explain why the poor devils who find themselves in 
consequentialist thought experiments should be in moral agony while evaluating something as 
cold as net utility, and why these same reprobates should subsequently despise themselves for 
doing the right thing. By the same token, it is equally clear that Driver’s strategy is not an 
improvement from the standpoint of virtue ethics as a rival to consequentialism, or for the 
concept of virtue in general. Not only does Driver subsume virtue ethics under consequentialism, 
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she relegates virtue to a strictly secondary role, as the dispositional codifications of rules 
conceived along utilitarian lines. 
However, there is one further strength of Driver’s consequentialist account of virtue that 
deserves mention, though the strength is not prominent in Driver’s own argument. Although 
Driver is apparently committed to value maximization as the criterion for the rightness of 
actions, she explicitly rejects maximization as a criterion for virtue, just as I did in the previous 
chapter. Driver’s consequentialist definition of virtue excludes maximization: the disposition 
need only systematically produce net utility, not produce the most net utility it possibly good. 
This is very helpful for those of us who wish to ascribe the virtue of benevolence to our neighbors 
despite our knowledge that Mother Theresa’s benevolence far exceeded that of our neighbors, 
and also despite our suspicions that the comparatively detached scientific interest that led to 
the discovery of penicillin did still more good than Mother Theresa. Driver suggests that because 
maximizing is excluded from her requirements for virtue, it can be helpfully applied to the 
recognized virtues in order to rank them: “the better virtues will be the ones that produce more 
good. Generosity is probably better than wit in that it produces more good. If there is a virtue 
that produces more good than any other, then that would be the best.”171 
As appealing as this ranking mechanism may be, it also creates tension within Driver’s 
project. As Driver defines modesty, modesty’s ability to produce good is inherently dampened by 
the disvalue (ignorance) upon which modesty depends for its existence. No doubt modesty’s 
social utility is considerable. It seems plausible that modesty deflects or at least abates the 
jealousy of others and that modesty helps its possessors avoid dangerous overreach: it is 
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probably better to somewhat underestimate yourself and what you are capable of than to 
significantly overestimate yourself or what you can manage. But Driver has configured modesty 
so that all these gains come at the cost of ignorance and untruthful representation of oneself, 
and it would surely be better to know precisely what you can do for society (and then do it) than 
to either underestimate or overestimate your capacities. Modesty may conduce to more good 
than harm, but its inherent inefficiency will place it much lower in the ranking of valuable virtues 
than others — such as integrity, honesty, and accuracy — that would override the virtue of 
modesty as Driver has defined it. It seems strange to use what should be an unimportant virtue 
as a rationale for completely subsuming all virtues within a consequentialist frame that 
overwhelms them. 
The most serious difficulty, though, stems from Driver’s definition of modesty as 
requiring ignorance that is invariably corrigible. In Driver’s modesty, there is a clear fact of the 
matter that the modest person ignores, favoring (albeit unawares) an underestimate: the modest 
person gets it wrong at a moment when he/she could have known better and gotten it right. 
Driver’s view has considerable plausibility as long as one focuses “modesty” on self-esteem, self-
worth, or pride. But the problems Driver attaches to modesty lose much of their force if we 
dispense with the assumption that the ignorance involved in modesty is always corrigible. 
Consider knowledge of the future. In common sense — or at least in the context of clinical 
medicine — much knowledge of the future is probabilistic at best: based on the data at hand, 
certain outcomes seem more likely than others. But we routinely do not know which outcomes 
will come to pass. We can take different attitudes toward this probabilistic knowledge and the 
incorrigibility of the accompanying uncertainty, but we cannot know we are in error until it is 
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too late to do anything about it. Consider three pollsters working from the same large data set 
and trying to predict the outcome of an election. One pollster is unduly prideful: “I’m an 
incredibly smart person, I’ve collected a tremendous amount of data, I understand that data 
perfectly, and my predicted outcome is all but certain.” Another pollster is proud, but not overtly 
hubristic: “I’m intelligent, I’ve taken a lot of pains to gather all the data I think is relevant, I 
understand that data well, and my prediction is as good as any you’ll find.” The third pollster is 
recognizably modest: “I’m intelligent, I’ve got all the data that’s likely to matter, but the future is 
a funny thing and my prediction, though highly informed, is really a best guess that may prove to 
be wrong.” The third pollster’s modesty is not an error of the sort that Driver’s modesty requires: 
the third pollster’s modesty rather reflects a certain attitude toward the limits of what humans 
can know about things that have not yet come to pass and how much confidence humans should 
invest in that knowledge. But it still makes sense to call the third pollster modest: there are 
prideful and modest attitudes to have toward the same facts and the same uncertainty. Notice, 
also, that these ascriptions of pride and modesty remain credible even if all three are right or all 
three are wrong in their predictions. The pollsters are recognizably prideful or modest even while 
their ignorance is incorrigible, before there is a fact of the matter (the election’s outcome) about 
which they can be right or wrong. 
Uncertainty may even apply to the self-esteem with which Driver’s modesty is specifically 
concerned. It is a characteristically consequentialist assumption that a person’s social worth can 
be accurately quantified, but this assumption is debatable. A person’s worth in the eyes of her/his 
spouse and children is likely to be much higher than in the eyes of a prospective mugger, with 
the worth assigned to that person by her/his employer somewhere in between (and hopefully not 
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too close to the mugger’s estimate). Is the correct evaluation of self-worth the self-worth assigned 
by those who see the person the most, the person’s family? Is the person’s true worth assigned 
by an “impartial” observer, with all the problems attempts at impartiality entail? Is the person’s 
worth the sum or average of the worths assigned by all those who interact with the person? The 
problems associated with quantifying the family’s estimate are considerable; the problems with 
establishing the fact of the matter in the second and and third cases are nigh on insurmountable. 
Estimates of a person’s social worth may be less uncertain (or less incorrigibly so) than are the 
outcome of an election most of a year from now and the local daytime high temperature on 
election day, but social worth is still subject to enough incorrigible uncertainty that modesty 
with respect to self-worth may be better served by characteristic attitudes than by mandatory 
underestimation. 
Judith Andre On Humility 
Judith Andre defines humility as “the ability to recognize and be at ease with one’s 
flaws.”172 Humility is the skill or habit of self-reflection by which persons accept the truth of their 
mistakes and failures with proportionate responses, “an emotional condition that recognizes 
and responds to one’s failings in such a way that the self regains harmony and finds strength and 
hence is less likely to fail in the same way in the future.”173 Andre rightly observes that this is an 
especially valuable skill to have because of the almost inevitable distortion of perception that 
occurs when we learn that we are in error. As Andre’s short definition suggests, this sort of 
humility has two steps. The first is accepting the hard truth that one really has made a mistake 
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or has failed; the second is “a calm and centered integration of the new awareness. One sees more 
of one’s defects than before, and comes, relatively soon, to live at peace with the changed self-
image.”174 Andre’s example is of a writer who encounters an unfavorable review and who can only 
with time come to see the truth in some or many of the criticisms, but it is easy to identify other 
instances of the distorting effects of embarrassment or pain on our self-assessments. Spats 
between otherwise happy couples seem often to have their basis in the difficulty one or both 
parties have in accepting news of their inevitable human failings — a late arrival for dinner, a 
thoughtless turn of phrase — with grace and perspective. Andre’s humility is the skill by which 
persons grow better at taking these moments that could phase a less virtuous person and 
adapting them into moments of personal growth. Andre applies this account of humility to 
medical error as a way of accounting both for how some physicians become more proficient in 
acknowledging and addressing their mistakes and for how the broader culture of medicine can 
become more humble. Andre’s foremost suggestion for both is candor: that doctors practice 
admitting their mistakes and that medicine become “a profession in which errors can be more 
easily acknowledged.”175 
Andre prefers to focus on humility, as opposed to modesty, because “[m]odesty turns out 
to offer a milder version of the problems that humility does[,]”176 and because Andre does not 
approve of some of the strategies used in connection with “modesty” as opposed to “humility,” 
even while she affirms that both modesty and humility are responses to the same moral 
intuitions. While I am persuaded that Andre’s account of humility is one of the most promising 
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accounts on offer, it does not actually extend to cover modesty as readily as do others considered 
here. Andre’s success in defining humility in such a positive way — so that it is “at its core, an 
affirmative emotional capacity, demonstrated in how one sees oneself and the world, and in what 
one does”177 — is actually a significant part of this difficulty. Andre’s humility does an exceptional 
job of responding to one’s failures, both in encouraging strong, harmonious attitudes toward 
those failures and in encouraging action to diminish the likelihood of those failures recurring. 
But those responses cannot be directly translated over to modesty, such that modesty would 
respond to accomplishments and evidence of one’s abilities by restoring harmony, finding 
strength, and diminishing the likelihood of future accomplishment. One’s inner harmony is not 
likely to be disturbed by success as it is by failure, one’s strength is not really in question as one 
succeeds, and certainly modesty is not plausibly described as an attitude that directly 
discourages future accomplishment. The core of Andre’s account, though, does admit of 
extension to modesty: modesty and humility alike aim at preventing one’s successes and failures 
from distorting one’s attitudes about oneself and about one’s potential. With regard to the task 
of responding to failure, Andre’s account of humility seems almost exactly right; when extended 
to accomplishments, though, it makes more sense to stress human limitation instead of internal 
harmony. 
Modesty as a Wandering Virtue 
In rehearsing the accounts of modesty (or humility) offered by Hume, Chesterton, Driver, 
and Andre, I have argued that modesty is a virtue, that modesty’s field of concern includes one’s 
abilities (especially one’s ability to know and predict things) alongside one’s self-estimate and 
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one’s failures. In brief, I have defended the working definition of the virtue of modesty that I 
initially proposed: a habit that responds to and generates norms with regard to one’s own 
attitudes toward one’s abilities, accomplishments, and failures by emphasizing human limits. I 
turn now to making the case that modesty is not only a virtue, but a wandering virtue, and that 
analyzing modesty as a wandering virtue can help make sense of the ethical difficulties that can 
attend medical prognosis. 
If the virtue of modesty is to be a wandering virtue as I have described the category, 
modesty must (1) encourage its possessors to neglect one or more other virtues, (2) possess no 
clear coordinate vices other than those that describe a deficiency of modesty, and (3) lack 
intrinsic references to the values of others considered as actual individuals. That modesty 
satisfies the third requirement is uncontroversial. Modesty — not only as I have defined it but as 
it is defined by any of the authors I have reviewed — is narrowly concerned with its possessor’s 
attitudes toward herself/himself with respect to her/his own abilities, accomplishment, and 
failures. Granted, a few accounts of modesty define it in terms of its possessor’s self-assigned 
ranking vis-a-vis the worth of others.178 But even these accounts that apparently refer to others 
are not concerned with the values that those others actually endorse, or even with those others’ 
own estimates of their worth, but only with the ostensibly modest person’s personal estimate of 
those others’ worth. 
Modesty also fulfills the second requirement: modesty possesses no clear coordinate 
vices other than those that describe a deficiency of modesty. Incidental support for my 
contention that modesty’s coordinate vices all fall on the side of deficiency comes from Robert 
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Roberts and Jay Wood, who enumerate a helpfully long list of the vices to which modesty (they 
use “humility”) is opposed: “arrogance, vanity, conceit, egotism, hyper-autonomy, grandiosity, 
pretentiousness, snobbishness, impertinence (presumption), haughtiness, self-righteousness, 
domination, selfish ambition, and self-complacency.”179 All of these vices reflect the various ways 
in which one’s modesty can be deficient: the vain person is immodest with respect to appearance, 
the hyper-autonomous person is immodest with respect to independence, the snobbish person 
is immodest with respect to taste, and so on. Modesty’s resistance to these numerous vices firmly 
establishes modesty’s status as a virtue, and an important one, given our collective human 
propensities toward these vices. But none of vices that modesty opposes are concerned with 
excessive modesty. It is difficult to imagine what such a vice of excessive modesty would look 
like, or even how it would be defined provided it were not trivially defined as “too much modesty.” 
Defining a vice of excessive modesty in this way will not persuade us if we expect, as I have 
suggested we should, that coordinate vices should be identifiable without direct comparison to 
the virtues that oppose them. For instance, we can identify vain and selfish people without 
having to refer directly to a standard of modesty from which they depart. We can certainly aver 
that some persons are observably too modest for their own good, but this cannot establish that 
such modesty is vicious in the absence of the doctrines of eudaimonism and the unity of the 
virtues. 
With regard to wandering virtues’ first requirement, that the wandering virtue encourage 
neglect of other virtues, Driver has already done the heavy lifting. I do not agree with Driver that 
modesty necessarily entails ignorance, but modesty certainly tends toward ignorance with 
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respect to one’s abilities and accomplishments, and modesty subsequently benefits from this 
ignorance. Modesty’s habitual responses emphasize human limits, so that the modest person’s 
attitudes toward her/his accomplishments will downplay both those accomplishments’ 
significance and the modest person’s agency in achieving them. And this modesty extends to the 
modest person’s abilities and potential for future success (or, with regard to intellectual abilities, 
potential for accurate prediction). With regard to failures, the modest person fares better, as 
Andre would expect: a modest person will not be surprised at concrete evidence of her/his own 
limits, and a response to failure emphasizing human limits may even be beneficial. But to the 
extent that modesty tends toward attitudes that result in less than accurate (that is, false) 
assessments of abilities and accomplishments, modesty at a minimum encourages neglect of the 
virtue of honesty, the habit by which we respond to and generate norms related to truth. So far 
as modesty suggests that the modest person is more limited than in fact he/she is, it will tend 
also to diminish realizations of other virtues, although these other virtues will be difficult to 
specify in advance. And modesty has an interesting feature that makes it especially difficult to 
rein in: if a modest person is shown to be in error about her/his self-knowledge and attitudes 
toward one’s her/his accomplishments or abilities, this may only reaffirm the modest person’s 
limits and the appropriateness of attitudes emphasizing those limits. 
George Eliot furnishes a poignant example of such wandering modesty in the central 
character of Middlemarch, Dorothea Brooke. Eliot characterizes Dorothea as exceptionally 
beautiful, beneficent, clever, pious, economical, intelligent, educated, courageous, and energetic: 
in Eliot’s words, “the hereditary strain of Puritan energy […] glowed alike through faults and 
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virtues[.]”180 With all of her worldly advantages, Dorothea seems unlikely to let modesty, habitual 
emphasis on her human limits in her attitudes toward herself, get the better of her, but this is 
exactly what she does. Eliot establishes at the outset that Dorothea’s dispositions are reliably 
toward limiting the worth and import of her abilities and accomplishments. In the first three 
chapters alone, Dorothea eschews jewelry for fear of calling attention to her beauty, forms an 
intention to abandon riding horses (at which she is accomplished) because it calls positive 
attention to her, deprecates the extent of her (in fact considerable) reading and knowledge, 
repudiates almost every compliment offered to her, and persuades herself that her capacities for 
independence are feeble (they will prove to be anything but). Dorothea convinces herself in short 
order that she ought to marry the much older Edward Casaubon, a local cleric and would-be 
scholar of religion whose lack of animating passion is memorably characterized by one of his 
neighbors: “Somebody put a drop [of Casaubon’s blood] under a magnifying-glass, and it was all 
semicolons and parentheses.”181 There is no doubt that Casaubon is an outwardly respectable 
person, or that he aims (but fails) to be a consistently decent man. But his preoccupation with 
amateur scholarship (which proves to be utterly trivial) and his lack of human warmth make him 
a poor prospective husband in everyone’s eyes save Dorothea’s. Dorothea, though, habitually 
downplays her strengths as weaknesses, her needs as failures, and her passions as misguided: 
Dorothea’s attitudes toward herself, her accomplishments, and her abilities consistently 
emphasize their limited importance because they are all so obviously human. Dorothea’s 
modesty drives her to be fundamentally dishonest with herself, so that it seems to her that 
Casaubon is the one man perfectly suited to the limited person Dorothea habitually affirms 
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herself to be. Nevertheless, the truth will out: following her wedding to Casaubon, Dorothea 
slides deeper and deeper into misery, misery abated only by Casaubon’s death and her growing 
affection for the man who will become her second husband. And in her growth as a person, 
Dorothea’s modesty is strangely re-inscribed: she comes to realize that for all her merit and all 
her modesty, she had been a far worse person than she knew, often cruel to her family and friends 
and overbearing in her zeal for virtue. 
Roberts and Wood, whose list of modesty’s coordinate vices was so helpful, would 
strongly disagree with my contention that modesty encourages the neglect of other virtues. 
Roberts and Wood define true humility as the virtue in which “concern for status is swamped or 
displaced or put on hold by some overriding virtuous concern.”182 Roberts and Wood give two 
examples of this: Jesus of Nazareth, whose humility consisted in disregarding his status as God, 
temporarily setting this status aside in favor of an earthly life (with a very humiliating end) in 
order to exhibit God’s love; and the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore, whose humility 
consisted in disregarding the status he could otherwise have enjoyed as one of the great intellects 
of his place and time, preferring to pursue philosophic truth even when it led him to contradict 
himself.183 The behavior that Roberts and Wood ascribe to humility inverts my first requirement 
for wandering virtues: Roberts and Wood impose a requirement on humility that it specially 
attend to another, more important virtue, not neglect other virtues. But Roberts and Wood 
evidently recognize that this is an imposition above and beyond what is normally expected: the 
exceptional examples they supply underscore the extent to which their true or praiseworthy 
humility diverges from the modesty and humility to which we are more accustomed. And even if 
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we were to grant Roberts and Wood’s definition of humility, it would still permit exactly those 
problems with modesty that I have attributed to Dorothea Brooke. Dorothea’s modesty is 
entirely in service to “her desire to make her life greatly effective[,]”184 specifically, to serve God 
and to benefit her community. But all the same, Dorothea’s modesty wanders from the straight 
and narrow and takes her flourishing with it. Unless we further stipulate that modesty be in the 
service of a greater virtue rightly conceived, even Roberts and Wood’s requirement will not 
prevent modesty from encouraging neglect of other virtues, including honesty at a minimum. 
For all the reasons I have rehearsed in the first and second chapters, I am skeptical of definitions 
of virtue that include the stipulation that virtues get things exactly right. 
Dorothea’s example also helps address the lingering concern that modesty’s coordinate 
vice of extremity might be self-effacement. Although it is not usually positioned as such, self-
effacement — diminishing oneself to the point that one is indistinguishable from one’s context 
— might be thought to be an extremity of modesty. Self-effacement is not always construed as 
negative, or as a vice. Certain schools of Christian theology praise those who strive to live into 
Christ’s example so thoroughly that their original selves vanish. But other persons, religious or 
not, regard self-effacement as a vice. If self-effacement is a vice and is rightly positioned as an 
extreme realization of modesty, then modesty would not be a wandering virtue after all. Modesty 
would then have a coordinate vice of extremity other than those of deficiency. But Dorothea 
makes clear that self-effacement is not an adequate descriptor of the extremes of modesty. 
Dorothea is clearly modest, even as she is by no means self-effacing: she wants to make an 
indelible mark on her community through her charity and piety. Dorothea’s modesty does not 
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constrain her aspirations for who she will become; her idealism is one of her most remarked-
upon traits in Middlemarch. Dorothea’s modesty only constrains her assessment of the worth of 
who she already is. Dorothea reminds us that a modest person may still be very ambitious, so 
long as her/his ambitions are not directed at self-aggrandizement, and in so doing Dorothea 
reminds us that the virtue of modesty may wander independent of ambition. 
Modesty And Medical Prognosis 
Medical prognosis presents a number of interesting theoretical problems, including 
epistemological and even metaphysical questions about the nature of probability. Perhaps most 
elemental is the question of what sort of clinical prediction merits the label “prognosis.” In 1960, 
the medical sociologist Fred Davis distinguished “‘real’ uncertainty as a clinical and scientific 
phenomenon” from “the uses to which uncertainty — real or pretended, ‘functional’ uncertainty 
— lends itself in the management of patients and their families by hospital physicians[.]”185 
Davis’s specific focus was pediatric polio. In the middle of the twentieth century, it was very 
difficult for physicians to know whether a child would recover from a polio infection and what 
the extent of that child’s durable disability would be during the first two weeks of a child’s 
hospitalization with polio. This predictive uncertainty progressively resolved on the basis of 
clinical evidence after the first two weeks of hospitalization. The parents of polio patients, 
however, initially had to be persuaded — and typically were persuaded within the first two weeks 
— that doctors were sincerely uncertain about their child’s future. Parent’s hopes for their child’s 
recovery stepped in to fill this void of professional certainty. Parents, who initially struggled to 
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understand physicians’ initial prognostic uncertainty, often had to be persuaded anew when the 
physicians did become confident in an unhappy prognosis. In brief, Davis described a mismatch 
between clinicians’ predictive uncertainty and parents’ understanding of that uncertainty, a 
mismatch no less reliable for the transformation it underwent over the course of the child’s 
hospitalization. On the basis of his research, Davis offered a four-fold typology of the 
intersections of communicated prognoses and clinical confidence in those prognoses. Only one 
of these types is unlikely to cause trouble: when a clinician “communicates” a prognosis in which 
that clinician has a high degree of confidence. Second best is a frank “admission of uncertainty,” 
though (to repeat) Davis saw this become complicated down the line more often than not. 
Although his aim is primarily descriptive, Davis discourages physicians from conveying 
prognoses in which they are uncertain (which he calls “dissimulation”) or from withholding 
prognoses in which they are confident (“evasion”).186 
It seems self-evident that a physician’s clear communication of predictive certainty is 
preferable to the alternatives, but it is not clear to me that only a clinically certain (or near-
certain) outcome should count as prognosis, especially because certainty is often difficult to 
establish in advance. But Davis seems right to exclude dissimulation and evasive communication 
from prognosis, and that admitting uncertainty either acknowledges the complexities that 
attend uncertainty or (in Davis’s narrative) create those complexities. The primary reason, 
meanwhile, that Davis deprecates frank admissions of uncertainty is that he is confident that, 
with time, the preferable, much more certain prognosis is typically available. Even if Davis could 
plausibly dignify only near-certain predictions with the label prognosis, this confidence in 
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medical certainty has since evaporated. Clinicians now rarely surprise patients and their 
surrogates when clinicians admit uncertainty about a particular patient’s course early in a 
hospitalization or course of treatment. Renée Fox attributes this to the public’s growing 
awareness of the vagaries of cancer and of other diseases that are not easily cured.187 Most 
members of the public have known two people with roughly identical cancer diagnoses whose 
clinical courses diverged sharply, and seasoned clinicians are still more aware of the ways that 
patients’ medical outcomes can depart from clinical expectations. It now seems unhelpfully 
narrow to confine true prognosis to near-certain medical predictions, since these would omit 
much of today’s medical practice, and more fair to acknowledge as prognoses those admissions 
of uncertainty that allow for the wide range of possible outcomes facing patients with complex 
or poorly-understood conditions. 
In addition to its broader, theoretical difficulties, medical prognosis presents pressing, 
practical concerns in the clinical environment: doctors dislike prognosticating, patients and 
surrogates regard prognoses as extremely important, and prognoses are often wildly inaccurate. 
Nicholas Christakas and Theodore Iwashyna’s 1998 study of 697 internists found that three-fifths 
of internists found prognostication “stressful,” that almost as many found it “difficult,” that four-
fifths thought “patients expect too much certainty,” and that nine-tenths avoid specificity in 
prognostication.188 These attitudes are almost diametrically opposed to those of patients’ 
surrogate decision-makers: Leah Evans and colleagues’ 2009 survey of 179 surrogates for 
                                                            
187 Renée C. Fox, “The Evolution of Medical Uncertainty,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly: Health and Society 
58, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 16. 
188 Nicholas A. Christakis and Theodore J. Iwashyna, “Attitude and Self-Reported Practice Regarding 
Prognostication in a National Sample of Internists,” Archives of Internal Medicine 158, no. 21 (November 23, 1998): 
2389-2395. 
 
125 
incapacitated intensive care patients found that 87% wanted physicians to communicate even 
uncertain prognoses, so long as that uncertainty was frankly addressed.189 That uncertainty may 
be more considerable than even physicians appreciate, however. Christakis and Elizabeth 
Lamont’s 2000 study of 365 physicians’ prognoses for 504 hospice outpatients found that only 
20% of prognoses concerning a patient’s expected survival (in days) were within 33% of the 
patient’s actual length of survival, while most prognoses (63%) overestimated the patient’s 
remaining days of life by greater than 33%.190 Compounding the problems with evidently 
predictable biases in individual clinicians’ prognoses, many standardized measures fare little 
better in terms of accuracy. Lindsey Yourman and colleagues found in 2012 that sixteen recently-
proposed standardized indices predicting mortality in older adults were not sufficiently reliable 
for application to medical decision-making or healthcare policy.191 
If ever there were a feature of medical practice crying out for modesty, it would seem to 
be medical prognosis. Patients and their surrogates value prognosis: what can be expected from 
an illness often figures prominently in their decision-making, not just medically but with regard 
to their lives more broadly. Prognosis is a charged moment. Clinicians, meanwhile, struggle both 
to be accurate in their prognoses and to muster the will to communicate those prognoses. 
Clinicians run flush up against human limits in their efforts at prognostication. What we expect 
                                                            
189 Leah R. Evans et al., “Surrogate Decision-Makers’ Perspectives on Discussing Prognosis in the Face of 
Uncertainty,” American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 179, no. 1 (January 2009): 48–53. 
190 Nicholas A. Christakis and Elizabeth B. Lamont, “Extent and Determinants of Error in Doctors’ Prognoses in 
Terminally Ill Patients: Prospective Cohort Study,” British Medical Journal 320 (February 19, 2000): 469–72. These 
optimistic prognoses, though obviously uncertain, would not have been adequately captured by Davis’s category 
of “dissimulation,” in that they were communicated to researchers, not patients: there were none of the usual 
ulterior motive to over-estimate that bedevil the delivery of bad news in clinical contexts. 
191 Lindsey C. Yourman et al., “Prognostic Indices for Older Adults: A Systematic Review,” Journal of the American 
Medical Association 307, no. 2 (January 11, 2012): 182–92. 
 
126 
modesty to accomplish in connection with medical prognosis will depend in large part upon 
what we make of modesty itself. 
A Vignette of Medical Prognosis 
Mr. Edwards is a 64-year-old man with a past medical history notable for an intracranial 
aneurysm and a (comparatively mild) bilateral stroke admitted to the hospital approximately 
one month ago after a fall at his assisted living facility. Imaging upon Mr. Edwards’s arrival at the 
hospital revealed an acute subdural hematoma. Since his admission, Mr. Edwards has suffered 
seizures, which are now suppressed with medication, and respiratory insufficiency, for which he 
is intubated and on a ventilator. Approximately one week ago, Mr. Edwards stopped responding 
to commands and interacting with his visitors; new imaging has revealed that Mr. Edwards has 
suffered new, extensive strokes on the left side of his brain. The consulting neurologist, Dr. 
Taylor, has advised the primary team that Mr. Edwards’s new strokes have left him paralyzed on 
the right side and unable to understand or form speech. Dr. Taylor has further advised the 
primary team that Mr. Edwards’s prospects for any meaningful neurological recovery are 
negligible, that Mr. Edwards is at high risk for further strokes, and that even without those 
probable strokes Mr. Edwards will be completely dependent and unable to interact with others 
for the rest of his life. 
After obtaining the opinion of the consulting neurologist, Mr. Edwards’s primary 
attending physician, Dr. Williams, asks Mr. Edwards’s wife of forty years to come to the hospital 
for a meeting to discuss next steps. Dr. Taylor, unfortunately, has rotated off and cannot attend 
the meeting with Mrs. Edwards, so it falls entirely to Dr. Williams to communicate Mr. Edwards’s 
dismal prognosis to Mrs. Edwards. Dr. Williams knows Dr. Taylor to be highly capable and 
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thorough neurologist. But Dr. Williams has seen many highly improbable things while caring for 
stroke patients during her residency, fellowship, and now three years as an attending physician. 
When the time comes for Dr. Williams’s meeting with Mrs. Edwards, Dr. Williams begins 
by updating Mrs. Edwards on her husband’s very serious condition. Dr. Williams then tells Mrs. 
Edwards about Dr. Taylor’s prognosis; in response to Mrs. Williams’s skeptical questions, Dr. 
Williams strongly endorses Dr. Taylor’s expertise. But then Mrs. Edwards says, “Dr. Williams, I 
believe you when you say that Dr. Taylor is the expert. But I’m sure you’ve taken care of a lot of 
patients like my husband. What do you think? Could he get better? I know that it would be 
enough for him if he could just see his granddaughters and hear their voices again; we were 
making it work in the assisted living facility before and I’m sure we could make it work if he 
needed a lot more help than that. I want to know what you think: is there even a chance that my 
husband could ever do that someday?” 
Dr. Williams knew that this sort of question was inevitable, but after a decade of medical 
training and three years as an attending physician, she is still deeply conflicted about how to 
answer. Dr. Williams does not doubt Dr. Taylor’s prognosis on an intellectual level: Dr. Williams 
agrees that Mr. Edwards’s chances of any recovery are extremely remote. Dr. Williams has seen 
almost all of her similarly situated stroke patients die within days or weeks, regardless of medical 
intervention. Strictly on the basis of the medical evidence, Dr. Williams is inclined to recommend 
a transition to comfort measures only, eventually including withdrawal of ventilatory support 
with the knowledge that this will almost certainly result in Mr. Edwards’s death. But Dr. Williams 
has also seen a tiny number of her similarly-situated stroke patients recover and live for a few 
more months. The lives that these patients have are not lives that Dr. Williams would want for 
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herself or recommend to anyone in her family: they remain dependent for all acts of daily living 
and seem only to follow simple commands. But Dr. Williams knows that those added months 
and (rarely) years have been meaningful for some of those patients’ families. 
Dr. Williams decides to say to Mrs. Edwards, “I haven’t seen nearly as many stroke 
patients as Dr. Taylor has, and I strongly encourage you to take his guidance very seriously. For 
my own part, I’ve seen nearly all of the patients I’ve had who were like your husband die in the 
hospital. But I’ve seen a few live longer than I expected and get a little better. The brain is a very 
complex organ, and while we understand injuries to it pretty well, there’s always a chance that 
our predictions will be a little off the mark. I want you to understand that I’ve never seen anyone 
fully recover from strokes like your husband has had. I’ve seen a couple make it out of the hospital 
to a skilled nursing facility. I wish I could give you some certainty, but I can’t. It is my professional 
opinion that the best thing we can do for your husband is keep him comfortable, rather than try 
to continue to provide aggressive interventions that are very unlikely to benefit him. But I can’t 
tell you I know he won’t recover at all: with strokes, we just can’t be perfectly certain.” 
At this point, Mrs. Edwards interjects, “You say you’ve seen a couple patients like my 
husband get better. What do we need to do to give my husband that chance? I’m not going to 
give up on him.” Dr. Williams is unhappy with this, but she reasons that the poor outcome she 
expects for Mr. Edwards is only highly probable, not certain. It could be, after all, that she would 
not be doing Mr. Edwards the kindness she expects by transitioning him to comfort measures 
instead of continuing aggressive interventions aimed at stabilizing or improving Mr. Edwards’s 
condition. 
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Analyzing the Vignette in Light of Wandering Modesty 
By the end of the vignette, it is more likely than it might have been that Mr. Edwards’s 
final days will be filled with aggressive treatments that will yield no medical benefit and that he 
will still succumb to the sequelae of his strokes during the current hospitalization, being pricked, 
prodded, scanned, and invasively supported along the way. If Mr. Edwards’s luck is different — 
better or worse is difficult to say — he will stabilize enough that he will receive a tracheostomy 
for more convenient ventilatory support, a surgically-placed tube to accommodate long-term 
artificial nutrition, and a discharge to a long-term acute care facility, where he will have 
additional strokes, develop an infection, or suffer some other complication that will send him 
back to the intensive care unit, where he will die, never having regained awareness. If Mr. 
Edwards is exceedingly resilient, he will join the handful of patients who remind Dr. Williams of 
her predictive limits as a physician, though Mr. Edwards will still require assistance with all acts 
of daily living, and may still require artificial nutrition and hydration if his speech therapy cannot 
rehabilitate him sufficiently to take food by mouth. 
These and similar considerations suggest that something has gone very wrong when 
family meetings for patients like Mr. Edwards result in highly aggressive plans of care. Some 
explanations for the alleged failure revolve around patients’ surrogate decision-makers. These 
surrogate decision-makers are sometimes said to be excessively hopeful, deluded, or in denial 
about the seriousness of the patient’s condition. The gentlest possible resolutions involve 
consistent and frequent communication with the patient’s surrogate decision-maker in order to 
give the surrogate time to process unwelcome news. More confrontational resolutions involve 
overriding or even replacing surrogate decision-makers when their decisions are deemed 
inconsistent with the patient’s medical interests or expressed desires. 
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Other explanations for the undesirable outcome pin blame on the physician having the 
discussion: if the physician had given firmer directions to the surrogate, the patient’s plan of care 
would have more closely resembled what was medically best for the patient. I have even heard 
physicians like Dr. Williams called cowardly because they put questions of patient care to 
patients’ surrogates when the probabilities all pointed in one direction. The charge of cowardice 
is based on the view that admissions of uncertainty are often motivated by fear of surrogates’ 
reactions to bad news or by fear of being wrong. A courageous physician in Dr. Williams’s 
situation, this line of reasoning goes, would tell Mrs. Edwards that Mr. Edwards was dying, that 
a transition to comfort care was the only medically-appropriate course of treatment, and that 
this was what was going to happen. 
It is understandably tempting to assume that something must have gone poorly when 
something has a poor outcome, especially when what goes poorly is as apparently manageable 
as a conversation. But treating Dr. Williams’s modesty as a wandering virtue is both more 
humane and more helpful. Rather than chastising Dr. Williams for a failure of character she did 
not exhibit, we can instead acknowledge that what happened was that one of Dr. Williams’s 
genuine virtues fared too well. 
Although there is always danger in attributing character traits on the basis of a limited 
sample, if we suppose that Dr. Williams’s behavior in the vignette is characteristic of her behavior 
in general, it seems clear that Dr. Williams is modest. Dr. Williams’s attitudes toward her own 
abilities and accomplishments in patient care emphasize her human and professional limits. Dr. 
Williams defers to the expertise of the consulting neurologist, despite Dr. Williams’s experience 
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caring for many similar stroke patients. And Dr. Williams readily admits the limits of her ability 
to know Mr. Edwards’s course in advance. 
If genuine modesty were guaranteed a priori to conduce to eudaimonia, to entail all other 
virtues, or to operate through a unifying virtue of phronesis than ensures its right function, Dr. 
Williams’s “modesty” would be specious. In this case, though, the plausibility of the vignette, 
which is derived from several real patient care situations, weighs against the credibility of a priori 
assurances that genuine virtues will not go awry. And Dr. Williams’s modesty seems to go awry 
in the ways we would expect of a wandering virtue. First, Dr. Williams’s modesty encourages her 
to neglect other virtues, including mercy and honesty. Dr. Williams enters the vignette 
responsive to the norms of mercy: she is attentive to, and motivated by, Mr. Edwards’s present 
suffering and dismal prognosis to recommend a transition to comfort measures only. But by the 
end, Dr. Williams’s modesty has overridden these concerns of mercy, and indeed Dr. Williams 
has persuaded herself that the merciful thing may be to give Mr. Edwards the chance Mrs. 
Edwards requests. In so doing, Dr. Williams’s modesty has also encouraged neglect of the virtue 
of honesty, as wandering modesty almost inevitably will. To be sure, Dr. Williams’s remarks to 
Mrs. Edwards are all true, as far as they go, but the virtue of honesty expects more than 
consistently true statements: an honest person will communicate an intelligible, thorough 
account of the truth with an ideal end-point of shared understanding. Though all of Dr. 
Williams’s statements are true, Mrs. Edwards’s understanding of her husband’s prognosis is 
almost certainly more optimistic than the truth would warrant or than Dr. Williams would 
endorse. 
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Second, Dr. Williams’s modesty never runs into a coordinate vice of extremity or excess. 
I have urged that modesty lacks such coordinate vices of excess, and Dr. Williams’s behavior in 
the vignette bears this out: her modesty never becomes something other than modesty, even as 
it wanders away from other virtues and takes Dr. Williams’s plan for Mr. Edwards with it. Third 
and finally, Dr. Williams’s modesty resides in her own analysis and nowhere else; it does not 
consult the actual values of others. Dr. Williams’s acquiescence to Mrs. Edwards’s optimism is 
not based in an inquiry into what Mrs. Edwards expects Mr. Edwards would value, or even a 
rigorous inquiry into what Mrs. Edwards herself values: allusions to time with grandchildren are 
more suggestive than substantial, and it might have been possible for Dr. Williams to dissuade 
Mrs. Edwards from an aggressive plan of care if the two of them had spent more time exploring 
what, specifically, Mrs. Edwards hoped for Mr. Edwards and whether those hoped-for outcomes 
remained possible. Instead, Dr. Williams’s modesty intervenes, and her confidence in her 
prognosis and plan of care declines. 
If Dr. Williams’s difficulties stem from (or at least involve) modesty’s character as a 
wandering virtue, it suggests that some typical suggested responses will be ineffective. First and 
foremost, if modesty is a virtue, albeit a tricky one, neither Dr. Williams nor Mrs. Edwards will 
benefit morally from an attempt to cut the Gordian knot and deny the applicability of modesty 
altogether. Although modesty conduces to the neglect of the virtue of honesty, immodest or 
proud prognosticators are inevitably dishonest: a clinician who implies her/his certainty about a 
diagnosis that is only highly probable has deceived. An immodest version of Dr. Williams would 
likely have an easier time persuading Mrs. Edwards to accept the recommended plan of care, but 
would do so at the cost of Mrs. Edwards’s informed consent to that course of care on behalf of 
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her husband. Second, if Dr. Williams’s difficulties stem from one of her genuine virtues, it will be 
unfair and counterproductive to accuse her of a failure of character, as the charge of cowardice 
implies. Dr. Williams’s difficulty is not habitual fear and unwillingness to dare what ought to be 
dared: Dr. Williams goes into the meeting with Mrs. Edwards and communicates hard truths 
without undue trepidation. Neither is it fair to say that Dr. Williams is afraid of being wrong. She 
frankly admits that she has been wrong before, which is precisely the issue. Dr. Williams’s 
difficulty is that she is only too well aware of the limits of her knowledge of the future and that 
her habitual attitudes reflect this, as they must if she is to be modest. This sort of wandering 
modesty is self-reinforcing: a person who emphasizes her/his limits will have an increasingly 
difficult time assessing whether the limits set by modesty are too narrow. 
It would be contribution enough if wandering modesty guided us to avoid discouraging 
virtue or impugning the character of virtuous clinicians, but wandering modesty also has 
positive suggestions for helping Dr. Williams and clinicians similar to her. First, because we 
ought not expect Dr. Williams’s modesty to self-correct or to be balanced out by the virtues of 
which wandering modesty encourages neglect, we should instead ensure that Dr. Williams has 
external support from the rest of the healthcare team for the accuracy and reliability of her 
prognosis and for the appropriateness of basing Mr. Edwards’s plan of care on that prognosis. 
Family meetings in which only the primary service sends an attending physician are routine, and 
understandably so: consulting services are often booked solid throughout the week, and 
coordinating spare moments across a primary team and multiple consulting services is often 
daunting. But placing the full weight of medical judgment on a modest attending physician 
provides no safeguards against that modesty’s wandering. Putting other clinicians in the room 
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adds voices that can reorient the (appropriately) modest attending physician: even a consulting 
physician who is modest about her/his own abilities can still assure another clinician of her/his 
own abilities.192 In this way, wandering modesty is better constrained, not by adding on other 
virtues, but by adding other voices that can evaluate and respond to the norms generated by the 
attending physician’s modesty. 
The second strategy suggested by treating modesty as a wandering virtue, perhaps 
surprisingly, recommends increasing the range of modesty’s application. The same challenges of 
tight scheduling that make it so difficult to organize family meetings in the first place also 
contribute to high demands on the productivity of those meetings when they finally take place: 
the various clinicians on the primary team, especially, hope that these meetings will result in 
clear plans of care going forward. But family meetings are often the first opportunity a patient’s 
family members have had to sit down with representatives from most of the clinical services 
involved in their loved one’s care or to hear their loved one’s prognosis. It is ambitious to the 
point of immodesty to expect that this same meeting will smoothly transition from news of a 
poor medical prognosis to making emotionally painful decisions in the best medical interests of 
the patient. Better would be to send modest clinicians into the meeting with more modest 
expectations for what they will address. 
                                                            
192 Larry Churchill rightly points out that Dr. Williams’s modesty might here have served her better than it did: had 
Dr. Williams’s modesty focused closely on her dearth of experience in relation to the experience of the consulting 
neurologist, Dr. Williams might have declined to relate her own experience at all. Modesty, even if a wandering 
virtue, need not always go astray. Wandering virtues are especially prone to go astray, but are not always in error, 
which distinguishes them both from Driver’s “virtues of ignorance” and from vices. However, because Dr. Williams 
is left to her own devices and has made the consulting neurologist’s opinion her own, her modesty is likely to 
impinge on her confidence in the prediction. This problem is ameliorated if the consulting neurologist can be 
present. 
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Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the features of modesty variously valued and criticized 
by Hume, Chesterton, Driver, and Andre are best explained if modesty is understood as a 
wandering virtue. I have suggested that wandering modesty can help explain some of the moral 
difficulties commonly associated with medical prognosis in the face of genuine uncertainty. The 
positive contributions that this analysis offers are not altogether what one would expect in a 
virtue ethic. Treating modesty as a wandering virtue does not explain problems in terms of a 
deficiency of virtue, but of insufficient concessions to the peculiar features of wandering virtues. 
This pattern of explanation is made even more clear in connection with the next virtue I consider 
as a wandering virtue, patience.
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CHAPTER 4 
PATIENCE 
Robert Kaster's Analysis of Roman Patientia 
The problems of the virtue of patience have long been apparent to its commentators. The 
pre-Christian Romans were peculiarly afflicted: the same patientia could signify diverse 
evaluations. Robert Kaster’s careful analysis of Roman attributions of the virtue patientia 
provides a valuable starting point for my own analyses of patience as a wandering virtue and of 
patience in clinical medicine. The precondition for any manifestation of patientia “is the quality 
entailed in being the recipient, not the generator, of action, or experience.”193 Kaster subdivides 
Roman uses of patientia into three related families of meaning. The first is the patience that 
enables a person to tolerate both the inevitable hardships imposed by an inhospitable natural 
world (distinct from human society) and pain, whether inflicted by humans or by something else. 
The Romans reliably ascribed this patience to the more-or-less mythical founders of their 
republic, whose subsistence farming compelled them to face down unfriendly nature and whose 
numerous battles occasioned grievous injuries. In the Roman mind, this first version of the virtue 
of patience was unequivocally good. The second version of patience was less common, but more 
excellent. This second aspect of patience extends beyond the ability to tolerate, and function 
under, adverse conditions to include a willing embrace of hardships one cannot avoid. Firmness 
of disposition and comportment in the face of torture and death are emblematic of this second 
                                                            
193 Robert A. Kaster, “The Taxonomy of Patience, or When Is ‘Patientia’ Not a Virtue?,” Classical Philology 97, no. 2 
(April 2002): 135. 
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sort of patience, and these connections patience is no longer merely good, but great-making. The 
third version of patience, however, was only a virtue in some people, but emphatically not a 
virtue in the best sort of people (in the Romans’ estimation). This third version of patience is 
toleration of social insults and injuries, the sort of patience the Roman elite expected slaves to 
exhibit unconditionally and hoped (but did not really expect) that free women would exhibit 
voluntarily. This third sort of patience is uncontroversially a virtue in slaves and in women. But 
patience’s virtuousness in a free man is inversely proportional to that man’s social status: the 
more elite a man is, the less patience for social insult he ought to have. Kaster rightly observes 
that no Roman could dispense with patience altogether: the constant reprisals that would have 
ensued had Roman men possessed no patience for one another’s frequent insults (real or 
perceived) would have collapsed the whole of Roman society. Even so, “if patientia in the great 
produced admiration, it was admiration born of fear, and the knowledge that forbearance was 
merely the dormant state of awful power.”194 
We can look back at the attitudes of the pre-Christian Romans and see — as all but the 
Roman elite probably did see at the time — how invidious were the classism and sexism 
undergirding the attributions of patientia that fell within Kaster’s third category. Clinical 
medicine would surely be improved if classism and sexism were no longer active concerns, but 
there is abundant evidence that classism and sexism continue to hinder both medical education 
and care.195 Nevertheless, classism, sexism, and similar prejudices are publicly decried in present-
                                                            
194 Kaster, “Taxonomy of Patience,” 144. Some theologians still map this sort of patience on to the Christian God. 
Romano Guardini suggests that God’s example of perfect patience “is the patience of the one who could use force 
but spares, because he is truly Lord, noble and gracious.” (Romano Guardini, The Virtues: On Forms of the Moral 
Life, trans. Stella Lange [Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967], 31) 
195 The seminal article, responses to which have substantiated its anecdotal concerns about witting and 
(especially) unwitting perpetuation of prejudice in medical education and practice, is Frederic W. Hafferty and 
 
138 
day U.S. healthcare (even if they are still privately practiced) and should play no role in justifying 
the virtue of patience. 
Once its unsavory justifications are set aside, Roman patientia (as Kaster analyzes it) 
seems to me a fairly comprehensive account of what is still expected of the virtue of patience 
today, at least in the context of clinical medicine. First, a patient person — typically the patient 
hospital patient — will bear the inevitable, physical hardships associated with illness and disease 
without expecting illness and disease to be other than they are. This can be transposed to 
clinicians: a patient clinician will bear the physical discomforts associated with treating illness 
and disease without expecting that illness or disease should be other than they are. Second, a 
patient person will bear these natural hardships in a way that is at least not anxious, reluctant, 
or resentful, and that is at best willing. Third, a patient person will also tolerate social injuries to 
her/his dignity, but without the willingness and acceptance that characterize a patient person’s 
responses to natural ills. 
Kaster’s analysis of Roman patientia also clarifies why the coordinate vices of patience 
are so difficult to pin down: though patience is a single virtue concerned with bearing up under 
injury and with expected behavior and characteristic attitudes are recognizably similar 
irrespective of the source of injury, patience’s willingness to endure these injuries varies 
depending on whether the injury is natural or social in origin. Patience’s willingness to bear 
social injuries is limited in ways that its willingness to bear physical hardship is not; this 
distinction will play an important role in my argument that patience is well-described as a 
wandering virtue. 
                                                            
Ronald Franks, “The Hidden Curriculum, Ethics Teaching, and the Structure of Medical Education,” Academic 
Medicine 69, no. 11 (November 1994): 861–71. 
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The Virtue of Patience as a Feature of Talcott Parsons's "Sick Role" 
In the middle of the twentieth century, the sociologist Talcott Parsons developed and 
elaborated an account of illness and ill persons’ relationship to physicians and to society that he 
collectively labeled the “sick role.” Parsons argued that the sick person is excused from her/his 
normal responsibilities to society and receives certain dispensations from social norms, but in 
return the sick person takes on atypical responsibilities to her/his physician. With regard to the 
sick person’s normal responsibilities from which he/she is excused, Parsons supplies the 
examples of children who are excused from school because of their illness and adults who are 
excused from work because they are sick; we might readily extend this to skipping parties, 
religious services, and civic gatherings on grounds of not feeling sufficiently well to attend. 
Parsons observes that, as a matter of social convention, sick persons are excused from 
responsibility in another sense: sick persons are not normally faulted for their illnesses. Infection 
with one of the more common illnesses (such as bronchitis, cold, influenza, or pneumonia) is not 
thought to be a moral failure, though there are conspicuous departures from this. But these 
exemptions are accompanied by a new, focused responsibility: to seek the aid of a physician and 
to comply with the physician’s plan of care: by doing these things, the sick person indicates to 
society that he/she has done what he/she can to improve her/his health and to return to her/his 
normal responsibilities.196 
Parsons’s sick role has come in for significant criticism since he elaborated it. First, 
Parsons’s inclusion of an expectation that the sick person will seek to regain her/his health is at 
                                                            
196 Talcott Parsons, “Illness and the Role of the Physician: A Sociological Perspective,” American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry 21, no. 3 (July 1951): 454-456. 
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best an uneasy fit for patients with chronic or progressive diseases:197 for instance, a patient with 
Parkinson’s disease may hope for a return to rude health, but it is beyond the limits of medicine 
to provide as much. Parsons’s sick role, as he developed it, would not readily accommodate the 
adherence of the patient with Parkinson’s disease. Second, since the middle of the twentieth 
century, some patients have become much more active in directing their own care than was the 
compliant patient of Parsons’s sick role. A subset of the healthy population is now actively 
concerned with improving its health even when apparently well, as attested by the proliferation 
of gyms, home fitness equipment, and herbal supplements; as patients, they gather information 
about their conditions and research the doctors to whom they have access.198 Third, the sick role 
has been criticized by proponents of narrative medicine for its monolithic interpretation of what 
is, for patients, a highly particular experience that varies significantly from person to person.199 
Together, these suggest that the sick role is not as universally applicable or as uniform as Parsons 
maintained it was. 
Parsons himself seems not to have been sympathetic to these criticisms, which was 
perhaps to the detriment of his theory. Parsons might well have addressed these criticisms 
simply by limiting its application to patients hospitalized with serious but potentially remediable 
conditions. But Parsons rightly took pains to repudiate another line of criticism that was notably 
off-target: that a person in the sick role was not dependent on medical expertise for direction. 
Parsons’s position on this point was very clear: 
                                                            
197 Alexander Segall, “The Sick Role Concept: Understanding Illness Behavior,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 
17, no. 2 (June 1976): 164-165. 
198 Chris Shilling, “Culture, the ‘Sick Role’ and the Consumption of Health,” British Journal of Sociology 53, no. 4 
(December 1, 2002): 622, 628-631. 
199 Arthur W. Frank, “From Sick Role to Practices of Health and Illness: The Wilson Lecture,” Medical Education 47, 
no. 1 (January 2013): 18–25. 
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social organization of health care, overwhelmingly in modern societies, but particularly in North America, 
has come to be organized in terms of an asymmetrical hierarchy with respect to the functions of this 
particular system, of which the two polar aspects are the role of physician as the highest grade of publicly 
certified expert in health care and the role of sick person independent of the latter's status in other 
respects.200 
The reason for this relationship is the physician’s ability and certified expertise in treating 
disease, while the sick person, in seeking the aid of the physician, tacitly acknowledges that 
he/she lacks what he/she needs (knowledge or authority) to address her/his condition alone. 
Modern hospital medicine might even be said to have been organized around physicians’ 
medical expertise and its delivery, to the neglect of the preferences, designs, and autonomy of 
patients.201 This is not to say that there is nothing for the sick person to do once he/she has sought 
the aid of the physician; it is to say that much of what the “responsible” sick person (someone 
fulfilling the sick role) does is adhere to the course of treatment as directed by the physician, 
rather than take responsibility for directing her/his life. And to do this well is to do it with 
confidence in (not anxiety toward) the physician, without reluctance at the inconveniences and 
pains of adherence, and without resentment of the authority of the physician. The sick role calls 
on the sick person to be, in a word, patient. Karen Lebacqz’s definition of patience in the context 
of clinical medicine, though not explicitly connected with Parson’s description of the sick role, 
seems apt: “To be patient is to preserve cheerfulness and serenity of mind in spite of injuries that 
result from the attempt to realize the good or to live humanly.”202 
                                                            
200 Talcott Parsons, “The Sick Role and the Role of the Physician Reconsidered,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly: 
Health and Society 53, no. 3 (Summer 1975): 266. 
201 Judith Lorber, “Good Patients and Problem Patients: Conformity and Deviance in a General Hospital,” Journal of 
Health and Social Behavior 16, no. 2 (June 1975): 213–25. 
202 Karen Lebacqz, “The Virtuous Patient,” in Virtue and Medicine, ed. Earl E. Shelp (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 
280. 
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There are more humane and less authority-driven conceptualizations of the doctor–
patient relationship than Parsons’s; in the practice of medical ethics, such a conceptualization 
would certainly be preferable.203 But the sick role continues to well describe what is often 
expected of patients, especially acutely ill hospital patients, whether it is the relationship we 
would recommend or not. And at the level of virtue, excellent discharge of the sick role trades 
above all on patience, both for one’s physical discomfort in therapy and the social injury of an 
inferior position in the medical hierarchy. 
Distinguishing Patience from Delayed Gratification 
Adapting patience to the overarching framework I have proposed for virtues, I will define 
patience as the habit (1) that responds to and generates norms with respect to what one suffers 
(2) by diminishing anxiety, reluctance, and resentment. This definition both is informed by and 
covers the classical patientia that Kaster analyzes and the patience expected of hospital patients 
in Parsons’s sick role. 
My definition of patience does omit one conventional use of the term, that of willingness 
to delay or defer some activity.204 John Bunyan supplies one of the best-known examples of 
patience of this sort in his allegory of Passion and Patience early in The Pilgrim’s Progress. The 
protagonist of The Pilgrim’s Progress, Christian, is shown a scene of the siblings Passion and 
Patience, corresponding to worldly and heavenly concerns, respectively. Mid-scene, Passion is 
showered with a heap of riches, to Passion’s great delight, and Passion in turn heaps scorn on 
                                                            
203 See Larry R. Churchill, Joseph B. Fanning, and David Schenck, What Patients Teach: The Everyday Ethics of 
Health Care (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 115 ff. 
204 For a contemporary, philosophical example of patience in this vein, see Joseph H. Kupfer, “When Waiting Is 
Weightless: The Virtue of Patience,” Journal of Value Inquiry 41, no. 2–4 (December 2007): 265–80. 
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Patience for Patience’s lack of the same riches. But Passion’s heap of riches is quickly 
transformed into dust, leaving Passion bereft of its happiness. Patience, meanwhile, has stored 
up a heavenly reward that will never molder. “Therefore Passion had not so much reason to laugh 
at Patience because he had his good things at first, as Patience will have to laugh at Passion, 
because he had his best things last; […] he that hath his portion last, must have it lastingly[.]”205 
With all due respect to Bunyan, the moral taught by his “Patience” is not the value of the virtue 
of patience, but rather the importance of taking a long view of self-interest when evaluating 
patterns of life. Passion and Patience, in the end, both seek the same thing: a reward. But the 
rewards desired by Passion and by Patience differ in two key respects. First, Passion’s reward is 
tangible and close at hand, while Patience’s reward is longer in arriving; second, Passion’s reward 
eventually comes to naught, while Patience’s reward is ostensibly eternal, though by the end of 
the allegory Patience still has not received its reward. Patience may be just as self-interested as 
is Passion, but Patience benefits from its willingness to delay its gratification and secures a far 
superior reward. Bunyan’s character “Patience” is only patient (in the sense with which I am here 
concerned) to the extent that Patience bears Passion’s ridicule without anxiety, reluctance, or 
resentment. There is no evidence in the text that Patience does bear Passion’s slights gladly, and 
in fact, Bunyan suggests that Patience may simply be containing its contempt for Passion until a 
more opportune time.206 
                                                            
205 John Bunyan, The Pilgrim’s Progress (from This World to That Which Is to Come) (London: Simpkin, Marshall, 
& Co., 1856), 62. 
206 Counseling patience in the face of temporal frustration in order to wait for and receive eschatological goods 
complicates efforts to adapt even very sophisticated theological accounts of patience into a more empirical 
framework. The prime example of such a theological account is, in my mind, that of Søren Kierkegaard, who 
considers the virtue of patience at length in three quasi-sermons published 1843-1844: “To Gain One’s Soul in 
Patience,” “To Preserve One’s Soul in Patience,” and “Patience in Expectancy.” Kierkegaard offers many worthy 
cautions about patience, and especially about impatient attributions of “too much” patience: impatience will 
always regard any patience as too much and too great: “Is there no danger, then? Impatience itself screams that 
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Bunyan’s character “Patience” illustrates the common confusion between, on the one 
hand, “patience” as a delay or deferral and, on the other hand, the virtue of patience considered 
as such. We frequently counsel children (and almost as often adults) that they should “be 
patient,” by which we mean to indicate that the best time for a certain course of action is not yet 
at hand, and that things will go better for them if they will simply wait for a more opportune time. 
But however elevated, this appeal is to self-interest, not to patience as a virtue. A child who is 
willing to wait until after dinner to eat ice cream at least wins the approval of his parents who 
insist that dessert is a lower priority than actual nutrition; in fact, if his parents are especially 
firm, the child might not receive the ice cream at all if he is unable to drop the topic of ice cream 
until then. An investor who heeds her broker’s advice to wait out a downturn in the stock market 
does so not do so out of some abiding concern for how society will evaluate her character, but 
because she expects ultimately to walk away with more money than she would if she sold off her 
stocks during the downturn. The child and the investor might be “patient” in a colloquial sense, 
but neither manifests a stable habit of bearing up under adversity without anxiety, reluctance, 
or resentment. In fact, both the child’s and the investor’s delays in gratification are wholly 
compatible with impatience at the level of character. The child might inwardly rail against his 
parents for their unjust dessert policies, while the the investor might hold her stocks while 
anxiously reading the business section of the newspaper every morning in the hopes of seeing 
                                                            
there is. But patience has discovered the danger, that the danger is not that it is too late but that impatience itself 
is wasting the last moment. What human being was ever as mean as impatience! Is it not friendship of sorts to sit 
with the unfortunate one and wring one’s hands and wail with him — and make him forget that there was time.” 
(Søren Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Kierkegaard’s 
Writings 5 [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990], 200) But for all his obfuscating talk about the paradox 
of patience, Kierkegaard ultimately defines true patience by its orientation to God, who will not go wrong and in 
whom patience is always secure. The challenge with patience, according to Kierkegaard, is not in the virtue itself, 
but in its acquisition. See Anthony Rudd, “Kierkegaard on Patience and the Temporality of the Self: The Virtues of 
a Being in Time,” Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 3 (September 2008): 491–509. 
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signs of economic improvement. If delayed gratification is a norm, it is one that more properly 
falls within astuteness’s field of concern, not patience’s. 
Patience Satisfies the Second Requirement for Wandering Virtues 
This distinction between colloquial “patience” (that is, delayed or deferred gratification) 
and the virtue of patience is essential to showing that the virtue of patience satisfies the second 
requirement for wandering virtues, that their coordinate vices are all of deficiency. Colloquial 
“patience” is limited at the extremes of deficiency and excess: it will eventually become apparent 
to the person who delays or defers gratification whether he/she has gotten it right. The child who 
delays his requests for ice cream will learn that his delay was worthwhile if he receives his ice 
cream after dinner, and the investor who holds her stocks will learn her delay was worthwhile if 
her stocks rebound. A person who persists in an obviously defective plan to secure her/his 
interests is recognizably foolish or stubborn: these are vices that characterize those who delay 
too long, and these vices stand opposite the vices that describe those who cannot bear to wait 
(hastiness and impetuousness, among others). However, the virtue of patience does not have 
coordinate vices except those of deficiency. One may be impatient, that is, one may respond to 
what one suffers with high levels of anxiety, reluctance, and resentment and expect that others 
should feel that way about one’s suffering as well. But it is difficult to describe a version of the 
virtue of patience that has somehow gone too far. Criticizing a person’s exceptional patience — 
patience that enables her/him to bear what he/she suffers without anxiety, reluctance, or 
resentment — implies the patient person should be anxious, reluctant, or resentful. So far as this 
criticism is self-evidently unjustified, so far can we be confident that patience lacks coordinate 
vices of extremity. 
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In very rare instances, criticism of forbearance in the face of interpersonal injury may be 
justified.207 Kaster’s distinction between patience for natural injuries and patience for 
interpersonal injuries is helpful. There are times that suffering interpersonal injuries without 
reluctance or resentment may not be characteristic of virtue, but rather of an exceedingly low 
self-estimate. And for the Romans (as Kaster analyzes them), this was exactly the point. The 
Romans thought patience for interpersonal injury no virtue at all in those whose high social 
worth meant they ought not suffer insults at all (let alone gladly), but in turn the Romans thought 
patience was a virtue in those of low social worth, especially slaves, who ought to suffer insults 
without complaint. However, these invidious social distinctions are unbecoming in present-day 
democratic society: one might reason that citizens of equal worth ought to resent the injuries 
done to them by others, and that it can hardly be virtuous to respond to social injuries without 
the resentment that is their due. Joseph Butler’s account of resentment of injuries and 
forgiveness of them suggests something to this effect. Reflecting on Jesus’ instruction that his 
followers ought love their enemies (Matthew 5.43-44), Butler concludes that what Jesus must 
have intended by this is not that injured Christians ought actually shower their adversaries with 
affection, but rather that injured persons should resent their injuries only to the extent that a 
neutral third party would resent them. Forgiveness, on Butler’s account, is merely the injured 
                                                            
207 Nicolas Bommarito argues that in at least some strands of Buddhism, anger is never justified and so criticism of 
forbearance when one might be angry would never be justified. I am reluctant to appeal to this argument because 
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(scholarly or popular), because Bommarito’s argument utilizes “perspective” as a sort of stand-in for flourishing, 
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if it seems plausible to the reader that anger, anxiety, and the like are emotions we ought never entertain or give 
credence to, then patience will by definition lack any coordinate vice of extremity: one cannot be too patient if one 
should never feel the ways patience discourages one from feeling. Nicolas Bommarito, “Patience and Perspective,” 
Philosophy East and West 64, no. 2 (2014): 269–86. 
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person’s mitigation of her/his resentment so that it is roughly equivalent to what an impartial 
observer would feel toward that injury.208 
Thus the case can be made that there is nothing praiseworthy about suffering 
interpersonal insults without anxiety, reluctance, or resentment. And this case could be taken so 
far as to imply that those who (wrongly) suffer interpersonal insults without reluctance or 
resentment are exhibiting some sort of vice, one we might label obsequiousness, habitual 
disregard of one’s worth or dignity. We can identify this vice in sycophants who attach 
themselves to persons of greater power and influence: the sycophant’s continued membership 
in the entourage is predicated entirely on her/his unquestioning acquiescence to the opinions 
and whims of the powerful person on whom the whole entourage is parasitic. The biblical 
prophets seem to have been routinely confounded by the false prophets who had secured social 
and institutional approval at the expense of the truth: Jeremiah famously accuses the societally-
approved prophets and priests of “treat[ing] the wound of my people carelessly, saying, ‘Peace, 
peace,’ when there is no peace.” (Jeremiah 6.14, NRSV) We can find contemporary examples as 
well. Think of board members for banks and investment houses who, despite their enormous 
wealth and influence, could not muster the will to question improbable profits and dubious 
business strategies as the good times rolled on toward the financial sector’s collapse in 2008. On 
university campuses, some fraternity and sorority pledges, who are often drawn from families 
with substantial material and social advantages, submit to degrading hazing practices during 
initiation despite the efforts of university administrators to eliminate abuses. Sycophants such 
as these, one might argue, are recognizably too patient with the social injuries inflicted upon 
                                                            
208 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel; to Which Are Added Six Sermons Preached on 
Public Occasions (London: Thomas Tegg, 1841), 93. 
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them, too willing to have their credibility, intelligence, and dignity insulted as a condition for 
membership in a prestigious group. If the virtue of patience had a proper limit at its boundary 
with the vice of obsequiousness, then the virtue of patience would not qualify as a wandering 
virtue: patience would have a coordinate vice other than that of deficiency. 
There are, however, several reasons to doubt that the virtue of patience can be bound by 
impatience on the one side and obsequiousness on the other. First, the sycophant’s forbearance 
in the face of interpersonal injury is actually closer to the colloquial patience exhibited in delayed 
gratification than to the virtue of patience. The sycophant’s obsequiousness is merely 
persistence in the face of insults and abuses in order to secure the sycophant’s perceived self-
interest; when the sycophant’s interests no longer align with that of the powerful people 
exploiting the sycophant, the sycophant’s apparent patience will evaporate along with her/his 
loyalty. The board members for banks and investment houses who passively accepted the 
improbable, rosy representations of dishonest executives would not have acquiesced had not 
their own financial interests aligned so closely with those same executives. Fraternity and 
sorority pledges would not endure hazing were there not an exclusive membership waiting on 
the other side of the abuse. Obsequiousness offends not with its forbearance in the face of social 
injury, but rather with its tawdry ends and its calculated acceptance of personal degradation to 
achieve those ends. This sort of calculated debasement is what David Hume sought to combat 
by elevating pride to the status of virtue, and with Hume it seems best to think that 
obsequiousness is not the coordinate vice of extreme patience, but rather a coordinate vice of 
the virtues of autonomy, self-regard, or pride.209 
                                                            
209 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford 
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In any case, we ought to be very careful about attributing the vice of obsequiousness. The 
examples of obsequiousness above are carefully selected to ensure that the persons involved 
uncontroversially have other options and the resources required to make those options readily 
accessible: the board members are wealthy and well-connected; with regard to hazing, many 
college Greek organizations are compliant with university prohibitions on hazing, and Greek life 
is not a degree requirement in any case. But it seems completely inappropriate to attribute the 
vice of obsequiousness to those whose forbearance in the face of social injury is due to the injured 
person’s lack of better options. For all our disdain for Roman society’s casual acceptance of social 
inequality, social inequality and its attendant power differentials persist in the present day. A 
waiter who cheerfully supplies the every need of an odious diner is an example of the sort of 
person whom society might wrongly label “obsequious”: it seems to me that the waiter is doing 
no more than he must in order to keep his job to support himself; if the waiter’s habits permit 
him to endure slights without becoming poisoned by anxiety or resentment, the waiter’s 
forbearance is praiseworthy (that is, patient), not vicious (that is, obsequious). 
Clinical medicine is not excepted from society’s enduring predilection for hierarchy. 
Perhaps the clearest example of hospital medicine’s hierarchy and the way in which it can limit 
clinicians’ options in the face of social injury is moral distress. In 1984, Andrew Jameton 
identified “moral distress” as an area of special concern for professional nursing ethics. 
Characterizing the phenomenon, Jameton writes, “Moral distress arises when one knows the 
right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the right 
course of action.”210 As examples of moral distress, Jameton suggests nurses’ feelings toward a 
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150 
hospital requirement that all patients receive an unnecessarily broad (for the hospital, 
profitable) panel of studies on admission, toward needless tests, toward residents fumbling 
through painful procedures, and toward an incompetent surgeon being screened by a hospital 
administrator.211 In addition to nurses, moral distress has since been described in medical 
students, whose junior position in the institutional hierarchy makes them especially vulnerable 
to social injuries to their values without possibility of redress.212 Moral distress arises precisely 
because a clinician’s sense of what is right is being trampled and that person is unable to remedy 
it. In the absence of better options, it seems inappropriate to condemn forbearance in the face of 
injury as obsequious.213 And if it is often inappropriate to attribute the vice of obsequiousness in 
clinical medicine, it is unrealistic to think that the vice of obsequiousness can serve as a 
coordinate vice that will bound excessive realizations of patience. 
There is one further consideration that weighs against positioning obsequiousness as 
patience’s coordinate vice of extremity: it only applies to one of the two sources of injury with 
which patience is concerned. The injuries that the obsequious person bears too gladly are all 
social, not directly physical. But physical illness and injury are the water in which hospital 
medicine swims. For all the interpersonal injuries that attend healthcare (and that explain the 
physical injuries afflicting some patients), hospital medicine addresses itself first to the physical 
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complaints of its patients. We might say that in some few cases it is inappropriate for a person 
to bear social insults too gladly, but we would be loath to criticize a person sincerely free from 
anxiety, reluctance, and resentment when facing down a cancer diagnosis. Much of the suffering 
in hospital medicine is beyond the scope of obsequiousness, and so too is much of the patience 
exhibited in response to suffering in medicine. 
Patience’s most promising apparent coordinate vice of extremity, obsequiousness, 
ultimately fails in the role: obsequiousness (1) is more accurately characterized as a deficiency 
of autonomy, self-regard, or pride than an excess of patience; (2) is rarely attributed fairly; and 
(3) cannot apply to the natural injuries that constitute so much of patients’ suffering in clinical 
medicine. The only other plausible candidate for a vice of extremity with regard to patience — at 
least that I have seen — is what Eamonn Callan calls “a sort of witless passivity in the midst of 
avoidable suffering and hardship.”214 In order to account for the differences between avowedly 
witless passivity and genuine patience, however, Callan appeals directly to the good per se and 
denies that apparently witless passivity is a good example of patience, on the grounds that other, 
less troublesome examples of patience abound.215 But Callan’s resort to both strategies is telling: 
the first appeals to objective morality to protect patience (it cannot go wrong because it is by 
definition right), while the second is a circular effort to admit only the evidence that supports 
the position that real patience is distinct from witless passivity. Beyond the problems with 
Callan’s argument, “witless passivity in the face of avoidable suffering” seems open to the same 
practical objections of attribution that trouble obsequiousness. If one sets the bar for the 
“potentially avoidable” low, a person’s patience will shade into witless passivity if he/she endures 
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something that he/she might have avoided by radically changing her/his pattern of life, that is, 
by being a different person than in fact he/she is. A waiter enduring abuse from a diner with 
patience might then be “witless” because he has not seriously entertained the possibility of 
abandoning the most lucrative form of employment for which he is presently equipped. But if 
one sets the bar for the “potentially avoidable” high, few persons’ patience will become witless 
passivity, even as that patience does them harm: a vice that does not even correlate with extreme, 
potentially harmful realizations of a virtue is probably no coordinate vice at all. Neither of the 
apparent candidates for a coordinate vice of extreme patience holds up under scrutiny. 
Patience Also Satisfies the First and Third Requirements for Wandering Virtues 
It takes less work to show that the virtue of patience satisfies the first requirement for 
wandering virtues, that of encouraging neglect of other virtues. Patience does encourage neglect 
of other virtues, most consistently the virtue of insight (or self-awareness), the habit by which 
one responds to and investigates one’s private experience, and the virtue of initiative, the habit 
by which one responds to and generates norms with regard to one’s independent, self-directed 
activity. The virtue of patience, which replies to suffering by diminishing anxiety, reluctance, or 
resentment, is not directly opposed to the virtue of insight: a person might be well aware that 
he/she is suffering but habitually answer that suffering without anxiety, reluctance, or 
resentment. But the virtue of patience will certainly find it easier to abate anxiety, reluctance, 
and resentment if its possessor is simply less cognizant of the severity of pain and injury in the 
first place. It is not merely that patience benefits from this neglect of insight or self-awareness: 
patience encourages it. A person whose habitual response to suffering is exceptionally free from 
anxiety, reluctance, or resentment might come to regard even the most grievous suffering as 
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unimportant and beneath notice. This is exactly the response we observe in many of the 
Christian ascetics of the late antique and medieval periods. Simeon Stylites, before he took up 
his eponymous habit of standing atop a column in the middle of the Syrian desert, is reported to 
have bound his whole body with a rope: “it ate into his flesh so that the rope was covered by the 
rotted flesh of the righteous man.”216 Simeon patiently bore his (self-inflicted) maladies without 
anxiety or complaint, but the stench of his wounds was so great that the other monks in his 
monastery had him evicted. When the truth came out about Simeon’s extraordinary suffering, 
the abbot who evicted him pleaded with Simeon to “teach me what patient endurance is and 
what it offers.”217 Simeon returned to his monastery for a few years, apparently to satisfy the 
abbot’s request. Eventually, however, Simeon’s patience became so exceptional that he no longer 
found his open wounds mortifying, and he left his monastery to live outside in stone enclosures 
and eventually atop pillars of his own construction, completely exposed to the elements.218 
Present-day psychiatrists might want to diagnose Simeon with something instead of designating 
him a saint, but Simeon seems to me a clear (albeit extreme) illustration of how a person’s 
progressive realization of the virtue of patience can dull her/his insight into the extent of her/his 
pain and sufferings. 
Insofar as patience abates anxiety, reluctance, and resentment of pain and suffering, 
patience also reliably encourages neglect of the virtue of initiative. The motivational utility of 
aversion to pain and suffering is well-established in the neuroscience literature.219 Informally, 
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our individual experiences, especially in childhood, have likely taught all of us the extent to which 
avoiding pain (or avoiding repetition of a known pain) can impel us to action. Someone who 
burns himself taking a pan out of the oven will contrive an improved scheme for insulation; a 
person whose arthritis acts up when she skips her daily walk will be much more likely to make 
that walk a priority. Our experience of something unpleasant can motivate us to take action in 
ways that we are unlikely to consider when things are going smoothly. Patience, though, 
diminishes several of the aversive features of pain and suffering; in handling pain and suffering 
well, patience can lead to neglect of the virtue of initiative insofar as addressing our suffering can 
motivate us. Simeon’s enthusiasm for the mortification of his flesh reminds us that patience and 
initiative are compatible, but plainly it took extraordinary efforts on his part to identify new 
endeavors as he became acclimated to what was already an intolerable situation considered 
from a more neutral perspective. In those of us who are less plausible candidates for sainthood, 
the virtue of patience, because it makes us less impatient with unpleasant situations, can 
diminish the motivating force we derive from our desire to escape that unpleasantness. 
With regard to the third requirement for wandering virtues, patience excludes reference 
to the actual values of others; it is strictly concerned with the patient person herself/himself and 
her/his responses to suffering. The virtue of patience thus satisfies all three of the requirements 
for wandering virtues. Patience (1) encourages the neglect of other virtues, especially insight and 
initiative; (2) has no coordinate vices save those of deficiency, which vices we can broadly label 
impatience; and (3) does not have intrinsic references to the values of others considered as actual 
individuals. 
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The Patient Hospital Patient and Lapses in Emergent Health Care 
Some of the very “best” hospital patients — the most agreeable, the most compliant, the 
most peaceful, and often accompanied by equally pleasant family members — end up receiving 
worse healthcare than much more frustrating hospital patients, patients who (with their family) 
whine, complain, exaggerate their discomfort and the severity of their symptoms, and pester staff 
with concerns. Treating patience as a wandering virtue helps clarify both why the patience of 
good hospital patients can harm them and what can be done to diminish the frequency of these 
harms. 
An alarming, near-miss example of the harms that can befall “good” (that is, patient) 
patients in need of emergent medical care was reported in the New England Journal of Medicine 
by the physician Louise Aronson in 2013. The patient was Aronson’s 75-year-old father. 
Aronson’s father had been home two weeks from a hospitalization for quadruple bypass, a 
hospitalization extended by several complications. Her father’s blood pressure dropped rapidly 
at home (as evidenced by his collapse into Aronson’s arms); he was rushed to an area emergency 
department in an ambulance. Once there, however, the emergency department physicians 
concluded that the culprit was dehydration, and Aronson’s father reported feeling better after 
receiving fluids. Aronson’s father’s blood pressure dropped again, but Aronson refrained from 
interfering with the emergency department’s plan of care; a nurse silenced the low blood 
pressure alarm and increased the fluids. Aronson’s father’s blood pressure later dropped again, 
and, when no one came running, Aronson went to the nursing station to make her case to the 
clinicians to review her father’s condition. Aronson was politely rebuffed, and she decided not to 
press the issue. Aronson writes, “I hoped to remain in my assigned role as patient’s offspring. At 
least as important, I didn’t want to be the sort of family member that medical teams complain 
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about.”220 Aronson does not frame her motives this way, but it seems fair to interpret her aims 
along the lines of the virtue of patience: she did not want to look like a “bad,” impatient surrogate 
and, by extension, to make her father seem like one of the “bad,” impatient hospital patients who 
exaggerate their problems and resist the medically-recommended course of care. So strong was 
Aronson’s disposition toward patience that even questioning the emergency department 
clinicians felt like crossing the Rubicon: after her polite rebuff at the nursing station, Aronson 
gloved up and performed a rectal exam on her (consenting) father in the emergency department, 
an action made only slightly less awkward by the fact that her father was a physician as well. The 
rectal exam revealed massive intestinal bleeding. Aronson took her blood-covered glove back to 
the nursing station for show-and-tell, and her father was promptly delivered into the hands of 
the intensive care unit. Reflecting on her conduct in the episode, Aronson writes, 
I had quieted my internal alarms for more than 2 hours. Instead, I had considered how doctors and nurses 
feel about and treat so-called pushy or “difficult” families, and as a result, I had prioritized wanting us to be 
seen as a “good patient” and “good family” over being a good doctor-daughter. […] When we call patients 
and families “good,” or at least spare them the “difficult” label, we are noting and rewarding acquiescence. 
Too often, this “good” means you agree with me and you don’t bother me and you let me be in charge of 
what happens and when.221 
Aronson is the authority on her own experience, of course, but it seems to me that what 
Aronson describes as undue concern for the attitudes of the physicians treating her father might 
instead be patience on her part and his: Aronson and her father were not as anxious or resentful 
as they might have been, two of the characteristics of a virtuous response to physical suffering. 
Whether Aronson would accept credit for the virtue of patience, it seems plausible that other 
hospital patients in need of emergent medical care are aptly described as patient in the face of 
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their pain, perhaps to their detriment. It may be that these patients exhibit a habitual response 
to suffering (one that diminishes anxiety, reluctance, and resentment) that leads them to make 
less of their suffering than is necessary to draw the urgent clinical attention that their medical 
conditions warrant. We could map this back on to a situation analogous to that of Aronson’s 
father. A drop in blood pressure may not be exceptionally painful, but losing one’s footing, 
scaring one’s family, and taking an ambulance to the emergency room are surely events about 
which others might be more upset than Aronson’s father seems to have been. Had his upset 
persisted into his interactions with clinicians, those clinicians might have enquired more directly 
into the cause of his repeated drops in blood pressure, sparing his daughter the trouble and 
embarrassment of making the diagnosis herself and accelerating his transfer to an appropriate 
level of care. This is not to say that Aronson’s father or Aronson would have been morally or 
emotionally better off if either had been more upset: it is simply to observe that a less composed 
patient might have drawn more attention to herself/himself in the hectic environment of the 
emergency department. 
Moreover, Aronson does not give clinicians such as herself sufficient credit when she 
conflates the “good” patient label with passivity. Clinicians can distinguish between, on the one 
hand, a depressed, resigned patient who acquiesces without protest and who would benefit from 
a psychiatry consultation and, on the other hand, a patient hospital patient whose calm and self-
composure in the face of suffering elicit admiration. Clinicians identify something medically 
wrong with the former, but not the latter; clinicians know that acquiescence born of depression 
can spell trouble in the longer term.222 It may be a fair criticism of some of clinicians to write that 
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they consistently equate “good” patients with acquiescent ones, but it is not fairly applied to all 
clinicians, even those who consciously or unconsciously distinguish between good patients and 
more troublesome ones. 
What we take the problem to be will directly impact what we expect in a solution. 
Aronson suggests that “we could benefit from a lens shift toward seeing more-vocal patients and 
families as actively engaged in their health care, presenting new, potentially important 
information, and expressing unmet care needs.”223 This is well said, though some emergency 
department physicians might wish to qualify Aronson’s recommended cultural shift with the 
caveat “unless the patient is asking for a prescription for opioids.”224 But if I am correct that in at 
least some cases the virtue of patience gets the better of the hospital patient, it will not be enough 
to tell clinicians that they need to seize the opportunities presented by vocal patients and family 
members, however true that might be. Rather, clinicians need to be mindful that a patient 
hospital patient does not necessarily, because he/she is patient, have insight into the seriousness 
of her/his situation: a patient’s apparent lack of urgency or fright does not make the underlying 
medical condition any less urgent or fearsome. The clinical evidence demands attention, 
whether the patient is demanding attention or not. And clinicians might remind their 
conspicuously patient hospital patients (and family members) that the patient’s task, especially 
in the emergent care context, is not to be patient, but to collaborate with the healthcare team to 
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address the pressing medical concerns that brought them to the emergency department in the 
first place. 
The Patient Hospital Patient and Avoidable Hospital Readmissions 
In the context of an extended hospitalization, wandering patience that impinges on the 
patient’s initiative can diminish the patient’s prospects of recovery and, relatedly, increase the 
likelihood that recently discharged patients will bounce back to the hospital. The physician 
Abigail Zuger, writing in the New York Times, recounts the tale of a 90-year-old woman admitted 
to the hospital with pneumonia. Zuger does not name her, so I will call the patient Ms. Jacobs. 
Against the backdrop of a roommate who was “loud, demanding and a complete nuisance,” Ms. 
Jacobs was evidently a very pleasant patient, “the cutest little thing on a ward full of disasters[.]” 
Ms. Jacobs’s patient response to her physical discomfort and her less-than-desirable quarters 
won the admiration of her clinicians, and in turn they showered her with attention and 
addressed all her needs: “The doctors joked with her, the nurses stroked her head and brought 
antibiotics and nebulizers right on time, and her private-duty attendant organized her pillows 
and fed her little snacks.” Ms. Jacobs played the sick role to perfection, was treated like the 
wonderful patient she was, and went home in what appeared to be fantastic shape. But Ms. 
Jacobs was back in the emergency department in two days with the same complaints that led to 
her prior admission. Attempting to explain this undesirable result (a result that can contribute 
to penalties in Medicare reimbursement), Zuger analogizes Ms. Jacobs’s situation to the theater 
and attributes Ms. Jacob’s bounce-back to a change in scene. In the first scene, set in the hospital, 
Ms. Jacobs is surrounded by medical professionals who respond to her “impeccable manner[s]” 
by assiduously meeting her needs. In the second scene, set at Ms. Jacobs’s home, she is aided only 
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by the relatives who happen to be there and by a home health aide who is not the constant 
presence Ms. Jacobs’s hospital nurses were. From this, Zuger draws the moral that “what we see 
in the hospital can sometimes be a masterful illusion, staged by experts. Only by squinting 
directly at the star of the show until her surroundings blur is there a chance of accurately 
predicting whether that fabulous performance can be sustained on an empty stage.”225 
Zuger makes excellent use of the theatrical analogy, and she is clearly wise to advise 
clinicians to look very carefully at what the patient can do herself/himself, not simply at the 
successes clinicians can engender. But Zuger’s analysis omits (understandably, as it is brief by 
design) reflection on why Ms. Jacobs, not her crotchety hospital roommate, ends up in the 
starring role. The patience of patients such as Ms. Jacobs in the face of hospitalization can help 
account for some of the casting decisions; patience’s propensity for wandering can help explain 
why some of these actors make unexpected and unwelcome curtain calls after discharge. 
Clinicians look at patient hospital patients and see persons whose conduct they admire; 
clinicians reward that conduct with admiration, attention, and attributions of competence and 
virtue that exceed what the available evidence supports. A patient hospital patient, whose 
response to her/his suffering is conspicuously free of anxiety, reluctance, and resentment, is 
often credited with more than just patience; as Parsons suggested, these patients are credited 
with being good more generally. This attributed goodness extends far beyond patience to cover 
wisdom (to adhere to physicians’ recommendations) and resolve (to press forward through the 
difficulties of hospitalization). But Zuger’s narrative underscores the extent to which a patient 
hospital patient can coast on the collective wisdom and initiative of the clinicians caring for 
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her/him. When active support drops away at discharge, the very patience that makes hospital 
patients such as Ms. Jacobs so agreeable during hospitalization may also make them less likely 
either to identify the health concerns that can cause them to bounce back or to insist that 
clinicians develop a robust plan of care to support them. Clinicians can have a good deal more 
confidence that anxious, petulant patients who (medical issues aside) would rather be anywhere 
else will harp on the needs that brought them to the hospital in the first place and insist on a 
discharge plan that is more likely to keep them out. 
The lack of anxiety, reluctance, and resentment at the discomforts and indignities of 
hospitalization exhibited by patient hospital patients may also obscure the additional risk of 
morbidity associated with any hospitalization: patients who seem to be faring well in 
hospitalization are not likely to be viewed as running the same risks of post-hospitalization 
difficulties as those who seem to fare poorly during hospitalization. Clinicians have identified 
numerous stressors that afflict most hospital patients and that continue to affect their health 
and functioning long after discharge. These stressors include insufficient and irregular sleep, 
unpredictable schedules, malnourishment, and deconditioning.226 There are steps that hospitals 
and individual clinicians can take to address these stressors, including adapting hospital 
schedules to better respect individual patients’ needs (as opposed to serving clinicians’ 
convenience by rounding on all patients at 7 a.m.), giving patients reasonable notice of expected 
tests and consultations, and delivering occupational and physical therapy to patients even when 
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patients seem content without it. But all these changes require hospitals and clinicians to take 
steps that will not seem as pressing if patients seem to be bearing up well under the suffering of 
hospitalization. And if patients who bear up well — patients who are, in a word, patient — are 
credited with more initiative and insight into their condition than they actually have, the very 
fact that they do not demand changes in how they are managed in the hospital or as they 
approach discharge may be wrongly interpreted as their satisfaction with the status quo. 
Chapter Conclusion 
The ghost of the unity of the virtues haunts the good hospital patient. The character or 
role of the good hospital patient is overwhelmingly defined by a single, wandering virtue: aptly, 
patience. But seeing the virtue of patience, clinicians attribute additional virtues that the patient 
may or may not actually possess; some of these virtues, such as self-awareness and initiative, are 
virtues of which patience actually encourages neglect. Freeing patience to wander theoretically 
is a practical reminder that the patience clinicians observe in their very best patients is exactly 
that: the virtue of patience, not more, not less. If the patient’s healthcare requires something 
other than excellence in bearing suffering without anxiety, reluctance, or resentment — and the 
patient’s healthcare often will require more — the clinicians who care for the patient hospital 
patient will do well to make further enquiries.
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CHAPTER 5 
LOYALTY 
Is Loyalty A Virtue? 
The challenge in showing that modesty and patience are wandering virtues falls almost 
entirely on the side of the wandering. The question is not whether modesty and patience are 
virtues: most of us are prepared to at least pay them lip service. The question with the virtues of 
modesty and patience is whether they are potentially troublesome once properly understood. 
With loyalty, the situation is reversed. The sordid politics and bloody wars on worldwide display 
since the beginning of the twentieth century offer abundant evidence that loyalty is troublesome 
and prone to stray. The question with loyalty is not whether it wanders, but whether it is properly 
a virtue at all. 
I begin this chapter by reviewing two different strategies for insulating loyalty from 
complaints about its wandering nature: specifying conditions under which loyalty is legitimate 
and assimilating loyalty to a different, less contentious virtue. Second, I rehearse Simon Keller’s 
arguments against regarding loyalty as either a value or a virtue. Third, I turn to Josiah Royce’s 
conjoint arguments in favor of the centrality of loyalty in both meta-ethics and practical ethics. 
Fourth and finally, I analyze loyalty as a wandering virtue and apply this analysis to two practical 
issues in clinical ethics: (1) the problem of doctor–patient confidentiality when it leads to harms 
to third parties and (2) neglect of justice in the distribution of transplantable solid organs 
concurrent with the thoroughgoing loyalty of transplant clinicians to their end-stage organ 
failure patients. 
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Strategies to Salvage the Virtue of Loyalty 
Moral theories that insist on strict impartiality will see loyalty as inherently immoral. The 
utilitarianism endorsed by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and (more recently) Peter Singer 
is so rigorously impartial that special loyalty to particular persons (or even to ideals other than 
the principle of utility) is incompatible with the dictates of morality.227 Many other moral 
theories, however, are not so averse to partiality. But paradoxically, some accounts that reject 
such thoroughgoing impartiality and defend loyalty nevertheless attempt to make loyalty safe by 
constraining appropriate or legitimate loyalty with reference to what impartial or objective 
observers would approve. Bernard Gert suggests, “Loyalty must be limited for it to be regarded 
favorably by impartial, rational persons. Loyalty is morally acceptable only when acting loyally 
does not involve unjustifiably violating a moral rule; impartiality is is required when one is 
violating a moral rule.”228 Gert does not mean that the loyal person must be impartial or else not 
violate a moral rule; this would, manifestly, preclude all but the most benign expressions of 
loyalty, such as preferring to give one’s discretionary income to one charity as opposed to 
another. What Gert means is that loyalty’s violation of general moral rules — which for Gert 
range from “Do not kill” to “Keep your promises” and “Obey the law” — would have to be the sort 
of violation that an impartial observer would approve, typically after weighing the rules that the 
loyal person would uphold at the expense of other rules.229 It is difficult to imagine many 
circumstances in which this criterion would permit a person to exhibit her/his loyalty. Some of 
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those who defied British laws as part of Mahatma Gandhi’s campaign of non-violent resistance 
against the colonial government may have done so out of loyalty to Gandhi or to his movement, 
rather than out of a thorough, reasoned view that such political action best addressed the needs 
of India. But even here, their loyal actions are justified only if those actions are otherwise the 
right thing to do: an objective observer has to approve of favoring some general moral rules over 
others without reference to the agent’s loyalty. On Gert’s analysis, actions motivated by loyalty 
are sometimes permissible, but those actions’ quality of being loyal does not figure in those 
actions’ permissibility. Gert sanitizes loyalty by evacuating it of moral value.230 
In Nursing Practice, Andrew Jameton utilizes a broadly consequentialist strategy for 
sanitizing loyalty that parallels Gert’s deontological strategy. Jameton writes that loyalty is in the 
right when it “express[es] duties that are reciprocal and which harmonize for the good of all.”231 
That is to say, loyalty is commendable when it conduces to relationships and outcomes of which 
we would approve, whether or not loyalty were the motive for realizing them. It is telling that 
Jameton gives unqualified approval to none of the forms of loyalty actually represented in 
contemporary hospital medicine. According to Jameton, loyalty between clinicians is good, 
except that it often leads them to obscure one another’s mistakes from patients and distorts 
clinicians’ moral sense; a clinician’s loyalty to her/his institution is good, except that institutions 
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are often cynically self-serving and are only exploiting clinicians’ loyalty to the institutions’ 
ends.232 While Jameton endorses the virtue of loyalty in principle, the loyalty that is achieved in 
medical practice falls far short of the loyalty that Jameton recommends. 
This is emblematic of the difficulty with Gert’s and Jameton’s respective strategies: the 
loyalty we encounter in life rarely satisfies the stringent requirements that both impose on 
loyalty if it is to be legitimate. In fairness to Gert and Jameton, an account of something that only 
approves of a small fraction of its instances is not in itself remarkable. Half-court shots in 
basketball are almost always a poor strategic choice, but if a player at half-court has the ball and 
no time to pass as time expires, a half-court shot goes from a poor strategic choice to the 
recommended one. To offer a more serious example, we typically disapprove of withdrawing 
ventilatory support from patients who cannot breathe independently, but many medical 
ethicists do now approve of withdrawing ventilatory support from patients who cannot breathe 
independently, who are comatose, who have no significant chance of recovery, and whose 
surrogates consent to the withdrawal of ventilatory support. But we should expect a virtue to be 
different: if a habit is a virtue, it should be praiseworthy more often than not. If a habit is typically 
worthy of censure, it is almost certainly a vice. Gert and Jameton’s sanitized versions of loyalty, 
though, would seem to approve only a small fraction of the instances of loyalty we find in the 
wild. 
Another approach to salvaging loyalty from the difficulties to which it is prone is to 
assimilate loyalty to a different, less contentiously virtuous trait, often fortitude or persistence. 
Romano Guardini defines worldly loyalty as a commitment that “overcomes change, injury, and 
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danger but not by a power of persistence inherent in one’s disposition […] loyalty is more than 
that; it is the firmness which results when a man has assumed a responsibility and abides by it.”233 
Despite Guardini’s effort at drawing a distinction, this still seems to be fortitude or persistence, 
only in a person who was not born with a disposition to it: loyalty is fortitude or persistence 
learned in service to responsibility. Assimilating loyalty to fortitude or persistence is an 
appealing strategy in some respects. Fortitude and persistence are better constrained by 
recognizable coordinate vices than is loyalty. We have a difficult time explaining how someone 
is “too loyal” except when we mean that he/she is regrettably loyal to the wrong person/thing. 
But we can identify someone whose fortitude or persistence has exceeded its mandate and 
become stubbornness, just as we can identify someone whose lack of fortitude or persistence 
makes her/him vacillating or indecisive. If we agreed to actually denote “fortitude” or 
“persistence” when we used the word “loyalty,” we might ensure that “loyalty” would not stray 
further than indecisiveness or stubbornness. 
In other respects, assimilating loyalty to fortitude or persistence does not improve 
loyalty’s prospects. Fortitude and persistence, no less than loyalty in its conventional sense, can 
be possessed by a person who pursues deplorable ends. Fortitude and persistence can aid a 
wicked person in realizing her/his ends, while loyalty to a bad group might help motivate a 
person to pursue deplorable ends and provide social support in pursuing those ends. It is difficult 
to say whether a resolute wicked person acting independently is more or less dangerous than is 
a person loyal to a bad group. However, it is worth noting that whichever is more dangerous, the 
two characters are recognizably different. Fortitude and persistence are the traits of an 
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individual considered as an individual, but loyalty is a trait that is almost always entangled in 
relationships to others. We do sometimes talk about loyalty to an ideal, independent of a real 
and present community that shares it: we might think of a knight errant in a medieval romance 
who is loyal to the ideal of chivalry, whether or not those he meets on his travels share the ideal 
of chivalry. But an account of loyalty that ignored loyalty’s frequent reference to relationships 
with family, friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens would, it seems to me, no longer be concerned 
with loyalty as it is typically understood, but rather (as the strategy intends) with fortitude or 
persistence. As important as the virtues of fortitude or persistence are, I intend here to focus not 
loyalty, not on fortitude or persistence in disguise. 
Simon Keller's Argument against Regarding Loyalty as a Virtue 
Simon Keller’s ethical analysis of loyalty in The Limits of Loyalty is one of the most 
thorough developed in the past several decades; on the basis of his thorough analysis, Keller 
concludes that loyalty is not a virtue at all. Keller’s account is highly nuanced: Keller treats loyalty 
neither as a mere theoretical nut for universal morality to crack nor as the central feature of the 
moral life. Keller works to build a theoretical account of loyalty from phenomena that are (on his 
account) uncontroversially instances of loyalty: the loyalty of friends to one another (friendship), 
the loyalty of citizens to their country (patriotism), and the loyalty of children to their parents. 
Keller delineates five expressions of loyalty. First, loyalty can be expressed in concern, 
“prioritizing X’s interests, or welfare, over the interests of comparable others.” Second, loyalty 
can be expressed through advocacy, sticking up for a cause, ideal, or person not to advance that 
cause, ideal, or the interests of the person, but rather to defend that cause’s, ideal’s, or person’s 
special worth. Third, one may express loyalty through ritual gestures that advertise or reaffirm 
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one’s commitment to a cause, ideal or, person: as examples of this, Keller offers standing during 
performances of the national anthem, attending religious services, and wearing a wedding band. 
Fourth, one may express loyalty by identifying oneself with a cause, ideal, or person: Keller’s clear 
example is of a person whose loyalty (as a fan) to a sports team motivates her/him to take the 
team’s victories and losses personally. Fifth, loyalty manifests itself “in the tendency to form or 
resist certain beliefs. As someone’s loyal friend, you may be especially inclined to believe that she 
is not guilty of the crimes of which she is accused. As a loyal parent, you may be especially 
inclined to believe that your child has special virtues and talents.”234 
On Keller’s analysis, loyalty often “comes into conflict with certain standards of good 
epistemic conduct.”235 Specifically, Keller has in mind the “epistemic norm telling us that our 
beliefs should, in standard cases at least, be responsive only to the evidence, or to what we take 
to be the evidence, for or against their truth” and the “epistemic norm telling us not to put 
ourselves into situations from which we are likely to emerge with beliefs that are not in the right 
ways responsive to the evidence.”236 Keller, though by no means doctrinaire, seems to harbor 
significant sympathies for deontological approaches to ethics. But what Keller calls “standards 
of good epistemic conduct” might equally well be called the virtue of honesty: the honest person 
will, as a matter of disposition or habit, strive both to form and harbor true beliefs based on the 
best available evidence and to avoid situations in which he/she expects to be deceived or 
otherwise dissuaded from the truth. 
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Keller has no difficulty mustering credible examples in which loyalty encourages neglect 
of standards of good epistemic conduct (that is, on my analysis, the virtue of honesty). A loyal 
friend will often harbor a far higher estimate of her/his friends than the available evidence 
warrants. A loyal friend attending a friend’s poetry reading will form a higher estimate of her/his 
friend’s poetry than the evidence justifies; another loyal friend will believe that her/his friend is 
a valuable teammate for pick-up basketball despite the latter friend’s woeful ball-handling and 
shooting.237 (My friends in seminary justified my participation in their church-league basketball 
team, despite my utter lack of basketball ability, by assuring me that the five fouls I could give 
before fouling out were a worthwhile contribution; unfortunately, my ability is so minimal that I 
would foul without intending to foul, squandering my one potential contribution.) A loyal 
patriot’s departure from standards of good epistemic conduct may be as benign as believing 
without adequate warrant that her/his country has certain objectively valuable characteristics 
that contribute directly to the country’s identity. An American patriot, for instance, might think 
that the U.S. is a (sometimes “the”) land of liberty, despite the abundance of available evidence 
that persons in the United States have hardly been uniformly free throughout the nation’s 
history. But patriotism’s neglect of honesty can, of course, be still more extreme, as exemplified 
by the old saw “My country, right or wrong.”238 Keller argues that the loyalty of children to their 
parents is excepted from the problems that characterize loyalties to other classes of persons or 
things because of the peculiar way in which society structures family relationships; Keller 
reasons from the special goods that only children can provide to a prima facie duty to provide 
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these goods to one’s parents.239 Although I will not loiter on this point, it seems to me that the 
special, comparatively untroubled loyalty that Keller attributes to the filial relationship might 
benefit from a change in terminology, as what is described is a sort of explicit, structural 
reciprocity out of step with the structures Keller describes in other sorts of loyalty. 
In good Kantian form, Keller distinguishes loyalty from conscientiousness, both of which 
can manifest themselves as steadfast commitment to an ideal. Keller’s distinction seems to rest 
upon whether the commitment is the result of reasoning or sentiment. If one reasons through 
whether a cause, ideal, or person, then one’s commitment is conscientious and, evidently, not 
susceptible to the same vicissitudes that afflict loyalty. If, however, one’s commitment is rooted 
in affection or sentiment, then it is loyalty, and can give rise to trouble.240 
When all is said and done, Keller defines loyalty as a commitment to a cause, ideal, or 
person, based in sentiment, that (with the exception of the loyalty of children to their parents) 
conduces to neglect of good epistemic conduct. Proceeding from this account, Keller argues that 
loyalty is neither valuable in itself nor a virtue. Keller suggests that the value we ascribe to a loyal 
friend or a loyal teammate is no different than the value we ascribe to a good friend or a good 
teammate. Loyalty is part of being a good friend or a good teammate, but loyalty’s value is entirely 
parasitic on the goodness of the relationship in which it participates.241 In order to examine 
loyalty as a virtue or trait of character, Keller tweaks his definition slightly: loyalty becomes “a 
tendency to form particular bonds of loyalty and act in their light.”242 The virtue of loyalty is, for 
Keller, a personal propensity to the commitments that constitute individual instances of loyalty. 
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Keller thinks golden retrievers a prime example of this sort of loyalty: a golden retriever will, with 
comparatively little incentive, become intensely loyal to the human who cares for it. The problem 
with this, Keller observes, is that the dog has little ability to discriminate between good humans 
to whom to be loyal and bad ones: dogs’ willingness to accept people as they are may be one of 
the most appealing features of canine loyalty. However, a person with a tendency to form 
commitments with a similar lack of discernment would place herself/himself in considerable 
danger. Keller invites his readers to reflect on whether they would want to raise a child to be loyal 
in the sense of being notably disposed to form commitments without stopping to discern the 
worthiness of the causes, ideals, or persons to whom he/she is committed. Keller concludes 
(reasonably, I think) that we would not want to encourage this trait in a child, an indirect but 
telling argument that loyalty is not a virtue, or at least not a very important one. The trait of 
loyalty, Keller suggests, is not only not an important virtue, but probably not a virtue at all. 
Loyalty “is rather like […] the trait of being opinionated. There are much worse things than being 
opinionated by nature, and much worse things than being loyal by nature; neither is of a piece 
with cruelty or greed. Still, these are traits that it is better, on the whole, to be without.”243 
Josiah Royce's Argument for the Centrality of Loyalty to Ethics 
In his early (more Hegelian) career, Josiah Royce sought to establish “harmony” as the 
unifying principle of all legitimate ethics and religion.244 However, in his mid- to late-career, 
Royce revised his views and propounded an account of meta-ethics in which loyalty was 
foundational to all moral value. By loyalty, Royce means specifically “[t]he willing and practical 
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and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause. A man is loyal when, first, he has some cause 
to which he is loyal; when, secondly, he willingly and thoroughly devotes himself to this cause; 
and when, thirdly, he expresses his devotion in some sustained and practical way, by acting 
steadily in the service of his cause.”245 
Royce does not specify the causes and ideals that loyalty should take as its object. The 
particular causes to which persons are loyal will depend on the person and on that person’s 
circumstances. What matters most is that the person is loyal, in the sense of being willingly, 
thoroughly, actively devoted to a specific cause. By way of both acknowledging the difficulties 
attendant upon this ambiguity and resolving those difficulties, Royce offers the following case 
study: 
A young woman, after a thorough modern professional training, begins a career which promises not only 
worldly success, but general good to the community in which she works. She is heartily loyal to her 
profession. It is a beneficent profession. She will probably make her mark in that field if she chooses to go 
on. Meanwhile she is loyal to her own family. And into the home which she has left for her work, disease, 
perhaps death, enters. Her younger brothers and sisters are now unexpectedly in need of such care as hers; 
or the young family of her elder brother or sister, through the death of their father or mother, has come to 
be without due parental care. As elder sister or as maiden aunt this young woman could henceforth devote 
herself to family tasks that would mean very much for the little ones in question. But this devotion would 
also mean years of complete absorption in these family tasks, and would also mean an entire abandonment 
of the profession so hopefully begun, and of all the good that she can now be fairly sure of doing if she 
continues in that field.246 
In the paragraphs that follow, Royce excludes the possibility of pursuing both ends 
simultaneously and reinforces the good to be done in pursuing either path. Royce’s advice to the 
hypothetical young woman seems, at first blush, vacuous: “Have a cause; choose your cause; be 
decisive.”247 But Royce is actually making an important normative claim. It is not finally 
important which path the young woman follows; neither course is correct to the exclusion of the 
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other. It is, however, vitally important that the young woman pursue one course or the other with 
loyalty. Neither the young woman nor anyone else will benefit if the young woman is indecisive 
and thereby chooses, in effect, neither to help her family nor to benefit society through her 
profession. The choice made, Royce’s message is reassuring: as long as she is loyal to the cause 
she chooses, the young woman can be confident she has made the right choice.248 
Royce’s confidence that either choice would be equally right, so long as it is made and 
pursued loyally, rests in his insight that no matter the particular cause, one must be loyal to it in 
order to be good, or even to be anyone at all. Royce affirms (with many other philosophers) that 
human beings enter life with incoherent personalities. Royce continues from this assumption to 
assert that a personality begins to cohere when persons assert both their independence from 
outside influences and their capacity to choose between those influences. Some people will not 
be loyal to any cause or ideal, but according to Royce, a person who pursues this route will never 
cohere into a mature personality. This seems extreme, but it can be expressed in a more 
common-sensical way. Apart from noting that he or she was an individual of the human species, 
we would likely be at a loss to describe an adult who was totally devoid of loyalty. Such a person 
would never hold a job or sustain a personal relationship for long enough to identify her/him 
with her/his employment or her/his friends. If this person had no remaining connections to 
her/his family and had no hobbies, it would be difficult to characterize her/him at all. Royce’s 
claim that one’s very personality depends on loyalty is not so outrageous as it might seem: “if you 
wholly decline to devote yourself to any cause whatever, your assertion of moral independence 
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will remain but an empty proclaiming of a moral sovereignty over your life, without any definite 
life over which to be sovereign.”249 
The situation is different with persons who are loyal to causes and ideals. We can say of 
a person who is loyal to his children that he is a father, of a person committed to her career in 
medicine that she is a physician, of a person committed to performing music for others that he 
is a musician. A person’s loyalty to his children, her medical career, or his music performance 
gives normative meaning to evaluations: the first might be a better or worse father, the second a 
better or worse physician, and the third a better or worse musician. Each of these evaluations is 
only intelligible because the person in question is in fact committed to the cause; we do not say 
of an childless woman that she is a good mother, of a welder that he is a bad physician, or of a 
restaurateur that she is a great musician. It is in loyalty to causes beyond oneself that one begins 
to be realized as a coherent moral personality. “There is only one way to be an ethical individual. 
That is to choose your cause, and then to serve it[.]”250 
Royce does labor to exclude a small number of causes and ideals from the range of causes 
and ideals to which one may legitimately be loyal. The principle Royce proposes to discriminate 
between legitimate causes and illegitimate ones is the principle of “loyalty to loyalty[.]”251 Royce 
concedes that this actually excludes very few causes, in that any loyalty will promote loyalty per 
se. Royce is persuaded that conflict between particular causes is almost inevitable; the only 
limitation that loyalty to loyalty imposes on this conflict is that “you may never assail whatever 
is sincere and genuine about [your opponent’s] spirit of loyalty […] Prevent the conflict of 
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loyalties when you can, minimize such conflict where it exists, and […] utilize even conflict, 
where it is inevitable, so as to further the cause of loyalty to loyalty.”252 So far as a person is free 
to choose the causes to which he/she is loyal, he/she ought to select the causes that seems most 
likely to promote loyalty, not just to one’s own cause, but to any cause that is similarly compatible 
with loyalty to loyalty. The most direct way in which Royce’s loyalty to loyalty manifests itself is 
in the virtue of loyalty, which Royce takes to be the form of all the virtues (in addition to the core 
of moral anthropology and, indeed, all morality). Royce believes that witnesses to profound 
loyalty will be naturally inspired by this loyalty both to respect the loyalty exhibited and to 
emulate it. Royce prefers to analogize the way in which particular loyalties promote loyalty in 
general to contagion, but loyal persons in Royce’s thought might be equally well described as 
moral exemplars, to use a more familiar term from virtue ethics.253 
More recently, R. E. Ewin and Richard Rorty have made arguments for the meta-ethical 
centrality of loyalty. Ewin proposes that loyalty has a similarly foundational role in human moral 
character, but that, contrary to what Royce urged, loyalty is not properly a virtue. Just as Royce’s 
loyalty is the precondition for coherent personality, Ewin’s loyalty is the precondition for 
coherent character. But Ewin does not share Royce’s confidence in loyalty’s goodness. Moreover, 
Ewin expects that all genuine virtues will participate in some version of phronesis, and Ewin finds 
that loyalty does not. Ewin’s loyalty is foundational, but neither good nor bad itself: Ewin’s 
“loyalty seems to take its colouring from the other virtues and vices that it brings into play.”254 
Rorty, for his part, has suggested that even the venerable idea of justice may, in fact, be better 
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explained as loyalty to the largest group with which we identify.255 It is not my purpose here to 
defend Ewin’s or Rorty’s positions, but merely to observe that the meta-ethical thesis that a fair 
part of morality is based in loyalty still attracts some interest. But even with this interest in 
loyalty’s meta-ethical import, Royce’s distinctive contribution remains the close connection he 
drew between loyalty’s role in normative ethics and loyalty’s dependability in meta-ethics. 
Royce has had his critics. George Fletcher compares Royce unflatteringly to “the pop 
psychology fostered in self-actualization therapy” because of Royce’s “naive faith in voluntary 
self-definition[,]” “the assumption that loyalty to causes is freely and autonomously chosen. 
[Royce] has no sense of the historical self that inclines individuals toward loyal commitments to 
their friends, families, countries, and religious communities.”256 This is, frankly, a gross 
misrepresentation of Royce. First, Royce was keenly attentive to the role that communities play 
in forming persons and even wrote specifically on the topic.257 Second, while Royce’s reflections 
on choosing a cause to serve were timely in a social context in which industrialization and urban 
migration continued to alter the fabric of American society, it is not the choice or the freedom of 
that choice that ultimately matters to Royce. What matters is the loyalty with which one pursues 
one’s cause or ideal, loyalty that, Royce thinks, is more likely if one has some sense of agency in 
the selection of one’s cause. Royce took the role of choice seriously,258 but he could have afforded 
to be fairly cavalier about the liberty (or lack thereof) one has in choosing one’s causes, since any 
loyalty to any cause or ideal conduces to the overarching good of loyalty to loyalty. 
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Other interpreters of Royce attempt to correct perceived defects in Royce’s argument and 
sacrifice some of its distinctive features along the way. Keller distinguishes loyalty to particular 
causes and ideals from loyalty to loyalty more sharply than does Royce; Keller concludes that, 
given the concerns that afflict particular loyalties to lamentable causes and ideals, Royce must 
only have wanted to recommend the latter. 
The person whom Royce describes being loyal to loyalty is better described as follows. She understands and 
values the human’s capacity to commit himself fully to a higher cause, and thereby give his life structure, 
unity and certainty. She may be committed to any number of local causes herself, but her greatest 
commitment is to the nurturing and promotion of this human capacity for wholehearted commitment, 
wherever it is found. The instruction that emerges from this construal of Royce is, “Devote yourself 
wholeheartedly to the cause of wholehearted devotion.”259 
Keller is one of the most astute commentators Royce has, but Keller, I think, substantially 
alters Royce’s arguments in order to identify Royce more closely with contemporary meta-ethical 
universalists. Certainly Keller’s version of Royce successfully avoids the liabilities that attend an 
uncritical affirmation of any and every loyalty to causes, irrespective of those causes’ merits. As 
Keller construes Royce, the legitimacy of all of our particular loyalties is to be evaluated with 
reference to the universal standard of human flourishing in devotion. But Royce himself prefers 
to answer the difficulty of distinguishing good loyalties from bad ones metaphysically, and seems 
finally to conclude that while particular loyalties may be more or less excellent, few (if any) 
loyalties are illegitimate. In The Philosophy of Loyalty, at least, Royce is confident that the conflict 
between causes that leads to some being labeled good and others bad is not ultimately real. 
Royce’s confidence stems from the observation that individuals loyal to the same cause can 
combine their efforts across space and time to achieve far-reaching successes that would be 
impossible for individuals considered alone. “Loyalty […] from moment to moment indeed thrills 
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with a purely fragmentary and temporary joy in its love of its service. But the joy depends on a 
belief in a distinctly superhuman type of unity of life. […] The loyal serve a real whole of life, and 
experiential value too rich for any expression in merely momentary terms.”260 Royce’s routine 
appeals to metaphysics until late in his career have been something of an embarrassment for 
later commentators who find his hybrid of pragmatism and absolute idealism implausible;261 
Royce himself turned from explicit metaphysics toward something closer to hermeneutics at the 
end of his life.262 But in The Philosophy of Loyalty, thoroughgoing loyalty to a cause is reliably good, 
whether or not its possessor has evaluated that loyalty in connection with overarching loyalty to 
loyalty: loyalty to a cause is the basis of moral identity and will flow, inexorably, to unitary reality. 
Royce’s almost limitless confidence in the virtue of loyalty makes little sense apart from his 
metaphysics. 
Loyalty as a Wandering Virtue 
After a circuitous route, I return to the question that opened this chapter: is loyalty a 
virtue? Royce positions loyalty as the form of all virtue; Keller sees in loyalty no virtue at all, but 
merely a “trait[] that it is better, on the whole, to be without.”263 In part this comes down to 
definitions, and in part it comes down to a fundamental disagreement about the basis and nature 
of human moral character. Keller, it must be said, defines the virtue of loyalty (as opposed to 
loyalty in general) rather unhelpfully: Keller’s virtue of loyalty is a personal propensity to the 
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commitments that constitute individual instances of loyalty, without consideration or regard for 
the objects of that loyalty.264 An indiscriminate propensity to devote oneself to causes and 
persons is obviously not a virtue, but it is not at all clear that this is a suitable definition of the 
virtue of loyalty. Conversely, Royce’s claim that the virtue of loyalty is the form of all particular 
virtues is also implausible. The examples Royce furnishes, benevolence and justice, are both 
other-regarding virtues.265 But there are many virtues that are not other-regarding: modesty and 
patience are two of them. And it seems a stretch to call one’s modesty or one’s patience instances 
of loyalty to the flourishing of the loyalties of all other persons. Nevertheless, Royce is right to 
emphasize the central role that loyalty plays in integrating us into the groups that will shape our 
moral identities. Keller’s Kantian distinction between reasoned commitments and sentimental 
loyalties suggests that Keller believes that how one ought to live out one’s commitments can be 
defined by reference to impartial reason alone. A host of moral communitarians and 
sentimentalists would disagree with Keller on the impartiality of moral requirements, as would 
others who are agnostic about reason’s ability to grasp ethics unaided. If one believes that 
impartial reason is the beginning and end of morality, then loyalty is no virtue at all. But if one 
thinks it more likely that a person’s participation in causes and relations with persons outside 
herself/himself provides a vital contribution to her/his moral identity, then it would be better for 
her/him to participate in those causes and groups well, rather than poorly. And habitually doing 
things well, rather than poorly, is the work of virtue. 
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Royce’s emphasis on decisiveness in choosing to what and whom one will be loyal reveals 
something that Keller’s fraught definition excludes. The virtue of loyalty does not consist in 
forming many relational commitments, as if the virtue of loyalty were some sort of networking 
exercise in which success was defined by the number of loyalties one has. Rather, the virtue of 
loyalty consists in how one lives out one’s commitments to causes, ideals, and persons besides 
oneself. Keller’s excellent example of loyalty in friendship cuts against him here. Keller suggests 
that “loyalty” is simply an epiphenomenal feature of any good friendship, but our own experience 
teaches us that some good friends are more loyal than others. Some friends, good to us at any 
sensible hour of the day, will have no patience for a phone call at two in the morning; other 
friends will take call and will not even begrudge us a trip out in the night if need be. Some friends 
are good to each other only while circumstances keep them together, but others remain close 
despite the geographic distance between them and the passage of time. And some of our friends 
seem not only to be loyal to us in these ways, but to be loyal to all their friends in these ways. 
These consistently loyal ways of living out commitments to one’s friends are not accidental or 
incidental, but habitual. The virtue of loyalty, I suggest, is the habit by which we respond to and 
generate norms of participation and inclusion in causes and relationships. 
I share some of Royce’s high esteem for the virtue of loyalty, but I hasten to add that I also 
share Keller’s abiding concerns. And if virtues needed to uniformly conduce to the good in order 
to be true virtues, this consideration might drive us to follow Ewin and carve out a strange space 
for loyalty outside of virtue and vice. However, if virtues can wander, then loyalty may be a virtue 
and still often conduce to characters and outcomes that are less than good. There is no question 
that loyalty fulfills the first requirement of wandering virtues by encouraging neglect of other 
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virtues, as those who are deeply loyal to deplorable causes make abundantly clear. Neither Ewin 
nor Keller dignifies loyalty with the name of virtue, but both helpfully supply several ways in 
which loyalty frequently affects other virtues. Keller rightly argues that the virtue of loyalty 
motivates neglect of the virtue of honesty: we are likely to favor higher estimates of those to 
whom we are loyal than the evidence supports, and perhaps to have lower estimates than the 
evidence supports of those who seem to antagonize the objects of our loyalty.266 Loyalty may 
affect the virtues of benevolence, kindness, and sympathy: loyalty will motivate us to respond 
more promptly and fervently to the experiences of those to whom we are loyal and may, in turn, 
make us less responsive to the experiences of the adversaries (real or perceived) of those to whom 
we are loyal.267 Loyalty especially encourages neglect of the virtue of justice, insofar as the latter 
is concerned with norms of equity. Loyalty may cause us to see the same favorable treatment as 
justice when it is bestowed on those to whom we are loyal and unjustifiable largess when it is 
bestowed on those to whom we are not; the same unfavorable treatment may seem hideously 
unjust when imposed upon the objects of our loyalty but no less than is deserved when it is 
imposed on those who fall outside our loyalty.268  
Loyalty also fulfills the second requirement for wandering virtues, that of lacking 
coordinate vices except those of deficiency. Disloyalty and treachery denote a dearth of loyalty, 
but it is very difficult to identify what it would be like to be “too loyal” without prejudicial 
distinctions between the objects of loyalty. Is a gang member’s loyalty somehow too loyal when 
he takes a bullet and bleeds out for his gang leader while the gang is shooting up a rival’s safe 
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house? We may deplore the gang member’s cause, his actions, and his avoidable death, but I do 
not see how we can fault the gang member’s loyalty, by which he has responded to the norms of 
participating in his group with the costliest sacrifice he could offer. Loyalty itself will tend to lead 
its possessors to think that no extent of habituation in loyalty is ever too much: the more 
habitually responsive one becomes to the norms of participation and inclusion, the more 
committed one is likely to become to remaining included. And often we even celebrate loyalty 
that shrinks from nothing: the soldier who sacrifices herself/himself to save the lives of her/his 
squad is the paradigmatic example, but teachers in public primary and secondary schools who 
give every waking moment to advance the education of their pupils are also commended.269 
Because it so often attaches to other persons, loyalty might seem to fail the third 
requirement for wandering virtues, that of lacking intrinsic references to the values of others 
considered as actual individuals. In reply, I offer two considerations. First, as often as it attaches 
to other persons, loyalty no less often attaches to groups to which specific values are attributed, 
independent of whether those values are reliably shared by the members of the group. My 
support for my hometown college basketball team supplies a ready example. I am loyal (though 
certainly not as loyal as some) to the team, but the excess of enthusiasm associated with 
supporters of my team is not a value that I share, or that most supporters I know actually share. 
I am not going to burn a couch in the street to celebrate a win, even though this practice is 
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applauded by the most rabid fans of my team. Nevertheless, extreme enthusiasm is a value of the 
group, one that I hold my nose and tolerate as part of membership. My loyalty here makes no 
reference to the actual values of others, even though those others are within the same group and 
even though I have a pretty clear idea of what those values are. Loyalty may often have reference 
to the values of others considered as actual individuals, but loyalty hardly requires it. Second, 
even loyalty to specific persons may not refer to them as they actually are. Sometimes this is 
because the person to whom we have become habitually loyal has changed. For Guardini, this 
seems to have been exactly loyalty’s point: one’s loyalty in marriage, according to Guardini, ought 
not to refer directly to one’s spouse as he/she changes over time, but ought rather refer to the 
responsibilities one has assumed toward one’s spouse, which do not change.270 In other 
instances, loyalty’s distorting effects on our perception of those to whom we are loyal mean that 
we are loyal not to the other person as he/she actually is, but as our loyalty has made her/him to 
be. Many of us can think of a friend to whom we were loyal but who, in hindsight, was not at all 
the friend to whom we thought we were loyal. Some of us may fear that we sometimes are that 
friend ourselves. Loyalty’s rose-tinted glasses may do some good in encouraging the other person 
to become the person her/his loyal friends think her/him to be, but they also prevent us from 
seeing the objects of our loyalty as they are. Even interpersonal loyalty can get by without 
reference to other persons considered as actual individuals; interpersonal loyalty may actually 
have an easier time without such references. Thus loyalty satisfies the third requirement for 
wandering virtues, that of lacking intrinsic reference to the values of others considered as actual 
individuals. 
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One of the foremost fictional examples of wandering loyalty is, conveniently, a medical 
man: Dr. John Watson, Sherlock Holmes’s stalwart companion. Watson is famously loyal to 
Holmes. Watson will shutter his medical practice for the day and leave his wife at home upon 
receiving an invitation from Holmes, all for the opportunity to tag along and chronicle Holmes’s 
exploits while having his own intelligence insulted. Watson seems often to be loyal more to an 
ideal than to the man before him: Watson routinely characterizes Holmes as a cold, aloof, 
calculating machine of a man, and Watson seems surprised anew each time Holmes actually 
expresses some genuine emotion, including, it turns out, a friend’s fondness for Watson. And 
Watson’s loyalty to Holmes most certainly encourages him to neglect other virtues, including 
justice and honesty. In some of their adventures, Watson commits more crimes at Holmes’s 
behest than Holmes actually solves. One of their earliest adventures includes the charming 
exchange below, beginning with Holmes: 
“By the way, Doctor, I shall want your co-operation.” 
“I shall be delighted.” 
“You don’t mind breaking the law?” 
“Not in the least.” 
“Nor running a chance of arrest?” 
“Not in a good cause.” 
“Oh, the cause is excellent!” 
“Then I am your man.” 
“I was sure that I might rely on you.”271 
Holmes and Watson go on to incite a riot and attempt an arson in a failed effort to steal 
a photograph. 
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Wandering Loyalty, Doctor–Patient Confidentiality, and Harms to Third Parties 
Turning from fictional doctors to real ones, doctor–patient confidentiality is one of the 
most common contexts in which a physician’s loyalty can wander away from the physician’s 
other virtues. For the most part, it is uncontroversially the case that physicians ought to keep 
their patients’ confidences, whether or not keeping those confidences promotes the patients’ 
health. This obligation to keep patients’ confidences is one of the most conspicuous norms to 
which a physician’s virtue of loyalty responds. But keeping patients’ confidences is more 
controversial when patients’ confidences can lead to harms to other persons. Since the California 
Supreme Court’s rulings in Tarasoff,272 almost all U.S. states have clarified or formalized a legal 
duty on the part of psychotherapists to warn and/or protect affected third parties of plausible 
threats of violence against them made by psychotherapy patients.273 Governmental insistence on 
psychotherapists’ duty to warn was not met with universal enthusiasm on the part of therapists, 
but it has subsequently become part of the acknowledged legal landscape of psychotherapy.274 
Since the spread of HIV/AIDS, medical ethicists have debated whether clinicians have a 
parallel duty to warn or protect the sexual partners of their HIV-positive patients about the 
patients’ HIV status when the patients will not disclose their HIV status directly. (This is separate 
from reporting the incidence of infection to public health departments, which is usually done 
with little controversy.)275 In a typical case presentation, a clinician learns that a patient who is 
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HIV-positive or is likely to become so does not want his status — and it is usually “his” status276 
— disclosed to a significant other who is unaware of the activities that led the patient to contract 
HIV. The clinician’s first step is always to seek to persuade the patient to cooperate with efforts 
to protect those whom the patient may expose, or may already have exposed, to HIV; this might 
take the form of direct disclosure by the patient or more oblique efforts to caution the patient’s 
sexual partners without necessarily revealing the identity of the patient.277 But should these 
efforts at persuasion fail, the clinician is faced with a dilemma: ought the clinician disclose the 
patient’s HIV-positive status to the significant other, violating the patient’s confidence? Or ought 
the clinician keep the patient’s confidence, perhaps leading to preventible harms to the patient’s 
significant other? Consequentialist and principle-based arguments can be made in favor of both 
positions. In favor of disclosure, the clinician has duties to public health and would of course 
prefer to avoid the adverse effects of HIV infection for the patient’s significant other. In favor of 
keeping the patient’s confidence, the clinician has duties to the patient, including keeping the 
patient’s confidences; a policy of disclosure, if made known to patients, would likely discourage 
them from seeking treatment for their infection and more generally discourage the candor that 
facilitates effective medical care.278 
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Introducing virtues into this mix will not resolve the dilemma, but recognizing the role 
played by the virtue of loyalty (and its characteristic wandering) will at least offer a more 
charitable approach to clinicians’ and ethicists’ ambivalence about disclosing a patient’s HIV-
positive status over the patient’s objections. There are unflattering explanations available. 
Donald Ainslie argues that medical ethicists and aligned clinicians unreflectively applied 
Tarasoff to sexually-active, HIV-positive patients without sufficiently considering whether the 
sexual partners of HIV-positive patients might not already be aware of the risk in a general sense. 
This insufficient consideration was born, Ainslie argues, of medical ethics’ dissociation from, and 
indifference to, the experience and priorities of patients. Ainslie does not make the point so 
sharply, but in contrasting professional commitments with commitments to patients, Ainslie’s 
complaint against the duty to warn might be framed in terms of a lack of loyalty to patients.279 
Conversely, other clinicians favor legal protections for disclosure over patient objections. Samuel 
Knapp and Leon VandeCreek, while hopeful that such instances will rarely arise, want clinicians 
to have options when they encounter patients who “continue to engage in high-risk behaviors 
with unsuspecting, identifiable partners.”280 Knapp and VandeCreek identify the lingering 
concern that nags at many clinicians caring for troubled patients: there may be some patients 
who, despite clinicians’ best efforts, seemingly do not deserve the same loyalty that is extended 
to most patients. 
Treating loyalty as a genuine virtue, but one prone to wander, can allow us to chart a 
middle path. Loyalty to one’s patients is absolutely essential, as Ainslie implies (and almost all 
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clinicians would agree), but the trouble with loyalty is that it will have a difficult time recognizing 
when it is loyal “enough,” even as it encourages neglect of the virtues that might weigh against 
loyally keeping patient confidences, such as sympathy and beneficence for third parties. Loyalty 
to one’s patients always risks neglect of the other virtues constitutive of a good clinician and a 
good person, but this does not mean that loyalty is any less a virtue. At the same time, recalling 
that loyalty is a virtue, rather than a set of duties to one’s patient or a set of desirable outcomes, 
to some extent softens the sharp dichotomy implied in balancing the duties and consequences 
of keeping confidences versus disclosing them. A clinician who reluctantly acts on a patient’s 
confidences contrary to that patient’s wishes may still be loyal, even if the norms that bound the 
patient and clinician together in a therapeutic relationship were not the dispositive ones. This 
has long been true of the duties derived from Tarasoff. Imagine a psychiatrist, Dr. Preston, who 
has done everything in his power — psychotherapeutically and pharmaceutically — to moderate 
the severe behavioral dysregulation of his patient, Mr. Flowers. Despite Dr. Preston’s efforts and 
Mr. Flowers’s reported interest in changing his behavior, Mr. Flowers remains prone to physical 
violence, which has so far been limited to brawling on slight provocation. But Dr. Preston 
becomes concerned when Mr. Flowers discloses his strong and apparently thoroughly 
considered intention to severely beat an irritating but otherwise harmless man in Mr. Flowers’s 
apartment complex. Dr. Preston urges Mr. Flowers to think through more constructive 
approaches to addressing his frustration, but Mr. Flowers perseveres in his intention to harm his 
antagonist. Dr. Preston could probably make the case to himself that Mr. Flowers is exaggerating, 
given that Mr. Flowers has only previously fought with people who were willing to fight him. And 
Dr. Preston is loathe to endanger the hard-won therapeutic relationship he has with Mr. Flowers. 
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But Dr. Preston is also concerned about the specificity of Mr. Flowers’s plans and the apparent 
defenseless of the prospective victim. When Dr. Preston warns the prospective victim, he will be 
breeching Mr. Flowers’s confidence. But Dr. Preston will hardly be ignoring the deliverances of 
the virtue of loyalty. That Dr. Preston is torn at all is evidence that he is highly responsive to his 
sense of loyalty to his patient and to the therapeutic relationship. It is not that Dr. Preston is 
disloyal: it is that Dr. Preston is other things also, benevolent among them. Those exceptionally 
rare patients with communicable, incurable, life-altering diseases who explicitly disregard the 
safety and health of those around them may similarly find that even very loyal clinicians feel they 
must, despite their loyalty, act in response to other virtues. 
Wandering Loyalty, Transplant Programs, and Transplant Patients 
Clinicians in U.S. solid organ transplant programs face a potential dilemma in managing 
the patients who come to them with progressive organ failure. On the one hand, clinicians have 
responsibilities to the patients in front of them, including (perhaps most conspicuously) 
promoting those patients’ health. In many cases of end-stage organ failure, transplantation is 
among the most clinically- and cost-effective interventions.281 It would seem that clinicians best 
serve many of their end-stage organ failure patients by working to maximize those patients’ 
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likelihood of receiving a transplantable organ. On the other hand, American transplant clinicians 
are expected to cooperate in distributing available solid organs so that the patients throughout 
the nation whose need for transplant is most urgent, and whose likelihood of success with 
transplant is greatest, receive transplantable organs first.282 The plethora of government and 
non-government agencies that monitor transplantation in the U.S. are not oblivious to the 
potential for conflict between physicians’ aspirations to secure organs for their own patients and 
the needs of the transplant community as a whole. Programs are required to comply with myriad 
regulations and to report data on their patients’ outcomes in a timely manner. Governmental 
interest in outcomes is hardly academic. A transplant program’s eligibility for Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursement can be affected by the program’s ability to produce outcomes that 
meet or exceed national expectations; many private insurers utilize the same data to make 
decisions about which transplant centers their plans’ coverage will include.283 Thus clinicians’ 
pursuit of their patients’ welfare would seem to favor listing and transplanting even high-risk 
patients, while clinicians’ responsibilities to their own transplant programs (and transplant 
medicine across the nation) will militate against listing and transplanting high-risk patients. 
It would be easy enough to analyze clinicians’ potentially conflicting obligations to their 
patients and to their programs in terms of divided or competing loyalties. However, this facile 
line of analysis would hardly do justice to a complex situation. Poor outcomes are often a good 
                                                            
282 The specific distribution policies regulating transplantable organs often include considerations beyond need 
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Don’t Know Can Hurt Your Program,” Progress in Transplantation 17, no. 2 (June 2007): 129–35; Lisa B. VanWagner 
and Anton I. Skaro, “Program-Specific Reports: Implications and Impact on Program Behavior,” Current Opinion in 
Organ Transplantation 18, no. 2 (April 2013): 210–15. 
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proxy for poor practices more generally. Through 2009, all transplant centers cited for poor 
outcomes by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (a government office and one of 
the most influential regulatory bodies in transplantation) were also cited for tangible 
shortcomings in care, including patient selection, the adequacy of the informed consent process 
ahead of transplant, and patient care.284 The burden on the patient associated with receiving a 
transplant is less explicit in the context of transplant medicine, but is no less important for this. 
Transplant commits the patient an intensive-care hospitalization that can vary in length and 
may readily stretch to months. Transplant also commits the patient to a lifetime of anti-rejection 
medications and a high likelihood of side-effects ranging in severity from the merely irritating to 
the life-changing. Intermittent complications from transplant, some requiring hospitalization, 
are likely. And though transplant is the recommended intervention for many instances of end-
stage organ failure, transplant nevertheless is not a plain or simple “cure” for end-stage organ 
failure. Rather, most forms of solid organ transplant, even when they go to plan, can be expected 
to provide a number of years of extended life, with median survival after a successful transplant 
ranging from over a decade after receiving a donor kidney down to eight years after receiving 
donor lungs.285 Much worse scenarios are by no means remote: a percentage (ranging from less 
                                                            
284 Thomas E. Hamilton, “Accountability in Health Care — Transplant Community Offers Leadership,” American 
Journal of Transplantation 9, no. 6 (June 2009): 1289-1290. 
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than 5% with kidney transplant and up to 12% with lung transplant)286 will die within the first 
year of receiving a transplant, commonly spending much of that time hospitalized. Regulatory 
pressure to produce good outcomes and thereby to make the best use of the limited number of 
organs available for transplant is often to the benefit of patients themselves: programs have 
strong incentives to provide excellent patient care and diminish the likelihood of bad outcomes 
and also to avoid transplanting patients who are unlikely to benefit from it, even when death 
from organ failure within a year is the probable alternative to transplant. When doing one’s part 
to advance the interests of one’s transplant program and doing one’s part to promote the well-
being of one’s patients reliably coincide, there is not unavoidable (let alone necessary) conflict 
between a transplant clinician’s loyalty to her/his patients and her/his loyalty to the transplant 
program of which he/she is a part. 
Loyalty’s troubles in the context of the allocation of transplantable organs does not stem 
from direct, necessary, or inevitable conflicts between clinicians’ loyalties to different parties, 
but rather from loyalty’s encouragement of neglect of other virtues, especially the virtue of 
justice. Jesse Schold and his colleagues have identified several trends in U.S. kidney 
transplantation over the course of the last decade, during which time the federal government 
has increased scrutiny of transplant programs across the country. Schold et al. have found that 
kidney transplant centers under scrutiny from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
self-report that they are more cautious about patient selection than they were before scrutiny.287 
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Schold et al. have also found that when a kidney transplant center is dinged with a low-
performance evaluation by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, those under-
performing transplant centers are statistically more likely to remove patients from their waiting 
lists than are transplant centers performing at or above expectations.288 Schold and his 
colleagues have quantified, in the context of kidney transplant, a tendency familiar across 
transplant medicine as a whole: to become more conservative in response to concerns about 
flagging patient outcomes at the program, both out of concern for the success of the program 
and for the well-being of the patients it serves. 
But Schold et al. have also found that, independent of all routinely-collected clinical and 
social data, patients who live in high-risk communities — communities in which comorbidities 
are more common and in which socioeconomic status and healthcare access are lower — are 
prone to notably worse outcomes both while awaiting transplant and after receiving one. 
Patients residing in high-risk communities are 20% more likely than those in low-risk 
communities to die while on the waiting list for a kidney and 30% more likely to be removed from 
the waiting list because they have become too sick to transplant or for “other,” nebulously-
defined reasons. When they remained on the waiting list for a kidney, patients from high-risk 
communities are significantly more likely to be listed for “expanded criteria donor” (ECD) 
kidneys, kidneys that are viable for transplant but that are, for various reasons related to the 
donor’s health, less likely to succeed as grafts than are preferable, non-ECD kidneys.289 Here, too, 
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Schold et al. have quantified in kidney transplant something that is anecdotally common 
throughout transplant medicine: even independent of the clinical indicators that largely drive 
formal transplant evaluation, social risk factors can overwhelm a transplant candidacy. These 
social risk factors, in turn, tend to be concentrated in certain communities. 
Transplant clinicians with the virtue of loyalty can be loyal to their particular patients’ 
well-being, to their transplant programs, and (by extension) to those patients’ and programs’ 
successes within a regulatory environment that emphasizes outcomes above all else. But 
clinicians’ frequently simultaneous loyalty to their patients and to their transplant programs has 
unfortunate effects on those clinicians’ exercise of the virtue of justice. For clarity’s sake, it is 
important to distinguish the virtue of justice from principles of justice and from just outcomes. 
The virtue of justice, as I conceive it, is dispositional or habitual responsiveness and initiative 
with regard to norms of fairness. The norms of fairness include just principles by which to 
organize society or political life, or fair outcomes for all affected by a decision. But the norms of 
fairness also include the sense of fairness that we value in everyday life, such as fair play in sport 
or in how one treats one’s children. It is this virtue of justice, habitual responsiveness and 
initiative with regard to norms of fairness, of which loyalty to transplant patients and to 
transplant programs encourages neglect. Clinicians are tasked with helping to distribute 
transplantable organs on the basis of need and likelihood of therapeutic success, but in order to 
do this, clinicians bracket the norms of fairness. Clinicians must, if they are to be loyal to the 
patient before them and loyal to their programs, set aside questions of whether it is fair that the 
particular patient in front of them should be such a poor candidate for transplant: why he has no 
family in this part of the country, why he has so little money, why he has had a poor diet, why he 
 
196 
has struggled to adhere to recommended therapies for his progressive organ failure in the past. 
The facts are these: the patient needs family caregivers, but has none; he needs more money than 
he can raise; he eats unhealthily and seemingly cannot improve his diet; he must adhere to 
therapy if the transplant is to succeed, and has never adhered to medical therapy before. The 
patient simply is a poor transplant candidate. The most beneficial thing for the patient is not to 
cut him open and put an organ in him, when, given his situation, he will probably sicken and die 
anyway, with only an extra surgery and hospitalization to show for his troubles. The best thing 
for the program’s outcome data is not to put an organ in a patient against whom the deck is 
already stacked. But there is something disquieting and suspect about a genuinely benevolent, 
thoroughgoing loyalty to patients and their well-being when that loyalty yields better clinical 
outcomes for those patients with more money and more stable home environments. 
The source of discomfort is not that loyalty to the patient and loyalty to the program do 
not align. Neither is it that loyalty to the patient and loyalty to the program conflict outright with 
the patient’s medical interests. It is that loyalty to both patient and program serves to make 
fairness medically irrelevant, when morally justice is anything but. The neglected norms of 
justice are numerous in a system that will gladly recover organs from anyone who can sign the 
back of a driver’s license, but that prefers only to distribute those organs to patients with a stable 
family and the ability to pay. 
Telling transplant clinicians to be more perfectly loyal or more thoroughly beneficent will 
not supply an appropriate resolution. The problem is not that transplant clinicians are disloyal 
(or insufficiently loyal) to anyone: clinicians carefully attend to the needs of both their patients 
and the broader U.S. transplant medicine community. And in so doing, transplant clinicians 
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manage to be tremendously beneficent as well: transplantation has gone in fifty years from an 
extremely dangerous intervention offering marginal survival benefit to a intervention that 
prolongs the lives of thousands of Americans each year. Clinicians are striving to maximize the 
clinical benefits of transplantation, as we would hope they would do with the scant 
transplantable organs available. It would be a needless risk to transplant a patient at high risk of 
graft failure and death within a year — whatever the root cause of that high risk — when a 
different, lower-risk patient might receive the same organ and live for a decade. Clinicians’ 
loyalty almost has to quiet norms of fairness if they are to be loyal to their patients, to their 
programs, and to transplant medicine. This may fail the virtue of justice, but as a failure of 
character it is comparatively small. The much larger failure, it seems to me, is that in 
contemporary U.S. society, there is a good chance that a physician will be the first stranger to be 
genuinely loyal to the health and well-being of her/his most unfortunate patients. Addressing 
the inequalities in American transplant medicine, and in American healthcare more generally, 
will require a far broader base of concerned commitment. 
Chapter Conclusion 
The ways in which the virtue of loyalty can wander in clinical medicine show how 
implausible it is to hope that loyalty’s problems will be solved by requiring that genuine loyalty 
be directed at an object of which we would collectively approve. We want our physicians to keep 
our confidences, and physicians must do so if they are to adequately address the often-sensitive 
health needs of their patients. Transplant medicine does a tremendous amount of good for 
numerous end-stage organ failure patients, but loyalty to patients and to transplant programs 
may wander all the same. This is not because the objects of physicians’ virtue of loyalty are not 
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good: it is because those objects are not perfect. The virtue of loyalty — the habit by which we 
respond to and generate the norms of participation and inclusion in causes and relationships — 
takes the good with the bad. So far as the objects of our loyalty are mixed in character, so far will 
the virtue of loyalty wander. And perfect objects for loyalty are in short supply, especially in 
clinical medicine.
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CONCLUSION: UNSAFE VIRTUES IN AN UNSAFE WORLD 
In his 1872 book The Martyrdom of Man — a “universal history” condensed into fewer 
than six hundred pages — the atheist utopian Winwood Reade spoke for many of his Victorian 
contemporaries when he wrote, 
By means of his inventions and discoveries, by means of the arts and trades, and by means of the industry 
resulting from them, [Man] has raised himself from the condition of a serf to the condition of a lord. His 
triumph, indeed, is incomplete; his kingdom is not yet come. The Prince of Darkness is still triumphant in 
many regions of the world; epidemics still rage, death is yet victorious. But the God of light, the Spirit of 
Knowledge, the Divine Intellect, is gradually spreading over the planet and upwards to the skies. The 
beautiful legend will yet come true; […] Virtue will descend from heaven, surrounded by her angels, and 
reign over the hearts of men. Earth, which is now a purgatory, will be made a paradise, not by idle prayers 
and supplications, but by the efforts of man himself[.]290 
The twentieth century disabused many utopians of their belief in the possibility, let alone 
the inevitability, of human perfection.291 But the image of virtue in heaven persists, even among 
some who, like Reade, deny (or are agnostic about) the reality of an extra-terrestrial heaven. Both 
the doctrine of eudaimonism and the doctrine of the unity of the virtues allow that we humans 
may still sometimes go wrong in living out the virtues, but this error will always be a function of 
our weakness or our ignorance: we may be deficient in our application of the virtues, but the 
virtues themselves remain blameless and pure, like the angels who surround it. Yet innocence 
and purity are not coextensive with goodness. It is uncontroversially the role of the virtues to 
make us better, rather than worse, to make us more responsive and generative of the norms in 
their field of concern, and the wandering virtues fulfill this role. With modesty, we handle our 
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abilities, accomplishments, and failures better; with patience, we respond better to our own 
suffering; and with loyalty, we are better members of the communities and better contributors 
to the causes that help make us who we are. The wandering virtues make us better, but they do 
not assure us of our innocence or protect our moral purity. In fact, the wandering virtues imperil 
both: by their very nature, wandering virtues encourage us to neglect other virtues and lack the 
references to coordinate vices or to other persons that would help us recognize the dangers we 
are running. 
Trade-offs between risk and benefit are familiar in clinical medicine, but they are 
something that theories of virtue have preferred to avoid. Virtue ethics seem often to provide 
assurances that the good we do and the character we build will travel together toward 
something, and the natural end point for this journey of goodness and character has seemed to 
be moral perfection. If we are to arrive at such a perfect destination, the reasoning seems to go, 
we need our guides, the virtues, to be perfect, too. Thus we find Reade and, in less rhapsodic 
prose, eudaimonists and defenders of the unity of the virtues locating us humans in moral 
purgatory and the virtues in heaven above. Dispositions and habits that fail to conform to the 
angelic standard this establishes for true virtue are consigned to the limbo of neglect or 
condemned, as vices, to moral perdition. 
Virtues have a dual character, however, of which the end of moral improvement is only 
one aspect. The virtues direct us to be better than we are, to be sure, but the virtues are, at the 
same time, our dispositions and habits in living our moral lives: wherever they would direct us, 
the virtues must meet us where we are. Clinical medicine offers stark reminders of facets of 
human life we might prefer to ignore and that we certainly prefer to avoid. Human health is 
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tenuous at best, and even low-risk procedures and common medications carry long lists of 
potentially serious side effects and complications. Assurances of success, such as those 
eudaimonism and the unity of the virtues proffer to theories of virtue, are in short supply in 
clinical medicine. Even when physicians and patients have clear ideas of where they would like 
to end up — a return to health, or, when that is impossible, the mitigation of suffering — they are 
sometimes at a loss for how to get there. It seems to me that tenuousness and uncertainty 
characterize not only clinical medicine, but perhaps more of life than we are comfortable 
admitting. 
By the time they enter the wilderness in the fifteenth chapter of Exodus, the Israelites 
have been assured that they will be delivered out of bondage in Egypt to the land promised to 
Abraham. The Israelites have witnessed God’s incredible power in the form of diverse plagues 
and miracles, so the Israelites would seem to be soundly assured of reaching their goal. But as 
soon as they start roaming the barren wilderness, an odd thing happens: the Israelites get thirsty 
and hungry. Protesting against their impertinence all the while, the Lord supplies water and 
manna. It turns out that even those with an unimpeachable guide to a glorious destination still 
have basic needs that are no less pressing for being so thoroughly mundane. 
Our virtues cannot all be concerned with directing us toward a distant moral perfection: 
we also need virtues that help us wander the sometimes bewildering, often precarious terrain 
directly ahead of us. Our modesty helps us to avoid overreach and to ameliorate failure; our 
patience helps us when we suffer; our loyalty helps us find and remain with fellow-travelers. Each 
of these virtues would be dispensable in a morally perfect world: it would be more perfect to have 
exact knowledge of one’s abilities and limits than to be modest, it would be more perfect never 
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to suffer than to suffer with patience, and it would be more perfect for all of our communal 
actions to be based on impeccably reasoned commitments than on sometimes unreasoning 
loyalty to a cause or group. But this is not a perfect world, and modesty, patience, and loyalty are 
virtues fitted to humans who must navigate the world we have. These virtues, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, share a few imperfections with their native environment. They are no less 
virtuous for it.
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